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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
New England Puritanism, as a derivative of Calvin
ism, was not by nature optimistic, but pessimistic.

The

promises of Christianity belonged only to the elect, or
to a small portion of mankind, chosen by God prior t o .the
creation of the world.

Puritans viewed life on earth as

merely a trial, after which those worthy ones would enter
into the Kingdom of God.

The majority of mankind, however,

corrupted by original sin and outside God's benefices,
were damned to eternal perdition.

God predetermined elec

tion and damnation absolutely, without regard to man's
earthly activity, as the guilt of original sin tainted the
elect and the damned equally.

This pessimistic theological

view developed within the scholastic conception of man and
the universe.

God, the absolute sovereign, actively par

ticipated in the daily workings of the universe} He con
trolled and moved the heavens, and ordered all events upon
the earth.

Man's trial was only one part of this divine

plan, not for the glorification of man, but of God.

This

view clouded man and nature in the same pessimistic morass.

1
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By 1760, changes within the New England Puritan
order created a new role for man in God's scheme, and
posited a more optimistic religion.

Signlficantly, man

no longer viewed himself only as a passive agent; he now
accepted an active role in the determination of his future
state, and was unwilling to leave that decision totally in
the hands of God,

Optimistic Puritanism, like traditional

Puritanism, rejected man's free will, hut instead modified
God's control over man.

The demands that God judge man

reasonably tempered the absolute sovereignty of God and
increased man's own function.

Other fundamental Puritan

tenets required similar re-interpretation for this changed
attitude to occur.

Joseph Bellamy, as well as other New

Divinity leaders^-, described the presence of sin in the
world as a blessing, or a benefit, creating greater good
for man, and not merely his damnation.

In this interpre

tation, the nature of sin had not changed, it was still as
hateful to God; however, through sin, God displayed His
divine purposes in the best possible means and elevated
the general level of holiness and happiness in the world.
Further, election, released from dependence upon predesti-

^•The New Divinity clergymen consisted of students
and followers of Jonathan Edwards. JThese enli/ghtened di
vines were to dominate New England^'the c/logy in the last
half of the eighteenth century.
They occupied the majority
of the Puritan pulpits, and in 1795 assumed leadership over
Yale College.
Infra. p. 175.
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nation, became less restrictive, encompassing "all men"
through a general redemptive call.

Taken together, these

changes within the doctrines of the sovereignty of God,
original sin, and the redemption of Christ moderated the
negative nature of Puritanism without severing connection
with the Calvinist tradition.
These changes in New England theology were not uni
que , but were part of a general response to the influences
of the Enlightenment.

Primarily a secular movement invol

ving a revolution in science and psychology, the prevalent
attitude of the eighteenth century emphasized m a n ’s reason
and confidence in his ability to comprehend the workings
of nature.

In response to this new intellectual mood,

Puritanism underwent profound redefinition in order to
become compatible with the age.

New England Puritanism,

more conservative than other Puritan religious bodies, re
sisted this redefinition, but following the Great Awaken
ing duplicated those changes that had occurred in England
and in other Calvinist countries.

Optimism, as a pervading

religious attitude, developed from this redefinition of
Puritan principles upon a firm reasonable basis.
In 1689, John Locke wrote An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding, describing a reasonable theory of the nature
of knowledge, that, like Newtonian physics, was based upon
inductive or empirical proof.2

Post-Reformation scholas

ticism taught that m a n ’s knowledge expanded by deductive,
or syllogistic reasoning, which demanded that man held
universal statements innately.

Locke denied that man

could have innate knowledge, because in the process of
-learning, one did not discover that which he already
knew.

Man derived all knowledge through observation and

experience.^

As innate knowledge was not possible, there

could be no innate laws or universal statements, imprinted
upon man's original nature.

Locke stated that these laws

were natural, merely hidden from man's understanding be
cause of his original ignorance.^

Even the idea of God,

the most natural discovery that man m a d e , was not an in
nate idea, but one uncovered by human reason.
We have an intuitive knowledge of our exis
tence and a demonstrative knowledge of God;
of the existence of anything else, we have
no other but a sensative knowledge, which
extends not beyond our senses.5
Thus, Locke described a unity in man's acquisition of know
ledge that rejected the scholastic separation of modes and
faculties.

Reason, imagination, will, and emotion were

\

^John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understand
ing (New York; E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1961), in two
volumes.
Lockjp wrote the )Essay in 1689# but all copies of
the first edition were datfed 1690.
3ibid.. I, p. 77.
5lbid.. II, pp. 157-158.

4 Ibld.. I, p. 35.

not separate processes of the mind, but conformed to the
same process of inductive reasoning.

With all knowledge

accessible through sensation, Locke removed the mysteries
that had surrounded man's comprehension of nature and ac
cented the role of human experience and the dignity of the
mind and senses.
In 1695» John Locke directly attacked the tradition
ov the English Church in The Reasonableness of Christian
ity, utilizing this change in epistemology.

Locke pleaded

for toleration for the dissenters, or Non-Conformists, that
the Act of Uniformity in 1662 had denied them.^

He searched

the scriptures and found that Christ had reduced the com
mandments of the church to but one article of faith.

He

commanded men only to believe in Him as the Messiah.
This was all the doctrine they /the scrip
tures/ proposed to be believed? for what
they taught, as well as our Savior contained
a great deal more? but that concerned prac
tice and not belief.7

^The Act of Uniformity revised the English Book of
Common Prayer, required episcopal ordination (excluded Puri
tan "presbyterian" ordination) and reserved the celebration
and administration of the Lord's Supper only to those so
ordained.
The Act, a reaction to Cromwell's Puritan rule
of England, was a part of the restoration of the Stuart
monarchy.
The clergy were forced to subscribe explicitly
to the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England? those
who refused were "dissenters" or "Non-Conformists." Norman
Sykes, From Sheldon to Seeker, Aspects of English Church
H i s t o r y (Cambridge, England? At the University Press. 1959),
pp. 5 , and p. 6 9 .
7john Locke, The Works of John Locke, vol. VI I 1 The

6
Locke argued that men had exceeded the biblical demands byrestricting church membership, and hence entrance into the
Kingdom of God.

The Bible required simply belief in Jesus

Christ as the Son of God.
Following the Newtonian revolution in science, men
began to argue the merits of natural religion over reve
lation, or whether man can best understand God through His
worksj i. e., the universe and natural law, or through His
word in the scriptures.

In scholasticism, no disparity

existed, but with the new science verifying a mechanistic
cosmos, some theologians favored proofs demonstrable by
natural law and reason rather than biblical ones.

Locke

rejected any difference between natural and revealed reli
gion, as both were reasonable and could not conflict.

In

a like manner, he argued that the doctrinal differences be
tween Conformists and Non-Conformists were traditional,
rather than' fundamental.

He denied that tradition could

establish any essential doctrine of the church.

’’Nobody

can.add to these fundamental articles of faith; nor make
any other necessary, but what God Himself hath made, and
declared to be s o ."8

Locke urged the elimination of all

Reasonableness of Christianity (Aachen, Germany, Scientia
Verlag, 1963), p. 51.
8Ibid., p. 115.
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church dogma that was not strictly scriptural; -the real
ization of this simple faith, he felt, would end all doc
trinal controversy and intolerance.

Man's senses could

judge the fundamental nature of these articles of faith in
the same manner that his senses revealed natural law.
Locke's writings lent support to a loosely organ
ized group of divines within the Church of England, known
as Latitudinarians.

Both Locke and these "liberal” theo

logians opposed enthusiasm and blind traditionalism, and
sought, by eliminating doctrinal questions,

"to preserve

Christianity while adjusting it to the rational /reasonable/,
scientific temper."9
The firstfruit of Locke for most people was
not the scepticism latent in his eplstemology;
It was his own faith in a rational /reasonable/7
religion, his commonsense revolt against the
'mysteries' accompanied, however, by his belief
that Christianity could be both simple and
clear.10
Latltudinarian liberalism appeared in England as early as
1650, influenced by the Dutch Remonstrants ( A r m i n l a n s ,

^Roland N. Stromberg, Religious Liberalism in Eigh
teenth Century England (London, England;
Oxford University
Press, 1954), p. 20,
10Ibld.. p. 18.
HArminians followed the teachings of Jacobus Arminius who was condemned at the Synod of Dort in 1618.
They
contradicted traditional Calvinist positions by denying pre
destination and by teaching free will acting in concert with
free grace.
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but at the end. of the century, one feature seemed to dom
inate their demands j

a plea for toleration for the dis

senters, or broad based membership of the church.

The

opposition to such a move by the Puritan element of the
church was a matter of course.

Any move to broaden church

membership led to further corruption of the Visible Church,
through the influx of the baser, more impure elements of
society.

Toleration was antithetical to Puritan principles,

as the Visible Church must approximate the Invisible
Church (the elect Kingdom of God) as closely as possible.
The Puritans who came to America in the l620's and l630's
left England because they abhorred toleration.

They sought

to establish the perfect Christian community, the community
of the elect, and through this experience, purify the
1P

church. &
Latitudlnarians made no such restrictions regarding
church membership? they considered all who confessed adher
ence to the Apostle's Creed as full members.*3

Their pre

ference for the Apostle's Creed indicated a desire to ac
commodate both Puritans and liberals within the framework

Yorki

l^Perry Miller, Errand into the W 1lderness (New
Harper Torchbooks, 195&). PP. ^-5.

^ N o r m a n Sykes, Church and State in England in the
XVIII Century (Hamden, Connecticut« Archon Books, 1^62 )",
p. 2 2 , and p. 2 5 7 .
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of the English Church.

The Act of Uniformity, in the Se

cond Prayer Book, had replaced the Apostle's Creed with
the Athanasian one.l^

These men of Latitude favored the

former primarily because it offered a much simpler state
ment of doctrine than did the one incorrectly attributed
to St. Athanasius.

In their attempts to make theology

reasonable, they generally followed Locke by reducing
church doctrine to essentials, in order to minimize' con
flicts which tended toward heresy.
Their attempt to simplify the foundation of the
church and .thereby to give it a broader base and greater
unity had the opposite effect.

The Athanasian Creed pos

tulated a triune God with no part superior, while the
Apostle's Creed indicated that Christ's position in the
trinity was subservient to that of the Father.

Instead of

drawing dissenting factions back within the Church of Eng
land, the emphasis upon the Apostle's Creed rekindled the
Arian heresy that the Council of Constantinople had set
tled in 381.

Instead of quieting doctrinal questions, the

l^James Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and
Ethics (New York*
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), vol. 4,
p. 242,
The Athanasian Creed, falsely attributed to St.
Athanasius, Bishop of Alexandria (c. 375)» was formulated
in the fourth century to oppose the Arian heresy that had
originated in the Eastern Church.
The other Christian creeds
are the Nicene and the Apostle's? the Roman Catholic adhered
to the former and Protestant Churches generally adhered to
the latter, because of its simple doctrine and connection
with the early church.
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Latitudinarlans opened further conflicts, and threw English
theology into turmoil throughout the first half of the
eighteenth century.
Latltudinarianism did not move into heretical posi
tions unknowingly.

John Tillotson, Edward Stillingfleet,

and Simon Patrick— typical leaders of these Latitudinarlans
in the eighteenth century— corresponded with the Dutch
Remonstrant, Philip van Limborch, ^--5

Ralph Cudworth, a

Cambridge Platonist, wrote Limborch in 1674- that the English
Church,
just as in Noah's ark were all sorts of ani
mals, are all kinds of Protestantsi
Calvin
ists, Remonstrants, a n d .I believe even Socinians, all dwelling here, united with no appar
ent discord in one and the same communion.1°
The dissenting Arian movement grew out of this seventeenth
century diversity, but was more directly a result of the
Latitudinarlan preference for the Apostle's creed.

The

1^Philip van Limborch, a leading Arminian theologian,
held a professorship at the Remonstrant college at Amsterdam
from 1668 until his death in 1712,
His most important works
included A Compleat System or Body of Divinity (1686) and
A History of the Inquisition (1692).
Samuel Macauley Jack
son, editor, The Schraff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious
Knowledge (Grand Rapids, Michigan:
Baker Book House, 1959)*
vol. 6 , p. 490.
Norman Sykes states that the Dutch Arminians and the Cambridge Platonists shared similar aims and
a vigorous correspondence from 1667 to 1687.
Sykes, From
Sheldon to Seeker, pp. 142-143.
l^Sykes, From Sheldon to Seeker, p. 146. Sykes
states that "the line dividing the Cambridge Platonists and
their Latitudinarlan successors is devious and difficult
to draw.
Their relationship indeed was one of filiation."
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actual heresy originated with Dr. Samuel Clarke's ScrlptureDoctrlne of the Trinity, published in 1712.

Clarke, obvi

ously Influenced by John Locke, demonstrated the necessity
of Christian principles conforming with reason.^-?

Clarke

did not deny the divinity of Christ, but felt that both
the scriptures and common sense taught that the Son was
subordinate to the Father.

He demonstrated the contrariety

of the trinity expressed in the Athanasian Creed to that
in the Bible.

Clarke's chief opponent, Daniel Waterland,

defended the orthodox position on the trinity.

Their con

troversy climaxed in 1719» at the Salter's Hall Synod,
with the split between Presbyterians and Independents over
the trinity.

Of the English dissenters, the Presbyterians,

who followed Dr. Clarke, became identified with liberty of
opinion and laxity of church doctrine.^-®
By mid-century, the division within the English
Church was greater than at the Revolutionary Settlement of
1689.

Between 1?30 and 1750, all the major doctrines of

the Christian Church came under scrutiny, resulting in the
realization that all of them were not purely scriptural.^
The Arlan controversy in England during the eighteenth

(Manchester 1

Hay Colllgan, The Arlan Movement In England
Manchester University Press, 19135 • pp. 33-3^.

1 8 I b l d . . p. 3^.
1 9 l b l d . , p. 94,
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century differed substantially from that of the fourth
century.

The promoters of Arianism intended to liberate

theology from predestination and election by reasonably
interpreting the scriptures and extending the Protestant
principle of private judgment.2®

Latitudinarianism had

challenged traditional Puritanism, and found the latter
wanting in the eighteenth century.
These changes that took place in science, psychol
ogy, and religion did effect New England theology, although
Puritanism there exhibited greater solidarity than in Eng
land.

For over a century, reliance upon the covenant or

federal theory of theology dominated New England Puritan
ism.

The covenant was the basis both of church polity and

of social theory; God covenanted individually with the re
generate person (the covenant of grace) and with the soci
etal group as a whole.

According to Perry Miller,

"God

settles the social terms with a band of men, which there
upon becomes committed, as a political entity, to a specif
ically enunciated political program,"2^-

Rigid Calvinism

had demanded absolute and predetermined election, but the
Puritan covenant system tempered this rigidity through this

2QIbld.. p. 146.
^ P e r r y Miller, The New England Mind; From Colony
to Province (Boston* Beacon PressT•1953)t p. 21.
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societal or national covenant,

Man's preparation for sal

vation, or endeavoring to perfect external behavior, could
not gain his personal salvation, but did fulfill the na
tional terms of the covenant.

Because even the elect had

no definite assurance of their future state, this inter-,
pretation gave a unity of purpose to society and impeded
the splintering into separate groups and competing inter
ests,

"All men could be called upon to prepare themselves,

and so to exert themselves toward exactly that obedience
required by the nation's covenant,"22

Preparation, oper

ating without the experience of saving grace, resulted from
human volition; man turned towards God and through this vol
untary act, obtained an awareness of his helpless and hope
less condition,23
Roland Stromberg, in discussing the widespread ac
ceptance and approval of Newtonian science stated;
By 1721 Cotton Mather of Massachusetts had
accepted the new science as Christianity's
handmaiden on behalf of what was surely the
Western world's most conservative religious
body.24
Stromberg correctly assessed the conservativism of New Eng-

22Ibld.. p, 5 6 .
23Edmund S. Morgan, Visible Saints; The History of
a Puritan Idea (New York;
New York University Press, 1963),
pp. 68-69.
2^Stromberg, Religious Liberalism, p, 22.
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land theology, but underestimated the extent that theo
logians there had adopted Lockean and Newtonian thought.
Perry Miller noted that in 1700 Cotton Mather published
Reasonable Religion, and followed with tracts entitled
Reason Satisfied and Faith Established and A Man of Rea
son; Experience Mayhew in 1720 wrote A Discourse Shewing
that God Dealeth with Men as Reasonable Creatures; and
Benjamin Coleman announced as well that God Deals with us
as Reasonable Creatures in 1723.

Further, the sermons of

Joseph Sewall, Thomas Prince, and Thomas Foxcroft "bur
geoned with similar tributes to the charm of reason."25
These principle Boston clerics had sought to incorporate
the Lockean and Newtonian emphasis upon reason within the
spirit of the church.
New England divines, while conceiving the world
order in Aristotelian terms, never completely made their
theology dependent upon scholastic science.

For the most

part, the shift to Newtonian physics created no great
change in their formal system of i d e a s . 2^

They merely

adopted the Newtonian world order, and utilized it in ex
actly the same manner to confirm their theological proposi
tions, and to defend the New England covenant system.

^^Miller, The New England Mind, p. 4-17.
26Ibid. . p. 4-39.
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Miller stated that these so-called Matherian conservatives
had learned to accept,

"willingly or unwillingly, an array

of ideas simply incompatible with their federalism."2?
For at least a quarter century, New England Puritans made
no attempt to reconcile the tension between the new science
and the rigidity of covenant theology.

New England Puritan

ism had not experienced any major conflict like the Puritan
Revolution in England.

As a consequence, rigid doctrinal

groupings had not developed,.so that the Latitudinarlan
controversy had made much less of an impact.

Not until the

Great Awakening, from 1739 to 17^5. did the church undergo
widespread schism, and allow Latitudinarlan principles to '
disrupt the New England system.
Jonathan Edwards, in the following excerpt from a
sermon that he delivered in 17^1 at New Haven, described
the spirit of the Great Awakening that had just swept
through New England.
The Spirit that is at work, takes off person's
minds from the vanities of the world, and en
gages them in a deep concern about eternal hap
piness...It awakens men's consciences, and makes
them sensible of the dreadfulness of God's anger,
and causes in them a great desire and earnest
care and endeavor to obtain his f a v o r . 28

27lbld., p, 460.
nO

Jonathan Edwards, "The Distinguishing Marks of a
Work of the Spirit of God," The Works of President Edwards.
Sereno Dwight, editor (New York!
Leavitt & Alien, 1854),
p. 5^6.
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This spirit of experiential religion emphasized, renewal,
or the regeneration of the purity of the Apostolic Church.
This spirit awakened within the sinner both the under
standing of the depth and enormity of his sin, and the
emotional beauty of God and His divine plan.

The revival

uncovered man's depravity, rather than optimistic promises
of universal salvation; yet, as Edwards noted, the spirit
of renewal awakened a general concern for salvation above
concerns of this world.

This reformation emphasized piety

and the personal relationship of man to God through the
conversion experience.

The Great Awakening signalled the

end of a long process of depersonalization of religion that
had accelerated in the early part of the eighteenth century,
and had removed the vital spirit from Christianity.^9
The reform of the Great Awakening, like all reli
gious reformations, was no simple process.

Man cannot

easily turn to a different spirit or ideal, when he is tied
to a particular institutional framework.

And the Puritan

^ E d w i n Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England
(New York: Harpers & Brothers, 1957) i P. 13. Gaustad
cites the Saybrook Platform of 1707/8, as the beginnings
of the movement away from pietism towards rigidity and for
malism.
C. C. Goen, Revivalism and Separatism in New Eng
land (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962), p. 3» describes similar declension in New England Puritanism with
the beginnings of separation between Massachusetts and Con
necticut churches dating from the Saybrook Platform.
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Church, as a social association had to operate institution
ally.

Reform can seek the simple spirituality of early

Christianity, as the New England Puritans did during the
Great Awakening, but expressing that spirituality within
an institutional framework frustrates that simple ideal.
The reformation of the Great Awakening, then, consisted of
two separate, but not necessarily antagonistic, processes.
The first related directly to the spirit of renewal, or
the individual "reform" of Christianity.

This process,.as

in the case of millenial reform, looks to an ideal spiritu
ality in the future, rather than in the past.30

The spirit

of renewal, with its emphasis upon personal piety and moral
purity, was institutionally careless, and in truth could
not be completely institutionalized.

Renewal led to the

second phase of reform, or to "re-form" the institution of
the Church to incorporate the spirit of renewal or the in
dividualized reform.

Institutionalized reform was more

traditional, and as a consequence, thwarted the full impact
of renewal.

30por discussion of the Puritan historical view,
see Wiliam C. Eamon, "Kingdom and Church in New England,
Puritan Eschatology from John Cotton to Jonathan Edwards,"
(unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Montana, 1970), pp.
4-7, and passim.
31For further discussion of "reform ideas" see Ger
hard Ladner, The Idea of Reform?
Its Impact on Christian
Thought and Action"in the Age of the Fathers (Cambridge!
Harvard University Press, 1959)'» "JeffreyBurton Russell,
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New England Puritanism, through the Great Awaken
ing, had experienced the first phase of reform prior to
17^5*

The reform after 17^+5 was institutional, concerned

less with revival, than with incorporating that spiritual
reform within a doctrinal framework.

The revivalists, es

pecially the enthusiastic lay preachers during the Awak
ening, had attacked the unconverted clergy and created di
vision within the church structure over questions of enthu
siasm and itineracy.

Exacerbation of these conflicts led

to schism, or separation within the Puritan Church by 17^2,
and led ultimately to the development of three doctrinal
groupings.32

This schism was the result of the attempt

to recapture or renew the spontaniety of pietism, or reli
gion of the heart33. the doctrinal separations that followed
were the workings of the institutionalization of that piety.
In the context of this second phase of reformation, Puritan-

A History of Medieval Christianity, Prophecy and Order (New
York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1968 ) , and Samuel H.
Miller and G. Enerst Wright, editors, Ecumenical Dialogue
at Harvard (Cambridgei Harvard University Press, 1964), pp.
330-3^3.
Each of these authors dealt with the tension in
Christianity that causes a' continual process of reformation,
either of the individual or of the institution.
Each em
ployed different terminology to describe this tension:
Ladner contrasted "renewal and reform," The Ecumenical Dia
logue , "reform and re-form" and Russell, the antagonistic
processes of "prophecy and order."
32xnfr a t p. 3 2 ,
33Gaustad, The Great Awakening in New England, p. 16.
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ism fully severed its reliance upon scholastic rationalism
in favor of the reasonable epistemology of the eighteenth
century.

The repudiation of scholasticism, along with this

reform of order, changed the relationship between God and
man, and created a new Puritanism, iiarkedly different from
that held before the Great Awakening.

CHAPTER II
THE DOCTRINES, OF GLORIOUS GRACE. UNFOLDED. DEFENDED.
AND PRACTICALLY IMPROVEDt

THE ARMINIAN

‘ CHALLENGE TO THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD
Optimistic Puritanism, a phenomena of the 1760's,
came not as a denial of Puritan principles, but was the
natural outgrowth of a reasonable religion, immersed in
eighteenth century natural law and order.

Traditionally,

Puritanism, a pessimistic creed, exhibited optimism, or
the promise of a better world, only for those whom God
had predestined to salvation, and only in life after
death.

The majority of mankind, depraved and corrupted

by original sin, deserved and received eternal damna
tion.

Essential to this pessimistic scheme was the fed

eral or covenant theology, which established a parallel
between sin's entrance into the world and man's deliver
ance from that sin.
federal heads:

God covenanted twice with mankind's

first with Adam in the covenant of works,

and second with His son Jesus Christ in the covenant of
grace.

Sin entered the world by one man, Adam, just as

salvation entered by the adherence of one man to the
moral law, Christ, or the second Adam.
20
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As Adam was the root of sin, death, and
condemnation to all his natural seed, so
Christ is the root of holiness, righteous
ness, and life to his spiritual seed.l
Traditional Puritanism depended upon the doc
trine of original sin, or the belief that all mankind
shared the sin of Adam through imputation, which made
man naturally corrupt and sinful, incapable of perform
ing good works.

Correlated to the doctrine of original

sin were the doctrines of predestination and redemption
by free grace.

Predestination required God's perfect

foreknowledge of Adam's fall prior to creation.

Conse

quently, God, through His absolute grace, chose some men
to salvation, and damned the majority of mankind, al
though the same pollution of sin tinged the elect as it
did the damned.

In this conception of God the sovereign,

the absolute ruler, no other power in the w o r l d 'limited
His judgment or will.
Doctrinally, this view had changed very little
since the early seventeenth century; however, conditions
by the mid-eighteenth century had changed drastically.
In America, the clerical leadership had avoided fundamen
tal doctrinal changes to a greater degree than in any
other Calvinist country.

New England orthodoxy institu-

^■Isacc Chandler, The Doctrines of Glorious Grace,
Unfolded, Defended, and Practically Improved (Boston; S"?
Kneeland and T. Green, 17^4), P. 9*

22
2
ted. changes, like the Half-Way Covenant and Stoddardism ,

to preserve and maintain their social control, and to in
crease membership, but these were institutional or cere
monial changes.

Voluntarism^ increased man's volition

in preparation for salvation, but retained covenant theo
logy and the sovereignty of God.

Thus New England Puri

tanism, without incorporating any vital doctrinal changes,
occupied a unique and unstable position in the eighteenth
century.

New England theologians had not harmonized cov

enant theology and the new science,* they avoided conflict
between the scholastic theological system and Lockean and
Newtonian thought because of the clerical solidarity in
New England,

No major challenge to this unity had occur

red prior to the Great Awakening in the 17^0's.

When

that disruption did occur, the English heretical ideas
infected New England and the attack upon Puritan ortho
doxy there began.
The schism in American Puritanism created by the
Great Awakening was not initially a doctrinal split, for

^The Half-Way Covenant allowed baptism for chil
dren whose parents had received baptism, but had not ex
perienced conversion.
The Synod of 1662 in Massachusetts
extended the criteria of the external covenant so that the
third generation Puritans were not excluded from the Church.
Stoddardism, begun in the Connecticut Valley by Solomon
Stoddard, extended participation in the Lord's Supper as
well.
3Supra, pp. 12-13.
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in the revival, churches separated over the spirit of re
newal and fear of an unconverted ministry, and not over
theological positions.

As early as 17^2, the midpoint in

the revival, the Boston clergy had divided into pro
revival new lights and anti-revival old lights over whether
or not the revival was the

"work of God.’,ij/ Charles Chauncy,

one of the first of the Boston clerics to oppose the re
vival, did so over questions of itineracy and ehthusiasm,
and not theology.?

In 17^2-17^3* Chauncy in Seasonable

Thoughts on the State of Religion and Jonathan Edwards in
Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival in New Eng
land clashed over the nature of the revival and of true
religion.

Chauncy claimed that an enlightened mind, and

not affections (emotions) judged truth through "reason
able solicitude," not "censoriousness, separations, itin£
erants, and frenzies."0 The revival, according to Chauncy,
was not the work of God, but in fact, the work of the

% . C. Goen, Revivalism and Separatism, pp. 3133, and 36-39.
Goen states that the concern of the clergy
over the evangelical issues exceeded that of doctrinal
differences at the onset of separation.
Immediately after
17^3 » separatist protest concentrated on the standard of
church membership.
^Clifford K. Shipton, Sibley*s Harvard Graduatest
Biographical Sketches of those who Attended Harvard College
(Bostonj
Massachusetts Historical Society, 1958)* vol. 6 ,
p.
.
^Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (New Yorki
Sloane Associates, 1 9 % ) , p. 176.

William

2k

Devil.

This debate exacerbated the differences between

pro-revival and anti-revival clergymen and led to a
wider schism.

The spirit of renewal and questions re

garding the "works of God" created the first significant
chink in New England theological solidarity.

The min

istry no longer presented a united front against doc
trinal errors? now they would have to come to grips with
religious changes that had occurred throughout the Pro
testant world..
In the period after 17^5* three doctrinal groups
emerged from the revival experience and became clearly
discernible*

radical new lights who tended towards Anti-

nomlanism, liberal old lights who tended towards Arminianism, and a middle group of pro-revivalists who avoided
either heresy and sought to re-intrepret Calvinism and
make it compatible with the new age.?

The history of New

?Goen, Revivalism and Separatism, p. 3kn. Alan
Heimert, Religion and the American Mind (Cambridge* Har
vard University Press, 196$), states "there were in sub
stance only two parties on the American religious scene
in the period after the Great Awakening.
Generally speak
ing one consisted of the opponents of the revival, and
the other of its advocates...." (p. 3.) Further, he
states that these groups represented either "reason." Or
"piety." While it is true that there could be no middle
ground over the revival experience, one either supported
or opposed it, the moderate leaders themselves felt their
median position.
Jonathan Edwards in Religious Affections
and Joseph Bellamy in True Religion Delineated saw the
religious reformation endangered by the activities of the
radical new lights as well as the opposition from the lib-
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England Puritanism from 17^5 to 1763t unveiled a reforma
tion of order, and institutional "re-forming” of the Puri
tan Church to incorporate the spirit of renewal.

Such a

reformation dealt with those questions that had been u n
important or ignored during the revival, and led ulti
mately to a redefined Puritanism.

This second phase of

the reformation had two major goalsi

to incorporate re

newal into the institutional structure of the church, and
to re-establish New England theological solidarity.

As

a consequence, clergymen turned their attention to those
questions, raised by the Enlightenment, of human liberty
and natural law, and to the English heresies.

The con

flicts that developed led to a new theology, doctrinally
tied to the earlier New England Puritanism, yet conformed
to the changing American experience at the end of the
colonial period.
Immediately following the Awakening, the differ
entiation of these groupings began.

The first to fall

out was, quite naturally, the old light liberals who
tended toward Arminianlsm,

These were primarily anti-

revivalists who opposed experiential religion, and after

eral old lights.
Thus, from the standpoint of the contin
uing reformation after 17^ 5 , three clearly discernible
doctrinal groups developed.
Two of these groups supported
the revival, and the moderate group represented a balance
between "piety" and "reason," denigrating neither.
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the schism, adopted the Latitudinarian attitudes that in
vaded New England,

Essentially, the problem after 17^5

was the same that had confronted the revivalists, as well
as those during the sixteenth century Reformationi
must I do to be saved?"

"What

However, Newtonian science and

Lockean epistemology created a new framework for its ans
wer; the elevation of human reason caused man in the
eighteenth century to doubt that the answer rested in the
sovereignty of God completely.

English Latitudinarians

had stimulated similar disturbances in the half-century
prior to the Awakening and had laid the foundation for
this attack upon Puritan orthodoxy.
In America, Arminianism had already infected the
clergy of the Church of England, especially the mission
ary wing of the church, the Society for the Propagation
of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG).

The Church of Eng

land, at the time of the English Reformation, had only
nominally accepted the doctrines of Calvinism, and in the
eighteenth century, many in the church recanted these te
nets.

Anglican Arminianism taught universal salvation,

free will acting in harmony with free grace, and had
Q

denied absolute predestination and original sin.

This

®Sir Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought .
in the Eighteenth Century (New Yorki Harcourt, Brace,
and World7 inc., 1962), a reprint of the 1876 edition in
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blatant denial of Puritan dogma indicated the denigra
tion of the workings of God and the elevation of man's
own part in the affair of salvation.

The emphasis upon

human reason and free will negated the very basis for ex
periential religion which demanded man's passivity in the
actual process of salvation? man prepared himself to re
ceive the workings of God, but this preparation did not
insure that he would be saved.

Thus, the doctrine pro

posed by these Anglicans offered a greater challenge than
the elevation of works over grace.

The emphasis of "rea

son" over "piety" challenged the whole process of revival
and religion of the heart.

Puritan resistance in the

period after the Great Awakening became more vital than
in the period preceeding it, because of the schism.

In

this second phase of the reform the Puritan clergy dis
covered that a retreat to the traditional interpretations
of the Bible was no longer an adequate response to doc
trinal attacks.
The conflict between Anglican and Puritan clergy
men predated the Awakening by at least two decades, in
tensifying after the revolt to Anglicanism by Samuel
Johnson, Timothy Cutler, and several of their Yale col-

two volumes.
Stephen provides a good survey of the Latitudinarian influences upon the Church of England.
For a
more recent monograph, see Norman Sykes, From Sheldon to
Seeker.

28
leagues in the 1720's.9

The opposition that followed the

Yale apostasy centered on church form and practice, rather
than upon doctrine.

In the specific debate between John

Beach and Jonathan Dickinson that began in the 1730's,
one can discern two separate phases.

Only in the second

phase that followed the Great Awakening and matched the
reform of order, did Beach and Dickinson include doctrlnal questions in their debate.

10

John Beach opened this

phase in 17^5 with a sermon entitled Eternal Life is
God's Free Gift.

This sermon embodied the heretical writ

ings of Daniel Whitby and Thomas Chubb, two prominent
English Latitudinarians, and threatened the workings of
the revival.

^Samuel Johnson, Samuel Johnson, President of
Kings Collegei
His Career and Writings, vol. li Auto
biography and Letters, edited by Herbert and Carol
Schneider (New Yorki
1929)» p. 13.
Jonathan Dickinson, The Vanities of Human In
stitutions in the Worship of God (New Yorkt John Peter
Zenger, 173^). and John Beach, A Vindication of the Wor
ship of God, According to the Church of England from the
Aspersions Cast upon it (New Yorki William Bradford,
1 7 3 6 " ) The Presbyterian, Jonathan Dickinson, accused the
Anglican Church of denying the Reformation and turning to
Romish practices, specifically with its liturgy which de
monstrated man's vanity in worship, (p. 8 .) The Anglican,
John Beach, responded that they placed no "religion” in
institutional ceremonies such as the liturgy, but were
merely means of placing "order” in worship, (p. 13.) The
fear of the Puritans, as expressed by Dickinson, resulted
from the apparent rejection of the sixteenth century Re
formation by the Anglicans? this natural antagonism ex
isted throughout the Colonial period.
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John Beach had. not defected from orthodoxy with
the initial group in 1722, but belonged to the second
wave of Anglican converts.

As an undergraduate at Yale

College, he came under the influence of Samuel Johnson,
his tutor, but upon graduation in the year of the apos
tasy, he remained within the Puritan fold.

Beach stayed

in close association with Johnson for nearly a decade be
fore he actually converted.

He entered the ministry at

the Congregational Church in Stratford, Connecticut,
where Johnson served as an Anglican missionary.

In 1724,

Beach moved to Newton, Connecticut, as minister of the
Congregational Church there.

His close friendship with

Johnson eventually led to conflict between Beach and his
congregation.

In 1732, convinced that he had strayed,

Beach's congregation voted his removal because of his
"defection to e p i s c o p a c y . F o l l o w i n g his dismissal,
he Journeyed to England and received Anglican ordination
and commission as a SPG missionary.

In September of that

same year, Beach returned to Newton and established an
Anglican Church there, and later another one in Redding,
;
1?
Connecticut.

1^Franklin B. Dexter, Biographical Sketches of
the Graduates of Yale with Annals of the College History
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, lHbjjj, p. 24-0.

11Ibld., p. 240.
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In 17*1-5, before the congregation in Newton, Beach
preached Eternal Life is God's Free Gift, using as his
text Romans 6 i 2 3 # ^

He asserted the concert of free will

and free grace, a position that Puritanism traditionally
denied._ Beach argued that in fact there was no contradictiom

man's salvation "began, continued, and ended
1 Ll

by the infinite mercy and free grace of God."A

There

fore, without grace, man could not effect his own salva
tion through good works, and the action of his will.
Beach merely expanded God's free grace, so that it was
not confined to an elect number of saints, but "compre
hends the race of Adam. "^-5

The crux of this scheme of

salvation hinged upon conditional grace and not absolute
grace.

Damnation occurred not from a lack of grace, but

the failure of man to improve the grace that God gave,
"...everyone of us Christians belong to the election of
God's free grace? yet notwithstanding, we shall perish,
if we d o n ’t walk worthy of God's electing’ love."1^

Also,

13 "For the wages of sin is death; but the gift of
God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."
l^John Beach, A Sermon Shewing that Eternal Life
is God's Free Gift. Bestowed upon Men according to their
Moral Behavior and that Free Grace and Free Will Concur
in the Affair of Man's Salvation (Newport;
Printed by the
Widow Franklin, 17^5)» P. 5*
15lbld.. p. 6 .

l6 Ibld.. pp. 13-1*K
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m a n ’s conversion "is of grace; and if we remain wicked,
it is because we abuse grace, when we could do otherwise.
In advocating the doctrine of conditional election, Beach
denied Puritan irresistible grace and predestination.
Puritans stipulated that grace was irresistible, or that
God's elect could not refuse His saving grace.

Beach

countered that if grace were irresistible, then man could
not avoid salvation, whereas free grace allowed a choice.
Man could work with God and gain salvation, or he could
turn and work against God's plan and receive damnation.
Free will placed the responsibility for salvation or dam
nation upon the individual; irresistible grace placed the
responsibility upon God.^9

if man did not have free will,

then the blame for sin reflected back to God, fori
if we did sin by necessity, our consciences
would never reproach us for any wickedness;
nor could we be justly punished, by God or
man for crimes that we could not a v o i d . 20
Beach's synthesis of free will and free grace, if

l?Ibld., p. 20.

l8Ibld.. p. 24.

■^Arminians, following the example of Daniel Whit
by, argued that the Puritan scheme of redemption and ori
ginal sin placed the blame for sin upon God and not man.
They reasoned that if man were not a moral agent, and some
other power determined their actions, then they acted nec
essarily and without free choice.
The blame for sin, then,
belonged to the cause, or author of sin, and not to the
bound agent.
^°Beach, Eternal Life is God's Free Gift, pp. 22-23.
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allowed, would disrupt the entire Puritan scheme, speci
fically the covenant or federal relationship of Adam and
Christ.

Universal redemption and universal free grace,

as proposed by Beach, limited God's sovereignty.

If the

Puritans conceded either doctrine, then man's will and
not G o d ’s sovereignty determined election.

Thus, in this

scheme of salvation, the Arminians viewed God's authority
as subservient to man's will and human liberty.

Beach

argued that man must have grace, and that grace preceded
any workings of man's will, but man's will made the final
determination whether the individual received salvation
or damnation.
Soon after Beach wrote this pamphlet, Samuel
Johnson joined in the attack upon Puritan orthodoxy.

Now

the two "ablest defenders of the Church /Anglican/ in the
colonies combined against the Calvinist view of redemp
tion."21

Johnson was one of the oldest and most promin

ent dissenters in Americaj when he published his Letter
From Arlstocles to Authades. he had actively opposed
Puritanism for nearly three decades.22

Johnson had re-

21Dexter, Biographical Sketches, p. 240.
22The same year as Johnson's graduation from Yale
College, 171^, the college library received the Dummer
Collection which included books by John Locke, Isaac New
ton, Daniel Whitby, Isaac Barrow, and John Tillotson, "how
ever, few had any curiosity to consult these fine writers

33
mained after his graduation at Yale as a tutor from l?l6
to 1719i the same years that the English heretical ideas
infected his doctrinal view.

After journeying to England

in 1722, and receiving ordination as a SPG missionary, he
returned to Connecticut as minister of the Anglican
Church at Stratford in 1723.2^

Johnson remained at Strat'

ford until April 15, 1754» when he became the first pres
ident of Kings College (now Columbia University)
Johnson anonymously entered the debate in 1745
with A Letter From Aristocles to Authades. Concerning the
Sovereignty and Promises of Go d .

Johnson's presence

greatly Improved the position of Beach, and gave the
Anglicans greater persuasiveness.

His careful reasoning

complemented the hot tempered rhetoric of

B e a c h .

Sam

except Messrs.. Cutler, Eliot, Hart, Whittelsey, Wethmore,
Browne, and he /Johnson/.
Johnson, Autobiography and
Letters, p. 7. Most of the individuals Johnson listed
journeyed to England in 1722, and received Anglican ordin
ation.
The English clerics warmly received the defectors,
and included with ordination an honorary D.D. for Rector
Timothy Cutler, and a M.A. for Johnson.
Later, in 1743.
Oxford University honored Johnson with a D.D.
2^Ibid., p. 13.
unique, as approximately
from England, petitioned
cedure lacked precedence
son from proselytization

The situation at Stratford was
thirty families, recently arrived
the SPG for a minister.
This pro
in Connecticut, and released John
in establishing a congregation.

2^William B. Sprague, Annals of the ‘American Pul
p i t , vol. 4 1 Episcopalians (New York; Arno Press and the
New York Times, 1969), p. 5 5 ,
^Throughout the controversy Beach resorted to vin-
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uel Johnson claimed that the doctrine of absolute sov
ereignty contradicted the attributes and nature of God as
the moral governor of the world, and established God as
a

judge, and not as an absolute sovereign.

He argued

that the Puritan doctrine placed God's creatures under a
"necessity of being good or bad, and leaves no room for
either virtue or vice, praise or blame, reward or punish
ment"^

He felt, therefore, that theologians must distin

guish between God the benefactor, the bestower of talents
and favors upon man, and God the judge, the arbiter of
man's use of those talents and favors.
Johnson granted that God exercised His decrees
absolutely and personally, but man's life was only tem
porary and probationary.

Therefore, he contended, an ab

solute disposition previously made, or predestination,
could not decide the condition of men, but rather God de
cided according to the improvement and use that the in-

dictlve attacks upon the Puritan clergy} e.g., "Thus by
your stupid interpretation of Holy Scripture...you have
presented /our blessed savior7 as being of the same mal
icious spirit and temper with infernal spirits, who re
joice in man's wickedness and damnation." John Beach,
God's Sovereignty and His Universal Love to the Souls of
Men Reconciled (Bostoni
Rogers and Fowle, 1747), p. 12.
2^Samuel Johnson, A Letter From Arlstooles to Authades, Concerning the Sovereignty and Promises of God
(Boston* T. Fleet, 1745), pp. 1-2,
2 ?Ibld., p. 6 .
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dividual made of the talents that God freely gave.

John

son pleaded for a reasonable God, one who sat in judgment
of

men as moral agents, rather than a sovereign, whose

divine

decrees conformed to no logical or consistent plan.
Johnson arrived at this view by surveying the ef

fects of God's absolute sovereignty on those who received
damnation without their activity as moral agents.

He ar

gued that man's will could work in harmony with God's,
but only if both complied with the laws of reason? God
could not be arbitrary and despotic in determining sal
vation.

If man acted by necessity, however, and his ac

tions did not determine his eternal condition, then man
lacked responsibility for his actions and could not sin.
If we suppose our actions immediately de
pendent on the will of God, we must sup
pose them necessary as to u s , and conse
quently that we are not to blame for them,
being not properly moral agents, but acted
and necessitated in what we do? which is
absurd as it makes God the author of our
sins.28
These arguments against Puritan principles origi
nated in England with Thomas Chubb, Daniel Whitby, and
Samuel Clarke.

Beach and Johnson served only as agents,

bringing the beginnings of the Enlightened spirit in theo
logy in America.

The Anglican Arminian position centered

28ibid.. p. 12.
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upon man's free will, or moral agency.

To deny free will

placed the onus of sin upon God, and therefore was blasphe
mous and degrading.

The doctrine of free will contradic

ted the doctrines of original sin and predestination, so
that the latter had to be tempered or removed from the
Christian redemptive scheme.

This demand by the Arminians

undercut God's sovereignty and challenged Puritan federal
theology.

God’s will and man's will worked in harmony,

with the individual Christian's eternal state determined
by m a n ’s activity alone.

The Arminians denied emotional

religion and the work of God upon man's heart and there
fore, dismissed the spirit of renewal that had just swept
through New England.
Jonathan Dickinson took up the Arminian challenge.
Before the Great Awakening, he had denounced, as danger
ous, the practices of the Church of England, and saw the
threat now posed to Puritanism as similar.

Dickinson's

opposition to Anglican Church practices stemmed from
their denial of the sixteenth century Reformation and
obvious popery.

In 17^5 they endangered the reform ex

perience that continued after the revival? the elevation
of reason at the expense of piety created a sterile, un
emotional religion.

Dickinson began this extended contro

versy with Anglican clergymen at the time of the Yale
Apostasy? his first defense of Presbyterian ordination
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came in 1 7 2 3 . ^

Until his death in 17^7» he remained the

constant opponent of those who denied religion of the
heart, and a proponent of the Protestant Beformation and
revivalism.

Thomas Foxcroft, delivering his funeral ora

tion, declared*
It may be doubted whether, with the single
exception of the elder Edwards, Calvinism
has ever found an abler or more efficient
defender in this country than Jonathan
Dickinson.30
Jonathan Dickinson's Vindication of God's Sover
eign Free Grace (1746) confronted the Arminian arguments
of John Beach, Samuel Johnson, and Henry Caner. 33-

He

launched a direct attack upon their logic, but relied most
heavily upon scripture and tradition to refute the Armin
ian principles.

His defense embodied the traditional

Puritan arguments defending the sovereignty of God and

2^xn 1723 Dickinson answered John Checkley's A Mod
est Proof of the Order and Government Settled by Christ, in
the Church with A Defense of Presbyterian Ordination. Leo
nard J. Trinterud, The Forming of an American Tradition
(Philadelphia1 The Westminister Press, 1949), p. 230.
3°Dexter, Biographical Sketches, p. 49.
33-Henry Caner's tract did not conform to the type
of approach revealed in those by Beach and Johnson, but
centered over a specious argument whether Christ directed
the Sermon on the Mount to the multitude or to His disci
ples.
Caner favored the latter, which he said taught the
elevation of works over grace. Henry Caner, The True Naure and Method of Christian Preaching, Examined and Stated
In a Discourse (Newport» Printed by the Widow Franklin,
17^-5)» P. 8 # and pp. 10-11.
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appeared more a part of the seventeenth century than the
eighteenth.

This did not mean that Dickinson had ignored

Locke and Newton, but indicated the rapid change that
was occurring within New England theology after the Awak
ening.

Dickinson's major concern was to retain covenant

theology, which had grown out of scholastic thought and
not the new science.

Thus, his defense comprised scrip

tural and traditional arguments, and failed to answer
definitively the questions posed in this reasonable age.
Beach had denied predestination, taught univer
sal redemption by Christ, free will cooperating with free
grace, and the possibility of the regenerate falling from
grace.These

statements conflicted directly with the

orthodox view represented by the declarations of the
Synod of Dort.

This Synod, composed of representatives

of all the reformed churches, convened in November, 1618,
at Dort, Netherlands, to adjudicate between the doctrines
of Jacobus Arminius and Calvinism,

The representatives

affirmed Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion
and the doctrines of original sin, predestination, and
justification by grace alone.

The Church of England con

firmed these declarations and denied adherence to the now
heretical doctrines of Arminius.

Dickinson argued that

32Beach, God's Sovereignty, pp. 17-21.
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Beach was maintaining a position counter to Protestant
ism in general, and specifically contradicted the Arti
cles of the Church of England, the institution that he
claimed adherence to,33

Article X denied expressly that

man had free will after the fall.3^

Dickinson pointed

out Beach's position refuted not only the fundamentals
of Puritanism, but the entire Protestant Reformation.
This he felt would be the result of overbalancing reli
gion based upon reason, rather than upon the heart.
Dickinson's primary concern dwelt with the Arminian conception of grace.

Beach and Johnson declared that

salvation came by way of grace, a universal grace that
contradicted any notions of grace held by Puritan theolo
gians.

The latter separated common and saving grace by

kind or species as well as degree.

In other words, com

mon grace was not just a lesser form of saving grace, but
a distinct type of grace that allowed man only to live a
holy and Christian life.

Universal grace, as described

by these Arminians, was to Dickinson no different than
common grace, also granted universally, but with no pro-

33 Jonathan Dickinson, A Vindication of God's Sov
ereign Free Grace (Boston* Rogers and Powle, 1746), pp‘.
14-15.
3^ibld.. p. 9.

^0
mise of salvation.35

Man could improve upon common grace,

but by that improvement, one could not earn saving grace.
Puritans separated two kinds of grace in order to allow
the individual to prepare himself for the workings of
God.

Man turned towards God and lived a Christian life,

but by so turning did not receive salvation.

Justifi

cation by grace alone meant that the work of election was
by God alone, without man's activity.
Dickinson also attacked Beach's concert of free
will and free grace, and uncovered some basic contradic
tions.

First, Beach stated that man cannot "oblige God

to thank or reward us," as God freely gave grace, which
denied any obligation.

Yet, when our obedience complied

with the conditions of the moral law, "veracity and jus
tice obliges Him to make the promise good; and when he
performs it, it is a reward of bounty."36

Beach contra

dicted himself in declaring that our obedience cannot
oblige God to reward us; however, our obedience in fact
does oblige God to reward us,37

Secondly, Dickinson

35johnson argued universal salvation from Matthew
20j16— "Many are called, but few are chosen." Dickinson
answered that only common grace was promised, and that
election to saving grace was predetermined, and outside
of man's will.
Ibid.. p. 6 9 .
3^lbld., p. 19, quotes Beach, Eternal Life, p, 5»
and p. 32.
37Ibid.. p. 19.

stated that Beach declared that "no man can come to
Christ til he be drawn of the Father," or until God de
termined man towards good and holy acts.

Again this was

a contradiction, as the notion of determination refuted
the notion of free acts by the individual, or freedom of
the will.38

Dickinson demonstrated that Beach placed

free will and free grace in opposition, as the Puritans
had, yet claimed that they acted in harmony.
Dr. Johnson's charge that the Puritan belief in
G o d ’s sovereignty made good and evil necessary posed a
greater problem for Dickinson.

He denied that Puritans

had ever held a compulsive necessity for holiness or wick
edness, but that mankind remained in a state of perfect
freedom, so that until election they acted by their own
voluntary inclinations.3^

He did deny though, that this •

"perfect freedom" of action had any effect upon man's sal
vation.

Dickinson circumvented the major argument of the

Arminians, ignoring the ticklish conflict of human liberty
and predestination.
In the Second Vindication, published after his
death by his brother Moses, he again approached the issue
of the authorship of sin.

Dickinson stated that God re

tained determining power over man's wills, but this did

38Ibld., p. 20.

39ibld.. p. 68.
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■

not make Him the author of sin, hut rather of holiness
and g r a c e . T h e

Arminians had confused tiie issue by de

manding that man have free will to committ sin and frus
trate God's plan, rather than turning to God and true
holiness.

Further, God did not determine the sin, in

stead He determined the event and permitted the sin to
occur.

God became the permitter of evil, but not the nec

essitating cause or author of sin.

God's decree to per

mit sin left the sinner with as much "liberty in all his
actions, as if there had been no decree at all, and there
fore, cannot be the author of sin which is freely and
voluntarily committed."^
Dickinson's logic, demonstrated in these two tracts,
was pejorative.

Freedom of the will could not improve

God’s purposes, but only man's, so that he placed less
value on unassisted human liberty, than the bondage of
man's will to God's divine plan.

The liberty that he al

lowed man was not human liberty in the eighteenth century
sense.

At his death in 1747, Dickinson had not halted

nor impeded the Arminian attack, nor had he met them on

^ J o n a t h a n Dickinson, A Second Vindication of God's
Sovereign Free Grace (Boston* Rogers and Fowle,1748), p.
19.
^ Ibid., p. 6 7 , The permission of sin was the
basis for the reasonable, optimistic Puritanism that Jona
than Edwards began and Joseph Bellamy perfected. Supra, pp.

^3
their terms,

God's sovereignty was as absolute with Dick

inson as it was with Calvin.

He had attempted to preserve

the theological solidarity that had existed before the
revival, and to do so, retreated to the authority of tra
ditional biblical interpretation.

The failure of Dickin

son to refute the Arminlans was not personal, but that of
traditional Puritanism.

The intellectual climate had

shifted, so that men judged truth by reason, rather than
venerated tradition.

Zi.2

Dickinson tried to preserve the spirit of the re
newal in terms of the revival itself.

His answers were

not essentially part of the reformation of order that
followed renewal.

He, like othe Puritans before the re

vival, endeavored to retain the traditional New England
system, the spirit of renewal, and the new science, which
led to an untenable position.
the Second Vindication,

In his unfinished work,

he hinted at a reasonable defense

of God's sovereignty through the idea of the permission

^ O t h e r s as well entered into the controversy, yet
Dickinson was the staunchest defender of Puritanism imme
diately afther the Great Awakening.
See also Jedediah
Mills, A Vindication of Gospel-Truth and Refutation of
Some Dangerous Errors (Boston» Rogers and Fowle, 17^7).
For the Puritan defense of justification by faith alone,
see Richard Elvins, True Justifying Faith Producing Evan
gelical Obedience (Bostoni S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1747)
and Israel Loring, Justification not by Works, but by
Faith in Jesus Christ (Bos ton» S'. Knee land and T. Green,
m9).

of sin, but had not re-interpreted Puritan principles,
so that they conformed to the demands of the eighteenth
century.
The recognition of the Puritan failure to retain
theological unity came in 17^7. with the first Arminian
pamphlet written by a Puritan and not an Anglican.

The

old light Puritans who had opposed the Awakening had not
entered into the controversy between the moderate Puritans
and the Anglicans.

That the first response from the lib

eral clergy favored the Anglican position in the contro
versy was extremely significant.

The Anglican pamphle

teers had successfully penetrated Puritan doctrinal unity,
and initiated a fundamental schism, beyond revivalism.
.The Puritan response to this split became more important
than the controversy between Puritans and Anglicans.
Experience Mayhew, father of the more famous lib
eral leader Jonathan Mayhew, wrote Whether Saving Grace
be Different in Species from Common Grace, or in Degree
On l y , and changed the complexion of the controversy.

The

elder Mayhew argued that the process of regeneration must
restore man's free will, so that former sinners could
turn to God and lead a holy l i f e , ^

MayheW's pamphlet

By no means did the Anglican attack end in 17^7»
but that controversy became only tangential to the disrup
tion within the Puritan orthodoxy, the concern of this
paper.

^5
espoused an extremely mild Arminianism.

He did not teach

a universal redemption promise, and retained the tradi
tional Puritan view that common grace and saving grace
differed in kind as well as degree.

However, he believed

that men could receive salvation through the improvement
of common grace, a position counter to traditional Puri
tanism,
The mild Arminian view presented in Experience
Mayhew's pamphlet typified the non-Anglican or liberal
Puritan position in the 1750's and l?60's.

The writings

of Clarke, Whitby, Chubb, and other English Latitudinarians did not affect the principles of these divines to
the extent that they did the Anglicans.

Charles Chauncy

and Jonathan Mayhew accommodated both the attitudes of
the Latitudinarians and the Puritan tradition in a scheme
that confused both reason and the s c r i p t u r e s T h e y did

Experience Mayhew, A Letter to a Gentleman on
the Question. Whether Saving Grace be Different in Species
from Common Grace, or In Degree Only (B o s t o m S. Kneeland
and T. Green, 17^7), p. 6.
^ P e r r y Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 176,
In the
debate between Chauncy and Edwards during the Awakening,
Miller cites the former defending his position in the lan
guage of the outmoded science, while the defender of Cal
vinism used modern, dynamic, analytic psychology.
This
contradiction resulted from Chauncy's retention of schol
astic psychology, with reason, Imagination, will, and emo
tion as separate "faculties.” He had not incorporated
Lockean mixed modes, ideas, and sensations into his theo
logical view as Edwards had.

46
not redefine Puritanism to fit the mood of the age, nor
did they sever their connection with Puritan orthodoxy.
Instead, they retained the best of both schemes; when
reason and scriptures conflicted, they accepted the rea
sonable proof.

Jonathan Mayhew displayed the inherent

contradiction in determining doctrine in this manner.

He

insisted that man must strive for salvation, but made no
provision in his doctrine for man's free will.

He accep

ted the loss of free will with Adam's fall, as well as
the doctrine of predestination.
a
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His position was more

modification or extention of the concept of voluntar

ism, than an attack upon orthodox Puritanism.

Mayhew and

other liberal Puritan leaders, by ignoring free will as
the underlying principle of their doctinral view,,contra
dicted the English Arminians and their American disciples,
Beach and Johnson.

The liberal Puritans argued moral vir

tue and not free will; they disregarded whether man acted
freely, maintaining only that his actions were righteous.
Opposition to the revival and experiential reli
gion centered around Harvard College in the 1740's.
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George

Jonathan Mayhew, Striving to Enter in at the
Strait Gate (Boston* R. Draper, 1761), p p . 4 1 -42. See
also Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unltarianlsm in
in America (Boston* Starr King Press, 1955)* P. 60, and
p. 9^. and Charles W. Akers, Called Unto Liberty (Cam
bridge* Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 124-125.
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Whitefield's famous claim that Harvard taught dangerous
doctrines inspired by the liberal Archbishop John Tillotson and Samuel Clarke was refuted in 1740, but probably
would have stood in 1 7 ^ 5 * ^

Whitefield's challenge sti

mulated interest in these works; during the Awakening,
Jonathan Mayhew, and undoubtedly others as well, read
these works and incorporated Latitudinarian principles
into their theology.

Harvard College became for America

during the Awakening, what the liberal academies at Whithaven and Finden were for the English dissenters in the
1720's and 1730's, both politically and religiously
Surely the rights of man and Lockean epistemology entered
Harvard theology as they did political theory.
The liberal influence of Harvard College became
apparent when Lemuel Briant challenged Puritan orthodoxy '
with the sermon, The Absurdity and Blasphemy of Depreca-

^ E d w a r d Wigglesworth, president of Harvard Col
lege, answered Whitefield that no undergraduate had bor
rowed Tillotson's works from the college library for nine
years, and Clarke's for over two, Akers, Called Unto Lib
erty. p. 28.
ko

See J. Hay Colligan, Eighteenth Century NonConformlty (Londoni
Longsmans, Green and Co., Ind., 1915)>
pp. 72-7 3 » for the importance of dissenting academies in
the growth of English heterodoxy.
For a similar assess
ment of Harvard, see Wright, Beginnings of Unitarianism.
p. 3 6 . Mayhew's fellow students included the Revolution
ary leaders James Otis, Jr., Samuel Cooper, James Bowdoin,
James Warren, and Thomas Cushing, as well as future reli
gious liberals. Akers, Called Unto Liberty, p. 23.

48
tins Moral Virtue.

Before Its publication in 1749, Briant

had preached this sermon several times; from his own pul
pit at the North Church in Braintree, and also from the
pulpits of Nathaniel Eells and Jonathan Mayhew. ^

Un

doubtedly, this repetition served more to stimulate con
troversy, than the doctrine it contained.

As it was,

Briant received scant notice from the major orthodox cler
ics.

Nathaniel Eells exclaimed after Briant first preached

the sermon,

"AlasI sir, you have undone today all that I

have been doing for forty years.

Eells, to repair the

damage, preached a series of sermons with doctrine closely
resembling that in The Absurdity and Blasphemy.

Briant

presented a doctrinal view quite common in New England at
the end of the 1740's, but gained notoriety primarily
because of his avowed Arminianism.
The heretical sermon had as its text, Isaiah 6 4 i4,
"All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags."

Puritans

traditionally interpreted this text as a demonstration of
man's inability to perform good works.

Briant argued that

this interpretation belied the context of the Book of
Isaiah.

The prophet referred to the wicked character of

^9shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 10,

P. 343.
50ibld.. pp. 343-3^4.
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the Jews, who "made religion a cloak for their immoral
ities," considered themselves righteous and God's chosen
people, yet lived an unholy l i f e . ^

By re-interpreting

this text, Briant claimed that the salvation scheme re
quired, man's personal righteousness, and that God did not
do everything.

Briant; like Beach had earlier, stated

that man's salvation "by grace" did not exclude all moral
agency, and that man's Christian duties, or works, at
least aided in salvation.

Puritans, Briant claimed, by

not studying the scriptures in context, took Christian
morality, which considered man as a moral agent, and
"turned /It/ into idle speculation instead of a doctrine
of sobriety, righteousness, and piety."52

Deprecating

moral virtue, as the Puritans had done by denying man's
righteousness, led men into utter contempt for those
things that they should value most.
Ostensibly, Briant argued the importance of man's
personal righteousness, but underlying these arguments
were the questions of justification by grace and by works,
the imputation of original sin, and the validity of pre
destination.

Puritans traditionally had argued that

^ L e m u e l Briant, The Absurdity and Blasphemy of
Deprecating Moral Virtue (Boston* J. Green for D. Gookin.
1/49), pp. 1^-16.
52 Ibld.. p. 14.
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Christ was the source of all human righteousness, and that
man had no personal righteousness because of Adam's fall.
Throughout the ensuing controversy, Briant insisted that
, the only disparity between his position and that of tra
ditional Puritanism was the single line of text from
Isaiah, and refused to argue the specific implications of
. his sermon.

He did not broach free will, original sin,

or predestination, but argued only moral virtue.

Still

his insistence upon man's personal righteousness was a
denial of God's absolute sovereignty and predestination,
and negated man's passivity.
Briant's sermon attracted little attention from
prominent Puritans; only John Porter, the country pastor
at the First Congregational Church at Brockton, felt
moved to answer him.

Porter, an unlikely defender of or

thodoxy, had previously ventured into controversy only by
, defending George Whitefield from charges of enthusiasm in
17^5.

Porter delivered his Justification by the Personal

Righteousness of Men is Absurd and Blasphemous from the
new light pulpit in Braintree on Christmas Day, 17^9.
Afterwards, Briant charged that Porter had invaded Brain
tree in an attempt to have him u n s e a t e d . 53

jn the debate,

both disputants were intemperate, lapsing into personal

53shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 10,

p. 3 ^ .
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charges rather than doctrinal criticism.

Porter accused

Briant of immaturity and "heathenish morality," and in
turn was accused of forgetting his Latin, misunderstanding
Calvin, and having stolen two of his sermons from Arch
bishop Ti H o t son.-5^

Each was reluctant to argue the

specific implications of moral virtue, and demonstrated
their failure to root their arguments in the reasonable
thought of the Enlightenment.

Briant's attack indicated

only a superficial reliance upon any Latitudinarian prin
ciples, and Porter's answer was traditional.
Porter correctly stated the traditional Puritan
view of personal righteousness and the text from Isaiah.
He claimed that Briant had first fixed upon the principle
of man's moral virtue, and then investigated the scrip
tures for support of this preconceived notion.

Through

this type of proof, he argued, "Arlans, Socinians, Arminians, Antinomians, and even Quakers have endeavored to
support and maintain their destructive tenets."5-5

Clearly,

the reference in Isaiah referred only to the righteous
ness of the best men, as the scriptures never used the
word "righteousness" to describe the hypocritical perfor-

5^ibid.. p. 70, and p. 3 ^ .
55John Porter, Justification by the Personal Righ
teousness of Men is Absurd and Blasphemous (Boston» S,
Kneeland, 1750)» P* 3#
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mances of wicked men as Briant had suggested.56

Further,

the reference to righteousness as "filthy rags" indicated
that m a n ’s acts were imperfect and not suited "to cover
their moral nakedness and render them agreeable to the
King of Glory."57

Porter understood the full implication

of Briant's sermon? personal righteousness voided the
Puritan conception of salvation by grace alone, and in
cluded works in the scheme of Justification.
Whoever is establishing a scheme /thatJ sub
stitutes the personal righteousness of men,
in the room of the surety righteousness of
Christ, in the affair of Justification and
salvation, runs counter to the gospel, and
will assuredly find themselves falling infin
itely short of the favor and Kingdom of God.5°
Briant, throughout the controversy, emphasized
that the only dispute between Porter and himself was the
interpretation of Isaiah.

Porter answered that in fact,

there was a general controversy between them over the na
ture of. Justification.

Briant had exploded the notion of

imputed righteousness from Christ in Justification, and
maintained that moral virtue made man righteous before
God, and that foregiveness of sin depended upon the per
sonal righteousness of man.59

5^ibid. . pp. 5-6,

Porter recognized the im-

-^Ibld., p. 8.

58 ibld.. p. 21.
59john Porter, Vindication of a Sermon (Bostoni
S. Kneeland, 1751)* p. 10.
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plication of these arguments, and exploited their inten
tion, presumably, to force Briant to admit adherence to
the papist doctrine5 of merit, or that man's works merited
salvation.

Such an admission would have demonstrated the

full implication of Arminian doctrine— the denial of the
whole reformation experience.
John Cotton, minister of the rural church at
Halifax, Massachusetts, joined Porter in an appendix to
the Vindication explaining the agreement of Briant's doc
trine to the traditional Arminian heresy.

Briant had ex

plicitly denied free justification by the imputed righ
teousness of Christ, and by this denial, opposed personal
election, or predestination, and the doctrine of original
sin.60
The most important outcome of the controversy
existed outside the pamphlet warfare, in the reaction of
Briant's congregation to his apostasy into the errors of
Arminianism.
cal views.

They called a council to judge his hereti
On April 14, 1753* the council, headed by

John Quincy, announced that they found no error in doctri
nal questions; they differed personally with his doctrine,
but upheld his "undoubted right to judge for himself.

6oIbld., p. 24.

6l

Shlpton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, p. 3^7.

5^
This judgment e s t a b l i s h e d a p r e c e d e n t that all o w e d d e v i 
at i o n f r o m o rthodoxy w i t h o u t c e n s u r e , and em p h a s i z e d
hu m a n li b e r t y arid the right of p e r s o n a l Judgment in r e l i 
gious matters.

The cou n c i l a f f i r m e d the a ttitudes of

Latitudinarianism,

that r e a s o n judged reli g i o u s truths,

and not traditon.

This judgment als o e n d a n g e r e d the

work i n g s of the A w a k e n i n g a n d r e n e w a l of-the heart,
e m p h a s i z i n g r e l i g i o n of the mind.
i n e s t a b l i s h i n g this precedent,

by

Briant's congregation,

a d m i t t e d that a n y hope

for d o c t r i n a l s o l i d a r i t y in N e w E n g l a n d was n o w at an end.
Lemuel Briant,

str i k e n w i t h illness before the

council met, d i e d later that year, vindicated.
remain e d active
in 1802,

J o h n P o rter

in his p u lpit at B r o c k t o n u n t i l his de a t h

but n e v e r a g a i n became

involved in controversy.

In his later years, he g r a d u a l l y mo v e d to an inc r e a s i n g l y
conser v a t i v e r eligious position.
Briant's views c o n c e r n i n g ma n ' s m o r a l virtue did
n o t deviate g r e a t l y f r o m those taught by mos t P u r i t a n
divine s in New E n g l a n d a f t e r the Great Awakening.
sequently,

Con

they ignored w h a t he said, b u t they could not

ignore w h a t he implied.

He a v o w e d Arminianism,

and taught

wo r k s and grace together as n e c e s s a r y for salvation.
Like m o s t liberal clergymen,

62Ibid.. p. 72 .

he e m p h a s i z e d the importance
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of man'a active participation in salvation, rather than
passive acceptance of God's decisions.

These Arminians

required God to act reasonably, and to perform as God
the judge rather than God the sovereign.

Their position

differed substantially, however, from that of the Angli
can Arminians.

They exhibited reluctance either to op

pose the Puritan redemptive scheme completely, or to
fully accept that of the Latitudinarians.
Lemuel Briant's more famous liberal associate,
Jonathan Mayhew, revealed the same accommodation of both
schemes, and reluctance to attack the position of Puri
tan orthodoxy on justification.

Mayhew had developed

his Arminianism prior to his ordination in 174-8, which
led to difficulty when that ceremony took place.

The

opposition came not from the parishioners of the West
Church in Boston, a rather homogeneous group of merchants
and the newly wealthy, but from the established clergy
at the other Boston

churches.

^3

The clergymen boycotted

the ordination ceremony scheduled for May 20, which de
layed that ceremony nearly two months, until July 17, 174-8,
In order to insure the presence of enough ministers the

^M i l l e r , Jonathan Edwards, p. 113. Miller dis
cusses the economic and social order within the West Church
that allowed Mayhew to break away from a purely orthodox
position.
He preached a theology compatible with reason
able and commercial Boston.
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second time, the West Church ignored the Boston clerics
and invited divines from country p a r i s h e s . ^
Even with these problems in ordination and his
position outside of orthodoxy, Mayhew did not attack the
principle Puritan tenets.

In the latter half of the

1750's, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
attempted to establish an American bishopric, and Mayhew's
stormy protest led to his acceptance by the Boston brthodoxy.^

Still, with the clerical opposition lessened,

Mayhew did not publish Striving to Enter in at the Strait
Gate until 1761, declaring the importance of works in the
scheme of salvation,

Mayhew, like other liberal divines,

dared not exert those ideas too strongly which would
split them from the Puritan fold.

They strove to remain

within orthodoxy, and to avoid being declared heretical.
Mayhew's Seven Sermons, published in 17A 9

, de-

^Akers, Called Unto Liberty, p. 51* Akers de~
scribes the boycott not as a religious one, but a protest
against the West Church's invitation of only the Brattle
Street and the First Churches, while Ignoring the other
seven Boston churches.
The ordination ceremony carried
great significance as a social and religious event in the
eighteenth century.
The boycotting of Mayhew's ordination
resulted in deep resentment and antagonism between Mayhew
and Boston's established clergy,
65lbld.. p. 91 .
&^Jonathan Mayhew, Seven Sermons on the Following
Subjects (Boston 1 Bogers and Fowle, 17^-9), demonstrates
his nascent Unitarianism that developed soon after ordi-
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monstrated the liberal reliance upon reason, and the ac
commodation of English Latitudinarianism and traditional
Puritanism.

Passages of these sermons indicated Mayhew's

acceptance of Lockean thought; Mayhew's style, like that
of most liberal divines in America, was simplistic and
highly reminiscent of Archbishop Tillotson's.^7

in the

first sermon concerning right and wrong, Mayhew declared
that there was a natural difference between truth and
falsehood; truth was determinant in itself and existed
independent of man's notions concerning it.
No man's opinions are either right or
wrong— that however contrary the senti
ments of different men are to one another,
both are equally conformable to the na
ture and reality of the thing that they
Judge.68
Mayhew believed that there existed an absolute nature of
truth and moral rectitude, which did not depend upon the
opinions of men, and especially upon the number of men

nation.
For Mayhew’s christology, see Wright, Beginnings
of Unltarlanlsm, or Akers, Called Unto Liberty.
67Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 27 and p. 48, com
pares the pulpit styles of liberal divines and the pro
revivalists.
The former, lacking the histronics of the
revivalists, were dry and reasonable to the extreme.
See also Louis G. Locke, Tillotson, A Study in Seventeenth
Century Literature (Copenhagen;
Hosenkilde and Bagger,
1954), pp. 114-116, and passim.
Locke discusses Tillot
son’s stylistic innovation, that of a plain and simple
style.
^®Mayhew, Seven Sermons, p. 7.

with such an opinion.

"They /absolute truths7 will not

change their nature out of compliance to the most numer
ous and powerful body of men in the world,"^9

He joined

this idea of truth and falsehood to ideas of man's per
formance of righteous acts, or m a n ’s need to imitate the
moral excellence of God and, thus, approach the design
of the C r e a t o r . 7°

Lemuel Briant had presented a much

more heterodox view of man's moral virtue than Mayhew
had, as the latter placed no value upon works themselves,
but called instead, for freedom of interpretation of the
scheme of God.
He expanded this theme further in the remaining
sermons, specifically with man's ability to recognize
the difference between truth and error.

Men had this

ability, but the ability varied in individual men.?1
This variation revealed a natural limitation upon human
reason that accounted for man's instruction through divine
revelation,

Mayhew distinguished in the manner of the

Latitudinarians between natural and revealed religion,
with revelation compensating for man's limited under
standing.

But even though man's understanding was lim

ited, reason exhalted him from the beasts in the field

69lbld.. pp. 17-18.
?1Ibld.. p. 29.

7°Ibld.. p. 12.
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and allied him to God and the angels.
Yea by this we resemble God himself.
So
that how weak so ever our intellectual
faculties are, yet to speak reproachfully
of reason, in general, is nothing less
than blasphemy against G o d . 72
Man's reason sufficed for him to judge moral and reli
gious truths, or those man received through divine reve
lation.

This contradicted the Puritan notion of total

Ignorance that resulted from Adam's fall and hid the work
ings of God from man,

Mayhew argued, in a manner contra

dictory to traditional Puritanism, that through reason and
revelation, man could understand the divine

scheme

.73

In further application of these ideas, Mayhew
stated that man had the duty to assert private judgment,
with freedom of thought and inquiry in religious matters.
Christ forbade man to submit implicitly to the dictates
of any other man, or for Christians to usurp or assume
authority over their brethren.

Man inhibited judgment

and assumed authority in the formation of creeds, or "set
ting up human tests of orthodoxy instead of the infallible
word of God."7^

Mayhew directed this argument against the

high Anglicans and Roman Catholics who based truth on the
authority of tradition and not upon reasonable interpreta-

72i b i d . .

p,

39.

7^

p.

59.

ibld..

73i

b i d . . p.

38.
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t lon of the w o r d of God.
size,

He realized,

but d i d not e m p h a 

the r elevance of m a k i n g the same a t t a c k against

Purit a n orthodoxy.
Mayhew's Se v e n Sermons e x p r e s s e d a con s e r v a t i v e
r eligious v i e w and ple d f o r f r e e d o m of inq u i r y a n d an end
to Judging truth by t r a d i t i o n rather t han c o m m o n sense.

His demands were significant in increasing man's role in
God's plan, but fell short of Briant's moral virtue.

In

1753 when the council at Braintree adjudged Briant's apos
tasy, Mayhew's insistence upon private Judgment received
open approval.

Even with this victory, Mayhew never

launched a full attack upon the Puritan redemptive scheme,
but attempted only to accommodate his views alongside
traditional church dogma.
Twelve years a f t e r the p u b l i c a t i o n of the Seven
Sermons,

M a y h e w sought to c l a r i f y his p o s i t i o n on J u s t i f i

c a t i o n In S t r i v i n g to E n t e r in at the Strait G a t e , and
stressed the importance of man's w o r k i n g for salvation.

He used for his text, Luke 13«1^» "Strive to enter in at
the strait gate:

for many, I say unto you, will seek to

enter in, and shall not be able,"

To Mayhew, striving

referred to man's earnest endeavors, or working for sal
vation.

This striving came after the spirit of God af

fected the heart of the sinner, and awakened an under
standing of his sinful nature.75

The failure of the major
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ity who "seek to enter in" was not due to election of only
a few, but that of those who heeded the call, few strove
to obtain the goal.78

Mayhew contended that the gospel

offered a general salvation to all men, and God would not
make the offer without providing the means.

"For if God

hath no pleasure in their death, but the contraryj and if
they themselves desire life, and endeavor to obtain it,
what should hinder their salvation?"77
Mayhew pointed' out that striving did not relate
to the regenerate, "or those already born of God, or such
as are true believers and real Christians," but wholly
to the workings of the unregenerate.78

Mayhew, then, re

tained the concept of predestination and election.

God

chose a few elect prior to the creation of the world, the
regenerate.

For these elect, works, or man's personal

righteousness had no influence, yet in the salvation of
the unregenerate, once the spirit of God had infected
their souls, works and virtue made them worthy of salva
tion.

Mayhew emphasized that works always followed grace,

and could not exist independent of grace.

By this argu-

7% a y h e w , Striving to Enter, pp. 11-12.
78Ibld., p. 35.
Mayhew did not deny election,
but argued only that election was not the sole means for
obtaining salvation.
77Ibld. , p. ^9.

78Ibid., p.
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m e n t , he shunned the threat of heresy for teaching the
popish doctrine of merit.
Mayhew had avoided any declaration regarding the
salvation of all men, and did not stress works and grace
in conjunction until the l?60's.

The actions of Mayhew,

Briant, and other liberal Puritans demonstrated a fear
of heterodoxy that forced them into only a mild Armlnianlsm.

They argued moral virtue and righteousness rather

than justification by works, and freedom of Inquiry rather
than freedom of the will.

For these Arminians, works did

not differ in definition from the Puritan "fruits of
faith" which followed grace.

Although these liberals

espoused only a mild Arminlanism, they aroused enormous
fear, that if left unchecked, the heresy would soon ex
ceed the bounds of the liberal divines and destroy the
work of renewal and the Puritan covenant system.
English Arminianism and liberal Puritanism differed
substantially5 the term "Arminian" did not actually re
flect the theological position of the liberal divines,
but was used by the Puritans as a term of derision.

More

than a separate theological group, they were a splintering
of Puritanism, and indicated that any claim to theological
solidarity was at an end.

The controversies involving

Jonathan Dickinson and John Porter had demonstrated the
weaknesses of traditional Puritanism in refuting these
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eighteenth century heretical views.

The retention of

Puritan order and the revival experience required a com
plete revision and redefinition of their religious posi
tions.

This task faced Jonathan Edwards and the New

Divinity School in the 1750's and 1760's,

CHAPTER III
A CAREFUL AND STRICT ENQUIRY INTO THE MODERN PREVAILING
NOTIONS OF FREEDOM .OF THE WILL»

JONATHAN EDWARDS

AND THE ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD
He that would know the workings of the New
England Mind in the middle of the eighteenth
century, and the throbbing of its heart,
must give his days and nights to the study
of Jonathan Edwards.1
Few historians have taken issue with this assess
ment by George Bancroft that revealed Jonathan Edwards'
central position in American intellectual life.

However,

in explicating that leadership, historians have not agreed
whether he was the first modern American, or the last in
a long line of medieval philosophers.2

Generally, one

can presume that the critics of Edwards' modernity looked

i

George Bancroft, The History of the United States,
quoted in Edward M. Griffin. Jonathan Edwards (Minneapolis»
University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p. 5, and Vincent
Tomas, "The Modernity of Jonathan Edwards," New England
Quarterly. XXV (1952), p. 60,
2For an assessment of Edwards' modernity see Perry
Miller, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 77-78, and passim.
Vincent
Tomas, in his critical review of Miller's biography. The
Modernity of Jonathan Edwards, pp. 60-84, and Peter Gay,
A Loss of Masteryi
Puritan Historians in Colonial Amer
ica (Berkeley and Los Angelest University of California
Press, 1966), viewed him as an anachronism in the American
Enlightenment.
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only at the nature of the religious questions he dealt
with, and the doctrine that he defended.

The questions

and the doctrine were medieval in form and substance, yet
his methodology unquestionably indicated his modernity.
Twentieth century man does not share Edwards' concern
for original sin or the bondage of man's will, but the
intellectual milieu of the eighteenth century determined
the importance of these questions, so that his preoccupa
tion with them was not singular.
While Edwards' conclusions conformed to sixteenth
t

century Calvinist dogma, the manner in which he arrived
at them departed wholly from the scholastic tradition.
Edward H. Davidson stated that Edwards "conducted his
intellectual and spiritual pilgrimage in point for point
relevance with the most advanced thought of his age— and
undercut it at nearly every occasion."3

He turned to the

source of the Latitudinarian attack— Lockean epistemology
and Newtonian science— and demonstrated that traditional
Calvinist doctrine, and not the Arminian errors, confor
med exactly to eighteenth century reason.

In this manner,

Edwards became in mid-century both an exponent of reason
able religion and a primary defender of experiential re-

3Edward H. Davidson,. "From Locke to Edwards,"
Journal of the History of Ideas. XXIV (1963), No. 3, p.
372.
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ligion.

He deni e d that r e a s o n a n d emo t i o n wer e d i s tinct

faculties of the mind, f u n c t i o n i n g sep a r a t e l y a c c o r d i n g
to A r i s t o t e l i a n terms,
self."**'

but w e r e

"powers of the u n i f i e d

Since.these facu l t i e s wer e not separate,

could be no hlero c r a t i c o r d e r i n g of
"affection," and

there

"understanding,"

"will"-— each c o n t r i b u t e d in a like m a n 

n e r to h u m a n knowledge.

Thus,

role of religious af f e c t i o n s
that of m a n ’s will,

one c o u l d emphasize the

(emotions),

as iden t i c a l to

and not denigrate religion,

but ho n o r

it.-5
Edwards'

I n t r o d u c t i o n to J o h n Locke's E s s a y C o n 

cerning H u m a n U n d e r s t a n d i n g came in his second y e a r at
Yale College at the age of thirteen.

Towards the end of

his l i f e , E d w a r d s , in r e c o l l e c t i n g that e a r l y reading,
statedi
/I/ was as m u c h engaged, and h a d more s a t 
isfaction and pleasure in studying it, than
the most g r e e d y m i s e r in g a t h e r i n g up h a n d 
fuls of silver and gol d f r o m some n e w d i s 
c overed t r e a s u r e . 6

^Griffin, J o n a t h a n E d w a r d s . p. 2k.
^ I b i d . , p. 2k.
J. M. Bumsted and J. E. V a n de
Wetering, '"What Must I Do to be Saved?'
The Great A w a k 
ening in Colonial A m e r i c a " (MS, unpublished, 1971), state
that the s i ngularity of Edwards' acceptance of the new
intel l e c t u a l m o o d has b e e n exaggerated.
The A w a k e n i n g i t 
self e m p h a s i z e d the h a r m o n y of m i n d and emotion, a n d by
its end, mos t leaders h a d rea d c o m m e ntaries u p o n Locke, if
not the w o r k s themselves.
The w h o l e n e s s of mind, spirit,
and e m o t i o n was w i d e l y accepted,
p. 132,
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He gained more than pleasure from this early reading of
Locke, for while still in his teens, he formulated the
intellectual and religious principles that were to govern
the remainder of his life.

He wrote the "Notes on the

Mind," a collection of uncompleted thoughts, which demon
strate his complete digestion of Locke's psychological
principles, and foreshadowed much of his later treatise
on the Freedom of the Will.

One cannot over-emphasize

Edwards' early intellectual development and the effect
that this early maturity had upon his later life.

He re

tained throughout his career as a minister and theologian
those intellectual principles that he had developed in
his teen.?
In the same manner that the "Notes on the Mind"
foreshadowed his later philosophic development, his youth
ful preparation for religious conversion previewed his
later concern for experiential religion.

Both as a child

in his father's congregation and in his senior year in
college, he underwent "seasons of awakening" which ex-

6samuel Hopkins, "The Life and Character of Rever
end Mr. Jonathan Edwards," Jonathan Edwards: A Profile.
David Levin, editor (New York« Hill and Wang, 1969), PP.
5-6.

^Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p.
"Edwards was
not the sort who undergoes a long development or whose
work can be divided into 'periods.' His whole insight
was given him at once, preternaturally early, and he did
not changei he only deepened."
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posed to him an "inward delight" in religious duties and
concern for the salvation of his soul.

This concern

stimulated him to pray "five times a day in secret," to
spend much time in religious talk with other b o y s , and to
meet with them in prayer.®

While his early religiosity

was fervent, he found that -these affections fostered a
self-righteous pleasure and false sense of grace.

After

each awakening, he soon "returned like a dog to his vomit"
to his old ways of sin.

The experience did not lead to

inner quiet and hope, but to violent inward struggles and
doubt as to his eventual salvation.

"I made seeking my

salvation the main business of my life...I felt a spirit
to part with all things in the world...but yet it never
seemed to be proper to express my concern that I had."9
The experience of trying to earn grace and failing, left
Edwards with the strong belief that salvation rested en
tirely in the hands of God, and that man's will had no
effect in securing true grace.
Soon after graduation from Yale College in Septem
ber, 1720, Jonathan Edwards experienced the deep religious
conversion that he had sought earlier.

Before conversion,

he had come to a full understanding of the meaning of the

®Hopkins, The Life and Character, pp. 24-25.
9Ibid., p. 2 5 .
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sovereignty of God.

In his youth, he had looked with

horror at God's absolute determination of election and
damnation.

But to the mature Edwards, this doctrine ap

peared exceedingly pleasant and honorable.

He stated

that the change occurred while reading I Timothy It 17—
"Now

unto the king eternal, immortal,

invisible, the only

wise

God, be honor and glory for ever and ever, Amen."

This passage opened within him a new sense of the divine
glory of God and the excellence of His being.

"From about

that

time, I. began to have a new kind of apprehension and

idea

of Christ, and the work of redemption, and the glo

rious way of salvation by Him.1,10
A short time after discovering this new sense of
divine things, he experienced saving conversion while
walking alone in his father's pasture.

He felt the glori

ous majesty of God and the meekness of His grace come to11

gether in a "sweet c o n j u n c t i o n . H i s

religious attitude

after this conversion changed drastically from that fol
lowing his youthful awakenings.
Those former delights, never reached the
heart; and did not arise from any sight of
the divine excellency of the things of God;
or any taste of the soul-satisfying, and
life-giving good there is in them.12

•^Ibid. , p. 2 6 .
12Ibid., p. 29.

1IIbid.. p. 27.
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Edwards' conversion convinced him that man's will was
entirely passive in the affair of salvation.

Man's heart

must be touched, or his will disposed toward God before
he could receive salvation or exhibit true justifying
grace.. Part of the preparation that man must undertake,
was a complete understanding of the sovereignty of God
and the binding of one's self to the will of God,
A year and a half after Edwards began to sense
this new spirit of divinity, he accepted the pastorate
at a small church in New York City, where he remained
slightly longer than one year.

He returned to the Connect

icut Valley, and in June of 1724, became a tutor at Yale
College.

In the interval between his graduation in 1720

and his tutorship, the Yale apostasy, or the defection of
Hector Timothy Cutler, Samuel Johnson, and others had
taken place, ^

This defection had left the college in

disorder, so that Edwards' tutorship, coming so soon after
the event, helped to stabilize the quality of instruction.
He left the college in 1727» and, at the invitation of
his grandfather Solomon Stoddard, became assistant pastor
at Northampton.

Edwards received ordination at the North

ampton Church on February 15, 1727» and two years later,
after the death of his grandfather, took sole c h a r g e . ^

•^Supra. p. 32 , and Johnson, Autobiography. p. 7.
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The Connecticut Valley had experienced periodic
ripples of revival, usually emanating from the pulpit of
the Northampton Church.

Grandfather Stoddard had stimu

lated several seasons of renewal, marked by an increase
in the number experiencing conversion and widespread con
cern for salvation.

In 173^ Edwards' own experimental

acquaintance with the spirit of God aided in the outpour
ing of renewal within his congregation, 1-5

The Northamp

ton revival began the Awakening in New England that lasted
for over a decade in varying degrees of intensity.!6
Samuel Hopkins stated that Edwards was "what is
called by some a rigid Calvinist." because he defended
those doctrines which many in the eighteenth century
thought should be removed.*?

One of the central themes

that he supported and others opposed was the sovereignty

l^Willsiton Walker, "Jonathan Edwards," Jonathan
Edwards> A Profile, David Levin, editor (New Yorki Hill
and Wang, 1969)» P. 93.
l^Hopkins, The Life and Character, pp. 51-52.
l^Edwards traced the spirit of revival in three
separate monographsi
A Faithful Narrative of the Surpris
ing Works of God in the Conversion of many Hundred Souls
(Boston t S. Knee land and T. Green, 173&). The"''Distin
guishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of Go d "(Boston> S.
Knee land and T. Green*." 17^1). and Some Thoughts Concern
ing the Present Revival of Religion in New England (Boston»
S. Kneeland and T. Green, 1742.)
17Hopkins, The Life and Character, p. 52.
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of God.

After the Great Awakening, he did not Join

Dickinson and others in the controversy with the Anglican
Arminians primarily because of the difficulties he faced
with his own congregation.

Edwards opposed the practice

begun by his grandfather in opening the sacrament of the
Lord's Supper to the u n c o n v e r t e d . S e v e r a l influencial
families, led by Israel Williams and Joseph Hawley, known
for their economic position in Northampton rather than
their piety, declared that Edwards was "un-Stoddardean.
The conflict between Edwards and the Williamses culminated
on June 18, 1750, when a council of nine churches met to
advise the Northampton Church whether or not to dissolve
the relationship between pastor and congregation.

The

council, packed with anti-Edwardseans, voted five to four
recommending dismissal.

The congregation concurred, vot

ing more than two hundred to twenty-three in favor of his
removal.20

On June 22, 1750, "fit only for study, aged

1^Stoddard saw that the Half-Way members, brought
into the church through the Synod of 1662, were not under
going conversion.
Stoddard opened the Lord's Supper to
the unconverted as a means to obtain conversion.
This
move discarded the New England covenant theories, and
blurred the distinction between the Visible and Invisible
Churches.
Miller, The New England Mind, From Colony to
Province, pp. 232-236".
:
l^Miller, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 218-219.
20Hopkins, The Life and Character, p. 61, and
Walker, Jonathan Edwards, pp. 105-107.
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forty-six and physically exhausted, Edwards was thrown
onto the world, a major artist and America's foremost
philosopher.
In December of that year, the rural church at
Stockbridge invited Edwards to become their minister and
missionary to the Housatonnuck Indians.22

Removed from

the pressures of a large congregation, he wrote his major
theological works, The Freedom of the ¥ 1 1 1 . and The Great
Christian Doctrine of Original Sin. Defended.

The first

treatise, published in 1754, reflected his concern over
the Latitudinarian challenge to the sovereignty of God.
Edwards' research into Arminianism began much earlier.
In a letter to Joseph Bellamy dated January 15, 1746/7,
he stated that he had begun reading Daniel Whitby's dis
courses, and "with It I have got so deep into this con
troversy, that I am no willing to dismiss it, till I know
the utmost of these matters."23

Edwards asked Bellamy If

he knew of any Axminian better versed in the idea of free
will, because,

"I d o n ’t know but I shall publish something

after a while on that Subject."2^

2lMiller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 225.
22Stanley T. Williams, "Six Letters of Jonathan
Edwards to Joseph Bellamy," New England Quarterly, I (1928),
p . 240.

23Ibid.. p. 230.

2^Ibld.. p. 231.
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The Freedom of the Will reflected Edwards' reli
ance upon both major attitudes that he had cultivated as
a

young man.

He combined Lockean epistemology and tra

ditional Puritan doctrine to establish a new reasonable
Puritanism, one that repudiated Aristotelian scholastic
ism in favor of the science and psycholosy that dominated
the eighteenth century.

The Freedom of the Will, the

cornerstone of the New Divinity theology, introduced the
reasonableness of the Enlightenment to Puritanism, but
did not change the restrictiveness of the benefits of
Christianity.

Edwards defended the traditional Puritan

sovereignty of God, election, and saving grace, and denied
the validity of the notion that free will was necessary
for m a n 's moral agency.
The real controversy in America was hidden within
questions of moral agency and man's working for salvation.
Edwards understood that freedom of the will was the central
issue in the Arminian-Puritan d e b a t e . T h e

sovereignty

25conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism,
insists that Edwards confused the issues; American Arminians held that the most important conflict was over o r i - '
ginal sin and not free will.
However, Wright looked at
these liberals, not. as they were in the 1750's, but what
they became for the nineteenth century, nascent Unitarians.
Therefore, failed to explicate properly their threat to
Puritanism in the mid-eighteenth century, even though
they were not Arminians in the strict sense of the word.

of God required man to bind his will to God's, and to be
come completely passive in salva,tion.

Bondage of the will

was the central theme attacked by the Arminians, but a
first principle in traditional Puritanism.

Also, Edwards

clearly recognized who his adversaries actually were.

He

ignored those Anglicans and liberals in America, and .
struck at the source, the the English divines who revived
the doctrines, of Jacobus Arminius.

Edwards concentrated

on the writings of three popularizers, who together en
compassed the entire scope of eighteenth century Arminianism,

Thomas Chubb, a Deist, illustrated the extremes of

the heresy, Daniel Whitby; an Arian-Armlnian, was a min
ister of the Church of England, and Isaac Watts, repre
sented Edwards* own tradition of theology,26

By demon

strating the unreasonableness of the central theme (free
will) and each divine's application of it, Edwards struck
a decisive blow at the root of the heresy and established
the bondage of man's will to God on a reasonable and a
scriptural basis,
Edwards* approach to free will closely followed
the treatment presented by John Locke in An Essay Concern-

26Jonathan Edwards, A Careful and Strict Enquiry
into the Modern Prevailing Notion of Freedom of the W i l l ,
Paul Ramsey, editor (New Haveni
Yale University’ Press,
1957)i P. 66.
(Editor's Introduction,)
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ing Human Understanding.

Locke had examined the reason

ableness of free will and stated that the question itself
was improper and invalid.
It is as insignificant to ask whether m a n ’s
will be free, as. to ask whether his sleep
will be swifti
Liberty being as little ap
plicable to the will as swiftness is to sleep.
Liberty which is but a power, belongs only to
agents, and cannot be an attribute or modi
fication of the will which is also but a power,

'

This definition restricted liberty to an agent5 liberty
cannot have liberty, and the power to choose cannot have
the power to choose? therefore, these conditions did not
establish a valid question.

To ask if man has free will

was to ask if the "will wills,M or if one ability has
another ability,

"a question at first sight too grossly

absurd to make a dispute or need an answer.”^®

Edwards

agreed with this assessment, and with Locke's description
of volition as an ability of the mind, rather than the
scholastic notion that will and understanding were sep
arate faculties.

However, as a -dedicated Calvinist, he

could not merely answer that the question was invalid.
He had to demonstrate more explicitly the nature of the
will and to prove that it could not be self-determining.

27john Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under
standing, vol. 1, p. 199.

2^Ibld.„ vol. 1, p. 200.
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Like Locke, Jonathan Edwards defined "will" as
that "by which the mind chooses anything.,.and an act of
the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice."^9
Edwards deviated slightly from Locke when he stated that
one choses according to one's desires, and therefore, vo
lition and desire always

agree.

30

Man's voluntary actions

arose from his pleasure or desire; he performed that which
he found most agreeable.

If man chose his actions from

disagreeable motives, then he would deny his pleasure.
Therefore, Edwards said, "the will always is as the great
est apparent good is."^1

In other words,

"will" and "the

greatest apparent good" (desire) were co-equal terms, and
an agent chose according to his pleasure those motives
that he comprehended as most inviting.

The equation of

will and desire further demonstrated that will was not a
separate faculty of the mind, but a power or ability.
Willing or choosing required an agent in the same manner
that desiring required an agent to desire.
Building upon the statement that choice or volition

2 ^Edwards, Freedom of the W i l l , p. 137.
-^Locke stated that choice resulted from uneasiness
in man's present state or condition and did not relate dir
ectly to desire.
Man's action, determined by uneasiness,
and his desire could run counter to each other.
Therefore,
he held man's choice (will) and desire as separate and dis
tinct.
Locke, Essay, vol. 1, p. 199.
31-Edwards, Freedom of the W i l l , p. 142.
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requi r e d the a c t i o n of a n agent,

E dwards d e m o n s t r a t e d the

unr e a s o n a b l e n e s s of the A r m i n i a n s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n of
the will.
will,

He said,

"to talk of the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the

supposes a n effect, w h i c h m u s t have a cause.

the w i l l be determined,

there is a d e t e r m i n e r . " ^ 2

regard to a s e l f - d e t e r m i n e d will,
termi n e r and the determined,

If
With

the w i l l became the d e 

or b o t h cause a n d effect.

This d e m o n s t r a t i o n by Ed w a r d s e c h o e d the e a r l i e r s t a t e 
ments b y J o h n Locke that the q u e s t i o n of f r e e d o m of the
w i l l was u n r e a s o n a b l e a n d invalid.
If one a c c e p t e d the A r m i n i a n c l a i m of the will's
sel f - d e t e r m i n i n g power,

then one m u s t grant that the w i l l

had s o v e r e i g n t y over itself, a n d ac t e d i n d e p e n d e n t of a n y
an t e c e d e n t acts.

These c o n d itions w ere necessary,

the w i l l itself w o u l d have the p o w e r of volition,
something,
Further,

or some other agent,

so that
and not

outside of the will.

Edwards d e e m e d that the free a c t i o n of the w i l l

requi r e d a n e q u i l i b r i u m of the m i n d before determination,
a nd als o c o n t i n g e n c y of the will.

The m i n d m u s t be d e v o id

of a n y ant e c e d e n t causes or predil e c t i o n s that c o u l d e f 
fe c t the w i l l ' s d etermination.
gency

Edw a r d s d e f i n e d c o n t i n 

"not in the c o m m o n a c c e ptance of the w o r d . . . b u t as

op p os e d to all necessity,

32 Ibid.. p. 1^1.

or a n y f i x e d a n d c e r t a i n con-
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nection with some previous ground or reason for its ex
istence.'*^
i

These conditions isolated the will from any
i

motives other than the will itself.

Otherwise, Arminian

self-determination actually had another cause, and the
will was only the determined and not the determiner.
After outlining these necessary conditions for the
self-determination of the will, Edwards demonstrated that
such conditions could not exist.

First, self-determination

of the will could logically only mean that the soul, or
the individual, exercised the power of willing.
When it is said, the will decides or deter
mines, the meaning must be, that the person
in the exercise of a power of willing and
choosing, or the soul, acting voluntarily,
determines.34
Edwards, drawing support from Locke, stated that only
agents had the power of choice, and not the powers them
selves.

However, according to the Arminian notion, the

will determined its own free actsj therefore, a preceding
act of choice had determined every free act of the will.
If the will determines the will, then choice
orders and determines choicei and acts of
choice are subject to the decision, and fol
low the conduct of other acts of choice,35
In other words, a free act of the will depended upon all
previous acts of the will, which must be free.

33ibid.. pp. 164-165.
35lbld.. pp. 171-172.

In a

3^ibid.. p. 172.
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series of three acts of volition, the freedom of the third
act depended upon the freedom of the acts that had immedi
ately preceded it.

If the second, or the first act in

that series was not self-determined or free, then in a
like manner, that third act could not be free.

Further,

according to the above definition,' for the first act in
this series to be free, a preceding free act of the will
must have taken place— a contradiction in the given as
sumption that there were only three acts of volition in
the series.

The only remaining explanation, said Edwards,

was that the first act in the series was not free or selfdetermined, and therefore, all succeding acts were also
not free, but determined by that first act.36
Edwards' approach was reductio ad absurdum, or to
logically extend his opponents' key assumptions until
they contradicted themselves.

The statement that the will

determined volition became absurd when directed specifi
cally toward the first necessary resolution the will m a d e »
whether or not it would be free.

His argument, going be

yond whether the will had the power to choose, settled
upon whether or not it had the power to choose that it
would be free.

Edwards maintained that unless a free act

of the will made this decision, unrestrained and unaided,

36lbld.. p. 172.
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the will could not "be free, but was determined and bound.
Further, reason insisted that this determination was im
possible, as any free act required a preceding free act.
The only other explanation, then, was that this first act
of the will was uncaused, for if a cause existed outside
of the will itself, it would be determined and not free.
Yet one could not Imagine an effect without a cause, so
that the first determination must have had some other
foundation than the will itself.3 7
Edwards purposefully did not base his destruction
of free will upon traditional Puritan theology and scrip
tural proof.

Jonathan Dickinson had failed to refute the

Arminians because he depended upon the authority of the
scriptures, but his opponents had not accepted the primacy
of the scriptural word over reason.

Edwards, by attacking

the doctrine of free will on reasonable grounds, severed
the connection between Puritanism and scholastic epistemology.
The denial of man's free will, in turn, established
the necessity of God's absolute sovereignty, for man re
quired some first principle or first cause outside of him
self to control and direct his volitions.

Thus, having

sustained God's sovereignty, Edwards re-established the

37lbld., p. 181, and passim.
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validity of the arguments Dickinson had presented defend
ing emotional religion and man's passivity in s a l v a t i o n .
Edwards re-affirmed the principles of the Reformation and
the Great Awakening, but he placed these principles firmly
within the common sense framework of the eighteenth cen
tury.

In The Freedom of the W i l l , he successfully brought

together those two early attitudes that governed his lifei
experiential religion of the heart and Lockean psychology.
At this point in the treatise, Edwards had not ad
vanced much beyond John Locke.

He had described the in

consistency between free will and reason with greater
clarity and in greater detail, but for the purposes of the
controversy that he had enjoined, Edwards had to approach
the specific arguments of his opponents.

Edwards realized

that they were "Arminian" in the same manner that he was
"Calvinist."

He could not assume that all those labelled

as Arminian held only those beliefs taught by Daniel
Whitby, any more than as a Calvinist, he accepted every
thing taught by Calvin,39

He selected Whitby as an op

ponent because he was a central figure in the English
heresy, widely read and quoted by the American Armlnians.
Thomas Chubb, less well known in either America or England,

38supra, pp. 39-^0, and p. ^3.
39Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 131.
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was a Deist and represented what Jonathan Edwards be
lieved was the natural extention of Arminian thought.
His third opponent, Isaac Watts, represented the serious
breach that Edwards felt Arminianism was making within
his own. theological t r adition.^

With a defense this

broad, Edwards, by demonstrating the errors of only these
three divines, effectively blocked all Arminian arguments.
The first opponent Edwards challenged was Thomas
Chubb, a candle and glove maker who devoted his leisure
to the study of philosophy and theology.

Within the cir

cle of English Arminlans and Deists, Chubb managed to ob
tain some repute as both a theologian and philosopher,
although he lacked formal education.

Sir Leslie Stephen

described him as "a good Salisbury tallow-chandler, who
ingenuously confesses, whilst criticising the scriptures,
h,1
that he knows no language but his own."
A self-proclaimed
disciple of William Whiston and Samuel Clarke, Chubb began
his theological writing with a defense of Arianlsm in The
Supremacy of the Father Asserted (1715).

During his career,

he passed from Arianism to Soclnianism, and finally to
Deism.

He was the least educated of the English Deists,

but showed considerable natural ability.

According to

^ ° Ibld., pp. 65-6 6 . (Editor's Introduction.)
Ai
Stephen, The History of English Thought, vol.
1. P. 73.
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Stephen, Chubb's writings came after the culmination of
the Delstic movement, accounting for his negligible in
fluence , although he had encompassed nearly the entire
spectrum of Deistic b e l i e f s . ^
A Collection of Tracts on Various Subjects (1730)
contained the arguments for free will that Edwards chal
lenged.

Chub had stated that the mind can choose to

comply with the motives that influenced the will, or to
refuse them.

"Man has the power, and is as much at lib

erty to reject the motive that does prevail as he has
power, and is at liberty to reject those motive that do
not,"^3

in other words, Chubb granted that man's will

and man's desire were not the same, nor did choice proceed
from previous dispositions of the mind.

Man was at per

fect liberty to accept or reject any motive that influen
ced the will.

By this separation of will and motive,

Chubb argued that an effect could be uncaused, or without
any necessary connection between cause and effect.

The

will "apparently acts wholly without motive, without any
previous reason to dispose the mind to it."

However, this

^2Ibld,, vol. 1, pp. 138-140, and Edwards, Freedom
of the W i l l , p. 6 7 . (Editor's Introduction.)
^ T h o m a s Chubb, A Collection of Tracts on Various
Subjects (London* 1730), quoted in Edwards, Freedom of the
W i l l , pp. 226-227.
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statement contradicted a condition that Chubb had out
lined in the same tract*

"no action can take place with

out some motive to excite i t . " ^
In addition to this contradiction, Edwards stated
that Chubb's concept of liberty was liberty of the will
from reason.

Reason and will were described as separate

faculties of the mind, in order to allow the will free
dom and to remove the necessary connection between will
and the last dictate of the understanding.

Thus, Chubb's

definition of liberty and will conformed more closely
with scholastic epistemology than with Locke’s mixed modes.
The absurdity of Chubb's argument was "certainly as much
to say there is previous ground and reason in the motive
for the act of preference, and yet no previous ground for
i t ."^5
Daniel Whitby offered Edwards a much more difficult
challenge.

Whitby was better educated than Chubb, he had

received his D.D. from Trinity College in 1672, and had
acquired wide recognition in England and in America as a
polemical divine.

Beach, Johnson, and other American

Anglicans adapted their Arminian arguments directly from
Whitby's tracts.

Jonathan Edwards himself became enmeshed

in the question of free will through Whitby’s discourses,

^ Ibld. . p. 230.

^ 5Ibld.. p. 231.

86
and in 17^6 asked Joseph Bellamy to ask Dr. Johnson if
anyone else was better versed in the Arminian notion of
free w i l l . ^

Whitby had adopted his heterodoxical views

prior to 1700, and with Dr. Samuel Clark's publication
of The Scripture-Doctrine of the Trinity in 1712, became
an Arian as well as an Arminian.

At his death in 1726,

he held an extreme Arminianism, but did not approach the
Deism of Thomas Chubb.
Whitby wrote several tracts attacking the Calvin
ist principles of the English theologian John Edwards^?
which were published in 1710 as the Discourse on the Five
P o i n t s In Freedom of the W i l l , Edwards directed his
his assault upon this work, especially Discourse IV, "The
Liberty of the Will of Man in a State of Trial and Pro-

^Williams, Six Letters of Jonathan Edwards, pp.
230-231.
John Edwards was an English polemlst who died in
1716. His dissenting views and rigid Calvinism, forced
his resignation from St. Johns College in Cambridge in
1670, because he conflicted with the 1662 Act of Unifor
mity.
He retired from the pulpit in 1686, and until his
death, published against the Arminian heresy that was
permeating the Church of England.
Sidney Lee, editor,
Dictionary of National Biography, vol. VI (London 1
Smith,"Elder, and Co., 1908), pp. 539-5^1.
^ E d w a r d s simplified the title of Whitby's tract,
The Dummer Collection at Yale College listed it as Dis
courses on the Qulnquartlcular Controversy. Edwards,
Freedom of the W i l l , pp."'62-6 3 . (Editor"'s Introduction. )
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bation."^9

in this discourse, Whitby ventured beyond

the traditional Arminian position and departed from the
more specifically theological defense of the five prin
ciples.^®
Whitby had asserted that if God had absolute and
perfect foreknowledge of the free actions of a moral
agent, that foreknowledge could not affect the individual's
free decisions.

A basic tenet of traditional Calvinism

stated that God did have perfect foreknowledge, and that
foreknowledge restricted man's will.

The American Puri

tan tradition modified that principle, not to denigrate
God's omniscience, but to allow man more freedom in that
scheme.

Whitby's statement went beyond Puritan volun

tarism and insisted that God's foreknowledge had no ef
fect on the determination of human events, and that man's
will was not subject to the divine will.

He stated that

foreknowledge had as little effect in the determination
of events as afterknowledge.

"God's prescience is not

the cause of things future, their being future is the
cause of God's prescience that they will be."-^

^•9Ibid. . p. 82.
50supra, pp. 30-31 . Arminians traditionally were
concerned less with free will (specifically a doctrine of
Pelagianism), than in Insisting upon conditional grace
over irresistable grace.
Whitby then modified Arminianism
from that condemned at the Synod of Dort in l6l8.
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Whitby did not deny that God had foreknowledge of
man's volitions.
not determination.

God was omniscient, but omniscience was
Edwards stated that Whitby's view

contradicted reason, for common sense dictated that God's
prescience of the volitions of moral agents was incon
sistent with the contingency of events.

Arminians argued,

in essence, that man was under no restraint or "coaction,"
yet because they allowed God's foreknowledge, these sup
posedly voluntary moral actions were necessary and deter
mined, -52

God could not foreknow events unless they were

to happen, and since they were foreknown, they must hap
pen, and therefore, were determined.

Whitby had argued

that the free actions of the individual were necessary
for man to act morally, but like the Puritans, held that
to obtain salvation, man must comply with the teachings
of God.

To Edwards, this Inconsistency Indicated that

the Arminians were as guilty as the Puritans in implying
a doctrine of fatality.53
Edwards questioned Whitby's reliance upon the
contingency of events rather than prior determination.

51 Daniel Whitby, Discourse on the Five Points,
quoted in Edwards, Freedom of the Will, pp. 262-253.
•52Edwards, Freedom of the W i l l , p. 271.
5 3 ibid.. p. 269, and pp. 270-271.
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By contingency, the free actions of individuals, and not
God, determined the future state of the world.

The course

of events depended upon "millions and millions of voli
tions," so that a single event could drastically change
the future for all succeeding g e n e r a t i o n s .5^

The whole

divine order and purpose rested upon contingency and not
God's sovereignty.

Therefore, man's independent actions

could thwart all biblical predictions, and God was "liable
to be frustrated of His e n d . "55

Edwards admitted that the

Puritan doctrine of necessity had restricted human liberty,
but the Arminians, through contingency, had restricted
the liberty of God.

They had, in effect, denied moral

agency to the most perfect moral agent— an absurd conclu
sion.
The essential qualities of a moral agent are
in God, in the greatest possible perfections}
such as understanding to perceive the differ
ence between moral good and evil...and a
power of acting according to his choice or
pleasure, and being capable of doing those
things which are in the highest sense of praise
worthy. 58
In the process of the will's determination, nec
essity and contingency again came in conflict.
argued that free acts must be contingent.

Whitby had

He did not

state with Chubb that acts of the will were uncaused, so

5^ibia., p. 2^8
56ibia., p. 166.

55ibia.. p. 255 .
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that the will's determination must depend upon antecedent
choices.57

Therefore, the will was not contingent, but

previous choice had determined the action of the will, and
made it necessary.
An yet they say, necessity is utterly in
consistent with liberty.
So that, by their
scheme, the acts of the will can't be free
unless they are necessary, and yet cannot
be free if they are necessary.58
Whitby claimed the impossible! contingency belonged to the
notion of liberty, yet was inconsistent with it.

Edwards

argued that Whitby's liberty, like Chubb's, was liberty
to act unintelligently and unreasonably, without the gui
dance of understanding.59

The Arminian argument could be

sound only if reason and will were separate, or "as long
as the will awaits outside the council chamber of specu
lation. "60
Isaac Watts, the most moderate of these divines,
was one of the most popular writers of the day.

His Cate

chisms. Or Instructions in the Principles of the Christian
Religion (1730) and A Short View of the Whole Scripture
History (1732) were standard works in England at mid-

5?Supra. pp. 77-78.
58Edwards, Freedom of the W i l l , pp. 270-271.
59lbld.. p. 273.
^°Mlller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 25*K
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century, but his greatest reputation resulted from his
hymns.

Although he was affected by the Arian heresy, he

never widely departed from the mainstream of Puritan
thought in either his theology or his hymnody.^l

In 1732

he wrote An Essay on Freedom of Will in God and in Crea
tures . expressing a mildly Arminian view.

He stated that

"spirits, which are beings of active nature," have the
power within themselves to make determinations.^2

Edwards

countered that the soul could not determine itself as
Watts suggested, because the mind cannot be the determin
ing cause of its own actions,

Edwards pointed out that

the soul, or spirit within the mind, was merely a linguis
tic substitution for will, and allowed the creature no
greater freedom.

"Therefore the activity of the nature

of the soul affords no relief from the difficulties which
the notion of a self-determining power in the will is at
tended with."^3
Edwards treated these three divines in the same
fashion? he demonstrated the inconsistencies and absur
dities within each's argument for free will in the manner

^ S i d n e y Lee, editor, Dictionary of National Bio
graphy , vol. XX, pp. 978-981.
^Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 186.
63lbld., p. 189.
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first outlined by J o h n Locke.

The process of v o l i t i o n

requi r e d a n agent and a cause outside of the w i l l itself,
so that the w i l l could not be self-caused.

Chubb,

Whitby,

and Watts each desc r i b e d d i f f e r e n t me c h a n i s m s for v o l i 
tion, but each c o n t r adicted the conditions n e c e s s a r y for
free determination.
of each,

By a n s w e r i n g the specific arguments

Edwards u n d e r m i n e d the f o u n d a t i o n of A r m i n l a n i s m

and u p h e l d the Puritan doctrine of n e c e s s i t y and the s o v 
ereignty of God on w h o l l y m o d e r n grounds.
A f t e r r e m o v i n g the major s t umbling block,

free

will, Edwards turned to questions of mo r a l a g e n c y that
W hitby had raised and that had occupied A m e r i c a n polemists.
W h i t b y stated that if h u m a n actions were necessary,

then

virtue and vice were empty names, a n d m a n was not a c c o u n t 
able for sin.
First, he said,

Edwards a n s w e r e d W h i t b y f r o m the scriptures.
"if there be any truth in C h r i s t i a n i t y or

in the h o l y scriptures,

the m a n Christ Jesus had his w i l l

infallibly, unalterably, and u n f r u s t r a b l y d e t e r m i n e d to
good and to that a l o n e . E d w a r d s

dou b t e d that any w o u l d

claim that Jesus was not virtuous or praiseworthy,

although

His w i l l was d e t e r m i n e d . .The A r m i n i a n statement that praise
and blame, virtue and vice could n o t exist w h e n man's
actions were determined,

c o n t r a d i c t e d the sense of the

6^ Ibld.. pp. 289-290.
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scriptures,

These conditions could not apply to Christ's

actions, and likewise, would not apply to man's.

If the

perfect moral agent lost no virtue because of determina
tion, then human actions, although determined, would also
deserve praise and blame.

Second, the Arminian notion

questioned the need for Christ's atonement for man's sin,
Whitby held that determination removed the accountability
for sin from man, and therefore, the imputation of blame
as well.

Without the pollution of sin, God had no need

to sacrifice His son.

This scheme perverted the entire

gospel and made Christ's atonement completely unnecessary.^
The most difficult argument that the Arminians
posed, claimed that the Puritan doctrine of necessity
made the first cause and orderer of all things /God7 the
author of s i n . ^
waysi

Edwards defined "author of sin" in two

the doer of an evil act, and the permitter of an

evil deed.

"*Tis manifest, that God sometimes permits sin

to be committed, and at the same times orders things so,
that if He permits the fact, it will come to pass."^?

God

had a completely passive role in the occurrence of sinj

65ibld., p. 3 0 1 .

66Ibld., p. 397.

67ibld., p. 403.
See also A. B. Crabtree, Jonathan
Edwards View of M a m
A Study in Eighteenth Century Calvin
ism (Wallington Surrey, Englandi
The Religious Education
Press, Ltd., 19^8), pp. 8-9, and p. 50.
Crabtree presents
seven means that reformed theologians used to expiate God's
responsibility for sin. Edwards, in choosing "permission"

through His Infinite foreknowledge, He knew that man would
sin, and permitted it to take place,

The permission of

sin and the performance of that sin differed greatly, so
that to accuse God of the latter was blasphemous, while
the former was not reproachful to His character.

Edwards

stated that God permitted sin because that permission
created greater good within the divine scheme, than if He
had forbade it.

He offered the example of Joseph’s en

slavement by his brother^' evil act.

They intended evil

and harm to Joseph, but God's ordering and determining
created greater good than if they had not sinned.

"As for

you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it unto
good.
The doctrine of necessity supposed all events were
connected to some antecedent ground and reason, and there
fore, man had the means to prove the existence of God.
In contrast, the Arminian doctrine of contingence, or that
events had no dependence upon preceding causes, took away
all such proof.^9

Arminians dispensed with all such

was not novel, since he had such predecessors as Hollinger
and Voetius.
However, Edwards used "permission" differently
than these earlier theologians, as he had severed the con
nection with scholastic rationalism.
Genesis 50*20, and Edwards, Freedom of the Will,
p. 406.
For Joseph Bellamy's application of permission
beyond Edwards, infra, pp. 153.
^ Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. ^05.
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notions of w o r l d order or a grand d e s i g n on the part of
God.

The y tended t o ward a mechan i s t i c cosmos,

God, a n d instilled w i t h reason.

However,

c reated by

that reasonable

order was human, c o n t i n g e n t u p o n m i l l i o n s and m i l lions
of volitions by finite men.

S u c h a p l a n could have no

other result than to d e s t r o y w h a t e v e r order God h a d i n 
tended.

Edwards a r g u e d that the m a intenance

of the grand

d e s i g n n e c e s s i t a t e d that this reasonable order be d e p e n 
d e n t u p o n God, and not u p o n m a n and man's w i l l . ? ®
Edwards a d m i t t e d that the Pur i t a n doctrine of the
s ove r e i g n t y of God p l a c e d limits u p o n ma n ' s reason, but
t h e s e ’wer e the n a t u r a l limitations of a finite creature.
The A r m i n i a n s , in a d v a n c i n g ma n ' s reason,
u p o n the finite creature,

placed no limits

but by so doing", limited God.

One could not r e a s o n a b l y suppose that the cre a t o r could
al l o w his creations g r e a t e r liberty tha n Himself, wit h o ut
fear of f r u s t r a t i n g the divine order,
plan.

Both the g o s p e l and the sacrifice

purposeless,
of men.

or His p r e determined

if His w i l l were

of God's son were

limited by the free actions

Edwards u n i t e d b i b l i c a l proof and r e a s o n to halt

the A r m i n i a n s u b v ersion of the grand d e s i g n of God and to
rescue the great P u r i t a n doctrine of the s o v e r e i g n t y of
God,

?°Ibld., p. 420.
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E dwards had b e g u n to reconcile the two chief a t t i 
tudes that d o m i n a t e d his p e r s o n a l i n t e l l e c t u a l and r e l i 
gious life.

He d e m o n s t r a t e d that Loc k e a n e p i s t e m o l o g y

supported the central doctrine of Pu r i t a n e x p e r i e n t i a l
r e l i g i o n — the s o v e r e i g n t y of God, and u n d e r m i n e d the c e n 
tral theme of the A r m i n i a n detractors.

As k n o w l e d g e of

the sovere i g n t y of God was the first step in s a ving c o n 
version,

so was it the first step in e s t a b l i s h i n g the new

reasonable religion.
vided that foundation,

Edwards' F r e e d o m of the W i l l p r o 
but other f u n d a m e n t a l tenets of

P u r it a n i s m r e q u i r e d that same profound redefinition.

CHAPTER IV
THE GREAT CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN, DEFENDEDI
THE NEW ENGLAND PURITAN RESPONSE TO JOHN TAYLOR’S
SCRIPTURE-DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN
With Jonathan Edwards' defense of the Puritan doc
trine of the sovereignty of God in 175^» that controversy
in New England slipped into the background.

The Arminians,

lacking any effective counter arguments for The Freedom of
the Wi l l , levelled only claims that Edwards was too meta
physical and had clouded the issues with his reductio ad
absurdum.

Further, Edwards, by ignoring the specific ar

guments posed by either the Anglicans or the liberal Puri
tans , had removed the controversy from the American exper
ience.

He had argued against position that the liberals

had also avoided— they had not argued freedom of the will,
but only the right of private judgment.

But the major

reason that the liberals Ignored Edwards' treatise was that
the nature of the controversy had shifted.

The liberals

and the moderate Puritans now clashed over the pollution
of Adam's sin.
From the time of St. Augustine, the question of
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free will included the scriptural argument on the doctrine
of original sin.1

In the eighteenth century, John Taylor

broached this question in his Scripture-Doctrine of Ori
ginal S i n , published in 17^0.^

Taylor's treatise renewed

protest against the ancient Christian doctrine that held
that the imputation of Adam's first sin tainted and pol
luted all of his posterity.

Traditional Christianity

taught that man's original corruption was necessary in the
redemptive scheme.

Romans 5«19 stated, "For as by one

man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obed
ience of one shall many be made righteous.''

Through Adam,

the natural head of mankind, all were made sinners and de-

^The doctrine of original sin, with its roots in
the Old Testament, traced m a n ’s natural depravity to Adam's
fall from grace.
By that fall, all men were placed in dis
favor with God.
Paul, in Romans 5«18-19— "Therefore as by
the offense of one .judgment came upon all men to condemna
tion...For as by one man's disobedience many were made sin
ners..."— established the covenant relationship between sin's
entrance into the world, and man's deliverance from that
sin. However, until the early fifth century, during the de
bate between St. Augustine and Pelagius, no one had under
taken a systematic study of original sin. St. Augustine
described man's fall as complete, so that all of Adam's
posterity received his "spoilt seed” and lacked the ability
to will good. James Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and
Ethics. vol. 9» PP. 559-561.
2John Taylor of Norwlck, England, (169^-1761) wrote
the Scripture-Doctrlne of Original Sin in 1735. "but some
dispute exists over the actual publication date.
Perry :
Miller, Jonathan Edwards, cites the date as 1738, while both
the Dictionary of National Biography and Jeremy Goring,
"Calvinism in Decay," Hibbert Journal, vol. 60, p. 206,
give the date as 17^-0.
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serving damnation, just as through the sacrifice of Christ,
mankind's spiritual head, God offered salvation to His
predestined elect.
Puritan covenant or federal theology softened God's
determinism, but did not lessen the effects of the impu
tation of Adam's sin.

If man were not depraved and ori

ginally corrupt, Christ's atonement and sacrifice were
superfluous.

The atonement included a change of state,

regeneration or circumcision of the heart? man must neces
sarily have been in an evil state for God to change his
heart to good.^

The sixteenth century Reformation had af

firmed the inability of sinful man to gain his own salva
tion.

The spirit of renewal during the Great Awakening

similarily emphasized man's depravity and the divine beauty
.of God.

Puritan experiential religion depended upon a close

connection between the doctrines of original sin and the
sovereignty of God? man's passivity and God's absolute de
termination in the affair of salvation reflected man's ori
ginal corruption.
In the disruption of orthodoxy caused by the Latitudinarians and Arminians in eighteenth century England,
the Christian doctrine also came under scrutiny.

John

3Joseph Haroutanian, Piety Versus Morallsm, the
Passing of New England Theology (Hamden, Connecticut?
Archon Books, 1965), pp. 20-21.
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Taylor's Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin renewed the
attack upon this fundamental doctrine of the Reformed
Churches In the same manner In which Christ's divinity and
the sovereignty of God had earlier been questioned.
questioned original sin on two grounds«
ture,

Taylor

reason and scrip

He examined the Greek and Hebrew texts and found

mistranslations that had been used incorrectly to estab
lish the doctine.

In this manner, he posited an opposing

view to St. Augustine's doctrine, that withstood traditional
Puritan counter arguments.

An Irish minister, reacting to

the treatise, stated "it is a bad book, and a dangerous
book, and an heretical booki and, what is worse than all,
the book is unanswerable.

Taylor expressed similar con

fidence, calling his tract the final blow to Calvinism.
Sereno Dwight, in his 1829 biography of Jonathan Edwards,
stated that Edwards' answer to Taylor's treatise dealt such
an unexpected blow to the confident Arminian, that it
brought about his early death.5
J o h n Taylor, r e p u t e d l y the best Hebraic s cholar in
England, had a t t e n d e d the liberal academies at F i n d e n and

^Goring, Calvinism in Decay, p. 206, and Jonathan
Edwards, The Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin. De
fended. Clyde A. Holbrook, editor (New HavenV Yale University Press, 1970). p. 3.
(Editor's Introduction.)
■^Edwards, O r i g i n a l Sin,
tion. )

p. 3. (Editor's I n t r o d u c 
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Whitehaven.

Despite their emphasis upon free thinking, he

did not drift away from orthodoxy until after he had left
school and entered the ministry.

While in college, he had

read the works of Philip van Limborch, the Dutch Remon
strant^, but these heretical ideas did not immediately in
fluence his theology.

His defection to Arminianism became

apparent only after his acceptance of the assistant pastor
ship at Norwich, England, in 1733.

Taylor wrote his trea

tise on original sin two years later, and followed in 17^5
with The Key to the Apostolic Writings. and in 1751 with
The Scripture-Doctrine of the Atonement.

Taken together,

these three books hastened the decline of rigid Calvinism
in England, in Scotland, and in America.^
The Scripture-Doctrine of Original S i n , the most
important of these three books in America, received wide
attention from both Arminian and Calvinist clerics.

Taylor's

extensive Hebraic scholarship, combined with Lockean epistemology, created an attack upon the orthodox view unlike
any that had preceded it.

He exploded the federal relation

ship of Adam to his posterity, as inconsistent with reason.
Taylor stated that unless man had some voice in the choos
ing of his personal representative, then he lacked respon-

^Supra. p. lOn,
?Goring, Calvinism in Decay, p. 206.
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s ibili t y for that r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ’s actions.

In the case

of Adam, he became m a n k i n d ' s f e d e r a l h e a d only through
divine decree, and w i t h o u t m a n ’s concurrence,
pos t e r i t y could not share in A d a m ’s guilt.

so that his

Further,

Taylor

stated that the H e b r e w texts s c r i p t u r a l l y d e m o n s t r a t e d
that m a n did not suffer the guilt of A d a m ’s sin, but only
its consequences.
Taylor div i d e d The Sc r i p t u r e - D o c t r i n e of Original
S in int.o three parts.

The first two were c r i t i c a l e x a m i 

n a t ion s of the G r e e k a n d H e b r e w b i b l i c a l t e x t s , a n d the
third d e a l t w i t h m o r a l theology.

The last part gain e d the

most a t t e n t i o n a m o n g his contemporaries,

as he a t t a c k e d

Calvin i s t a s s u m p t i o n s r e g a r d i n g origi n a l sin.
Essentially,

T a y l o r a r g u e d that the d o c trine of

origin a l sin was the i n v e n t i o n of St. Augu s t i n e a n d that
the A p o s t o l i c Church had not h eld such a view.
he claimed,

There were,

at m o s t five r e f e rences in the Bible that e x 

p l i c i t l y d e s c r i b e d the c o n s e q u e n c e s of man's fi r s t t r a n s 
gression.
were

Two of these w ere in the Old Test a m e n t a n d three

in the New.®

He d e n i e d that a n y of these r e f e rences

®The two Old T e s t a m e n t citations wer e Genesis 2il7,
"But of the tree of the know l e d g e of good and evil, thou
shalt not eat of itj for in the d a y that thou eatest thereof
thou shalt s u rely die," a n d Genesis 3*7 to the end of the
chapter.
This passage d e s c r i b e d the pun i s h m e n t God levied
for Ad am's transgression.
God t h r e a t e n e d A d a m w i t h death
in the f i r s t reference, b u t a c c o r d i n g to the second, that
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established the federal nature of Adam, so that all of his
posterity could not have shared in the guilt of his sin,
but only in its consequences,

Adam brought death into the

world, but only physical death, or the loss of immortality.
This, he stated, was not a punishment, but a blessing, for
how else could man enter into the Kingdom of God, save by
dying,9

Taylor based his argument upon original guilt

rather than original sin.

Man could not be blamed for

sharing in the sin of Adam, any more than the family of a
criminal shared in the guilt of the father*s crimes.

The

father in this case, as with Adam, was the natural or fed
eral head of the family.

The guilt in either instance was

not imputed to the posterity, but only the consequences of
that guilt.

The criminal's family would suffer because

of his crime, but they would not share in the responsibility
of blame.

death was only the loss of immortality.
In the New Testa
ment there were Romans 5*12-21, especially verse twelvei
"Wherefore, as by one sin entered into the world and death
by sin; and so death passed to all men, for that all men
have sinned," I Corinthians 15*21-22;
"For since by man
came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead.
For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be
made alive," and I Timothy 2;l4i
"And Adam was not de
ceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgres
sion. "
^John Taylor, "The Scripture-Doctrine of Original
Sin," Hlbbert Journal, vol. 6l, pp. 91-92.
This journal
article contained only excerpts from the third section of
John Taylor's full treatise.

10^
Original guilt and the nature of representation
reflected the changing thought in the eighteenth century.
Guilt Implied the action of an agent, with the agent ac
countable for his performance.

Man in "sinning with Adam"

did not willfully join Adam in the performance of sin, and
therefore, suffered only the consequences of that sin, the
fall from grace, but not the pollution of guilt.

In a

like manner, representation could not be absolutely decreed
or imposed upon mankind.

They must have shared in the

choosing in order to have shared in the responsibility of
their representatives guilt.

If man neither willfully sin

ned, nor selected his representatives, then reasonably, he
could not suffer the actual guilt for another's actions.
Further, Taylor admitted that sin and corruption
were in the world, but the cause of that sin must be in
man himself, and original sin gave a false cause.
Doth not the doctrine of original sin teach
you to transfer your wickedness and sin to
a wrong cause i whereas you ought to blame
or condemn yourself alone for any wicked
lusts which prevail in your heart...you lay
the whole u p o n A d a m . 10
Taylor felt that the doctrine of original sin imputed the
cause of man's sin to a pollution or corruption of the
nature of man.

Extended logically, this doctrine imputed

the cause of sin to God, rather than to man.

l°Ibid.. p. 91.

Assuming a
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pollution of man's nature, meant that man was necessarily
vicious and sinful,

And if sin were natural and unavoid

able , there could be no guilt or condemnation for that
which one could not avoid.

Taylor felt, then, that the

doctrine of original sin subverted the Christian practices
of sobriety, righteousness, and charity; original sin cor
rupted the basic Christian ethical system and was blasphe
mous to God.

Christians needed to emphasize the encour

agement offered by Christ's redemption, rather than a state
of wretchedness that rendered man's reasonable powers
11
quite useless. A
New England clerics made no immediate response to
Taylor's treatise, although it must have had wide circu
lation in the early 1 7 ^ 0 ' s . ^

However, until after the

middle of the 17 5 0 's, the doctrine of original sin was
only a secondary issue.

The Anglican Arminians, Dr, Samuel

Johnson and John Beach, had attacked that doctrine, but
they had directed the brunt of their assault against the
sovereignty of God.*3

Until the publication of the Freedom

11Ibld.. p. 9 1 .
12h, Sheldon Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original
Sin; A Study in American Theology Since 1750 (New Yorki
Charles"Scribner*s S o n s 1955)» PP. 1 ^ - 1 5 . Smith cites
Samuel Hopkins reading the tract at the age of twenty-three
(he was born in 1721), and assumed that it was widely cir
culated late in the 1740's,
Jonathan Edwards had received
a copy from John Erskine of Scotland in 17^8.
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of the Will in 175^» the liberal wing of the Puritan
Church placed little emphasis on original sin.

Edwards,

by undermining the arguments for man's free will and moral
agency, shifted the controversy to the doctrine of original
sin.

Liberals, in attacking the Freedom of the W i l l , as

serted that Edwards' use of Locke was abuse, and that by
establishing "a theoretical necessity of sin, it destroyed
1itthe sinfulness of sin."x
With this apparent chink in
Puritan orthodoxy created by the earlier controversy,
Samuel Webster published A Winter's Evening Conversation
upon the Doctrine of Original Sin in 1757» attacking that
Puritan doctrine.
At the time of publication, Webster was not one of
the more prominent clergymen in New England,

He had earned

his B.A. and M.A. at Harvard College, the latter in 17^0,
and settled as minister of the Rocky Church of the West
Parish of Salisbury.

Prior to the Winter's Evening Conver-

sation, he was unknown as a polemical divine, and even as
the controversy progressed, his principle rival, Peter
Clark, knew him only as the author of that heretical pamph
let.

The controversy removed Webster's obscurity as his

works became widely read throughout New England.

^ Supra. pp. 35-36.
^ M iller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 268.

By 177^
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he had gained sufficient repute to be asked to deliver the
Dudleighean Lecture at Harvard, an honor stemming from his
attack upon the doctrine of original sin,1-5
The "conversation'' was a dialogue between two Puri
tan laymen and a liberal clergyman.

The laymen had raised

the question whether the doctrine of original sin was a
fundamental statement in Christian orthodoxy.

The cleric's

answer, in denying original sin, offered a watered-down
version of John Taylor's tract, without the scriptural
arguments.

The clergyman skillfully exploded the federal

relationship of Adam to his posterity, using the catch
phrases of Taylor.

He argued that even if Adam was the

chosen representative of mankind, and committed sin, the
guilt could not be imputed to his posterity. .The effector
of the sin alone was balmeable for the guilt; mankind suf
fered only the folly and ill consequences of sin.

He con

cluded that if man received no taint from the sin of a
chosen representative, then certainly the sin of one who
was not his chosen representative could not be imputed,1^

^Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 10, p.
253.
l6

Supra, p., 101, and pp. 104-105.
Webster argued
Taylor's point regarding original guilt rather than ori
ginal sin, and guilt required man's moral agency.
Both
the position on guilt and the demands concerning repre
sentation negated the idea of the imputation of original
sin to mankind.
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Webster's cleric followed closely Taylor's other major
argumentsi

original sin was the invention of St. Augus-.

tine1?, death was a blessing to man and not a punishment,
and there was little scriptural support for this doctrine.1®
Webster differed from Taylor in applying the effects
of the imputation of Adam's sin upon newborn children.
Taylor originated the point, but Webster changed the empha
sis.

Instead of being merely an application of the doc

trine of original sin, infant damnation became the funda
mental issue between moderate Puritans and the liberals.
The argument, while based in reason, was charged with emo
tion.

Webster asked what was the nature of a God that

would condemn a stillborn or newborn child for A d a m ’s sin,
a sin which reflected no fault or wrongdoing on the part
of the child?

"How can you reconcile, the goodness, holi

ness, or justice of God, to make them heirs of Hell, and
send them into the world only to breathe and die, and then
take them to Hell?"19

The question of infant damnation was

the most compelling argument posed by Webster? an argument
that many Puritans were wont to answer.

Webster pushed the

1^Samuel Webster, The Winter's Evening Conversation
upon the Doctrine of Original Sin (Boston» Green and Rus
sell, 1757), p. 4, and p. 2 3 .
^ Ibld. . p. 1 3 , and passim.

19Ibld., p. 6.
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argument to the extreme, and. stated that if the infants
were not sinners before the imputation of Adam's sin, then
the imputation alone made these infants sinners and deserv
ing of eternal damnation.

If this were the case, the

author of that imputation was the cause of their sin and
alone was blameable.

The creator of all that was good and

holy could not also be the author of all that was evil.
Thus, Webster argued, the doctrine of original sin did not
reflect well upon the character of God, and the holders of
such doctrine were guilty of blasphemy.

OA

Peter Clark, the minister at Danvers, took issue
with Webster's claims the following year.

The title of his

tract, The Scripture-Doctrine of Original Sin, Stated, and
Defended In a Summer-Morning Conversation. Between a Minis
ter and a Neighbor, indicated that he was examining original
sin in the harsh light of reason, Instead of the idle specu
lation of a "Winter's Evening Conversation."

Clark had

earned a reputation as a champion of reason in an earlier
controversy with the Baptists (1735)* and was considerably
better known than Webster.2*

Clark was a conservative

minister of the same ilk as Joseph Sewall and Thomas Prince,22

2QIbld.. p. 2 7 .

61.7 .

2^Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 5» p.
:
:
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He had welcomed the Great Awakening and supported evangelicalsism, but like most of the Boston clergy, opposed enthu
siasm.

Clark's tract maintained the mechanical framework

begun by Websteri

the reluctant layman, reflecting upon

the ideas that Webster had presented, entertained doubts
about the liberal view.

However, instead of returning with

his questions to the "Winter's Evening" minister, the lay
man went to his own, a moderate Puritan.

The question of

infant damnation disturbed neither the layman nor the
cleric; they stated that the major conflict between Puri
tans and Arminians was whether original sin was a funda
mental doctrine. . Clark dismissed infant damnation in the
preface of this trace as among the secret things which be
longed only to God,

Again in the body, he referred to in

fant damnation as a "thing which few or none maintain,"
but otherwise ignored it as a major issue in the contro
versy .^3
Peter Clark's Summer-Morning Conversation presaged
many of the arguments that Jonathan Edwards would use to

??
Joseph Sewall and Thomas Prince, two of the older
moderate leaders in Boston, shared the pulpit of the Old
South Church from 1718 until Prince's death in 1758.
23peter-Clark, The Scrlpture-Doctrlne of Original
Sin. Stated and Defended in a Summer-Morning Conversation,
between a Minister and a" Neighbor (Bostoni S. Kneeland.
i'758 )t P. i» and p. 6.
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explode John Taylor's tract.

He combined reason and scrip

ture in the manner of Edwards, but his argument had one
major deficiency, he rigidly retained federal theology.
In so dbing, he denied man the right to choose his own re
presentatives.

An act of God established Adam as the fed

eral head of mankind} God covenanted with the whole of
mankind, when Adam was the whole of mankind, for, as Clark
argued, Adam's posterity "are but Adam multiplied."2^

Adam

was the natural representative of mankind, as parents are
the natural representatives of their children.

The federal

relationship, then, was merely the continuation of a law
of nature.2-5

Clark was unwilling to surrender this argu

ment, as he saw covenant theology, complete with original
sin, as the major discord between Webster and himself.

If

Adam were not the head of physical mankind, as Christ was
the head of spiritual mankind, then the entire Puritan
redemptive scheme failed.

Sin entered the world by Adam,

and redemption by Christ.

Man was totally depraved and

corrupt by nature, which established original sin as a
fundamental doctrine.

Clark correctly centered the contro

versy on the relationship of original sin to the redemption
by Christ, but placed his defense in an untenable position
through his insistence upon federal theology.

2^Ibld.. p. 21.

25Ibld.. p. 17.
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Clark denied that St. Augustine had invented the
doctrine of original sin.

St, Augustine had given the be

lief a name, but the doctrine itself had Old Testament
roots, and was generally received and confessed in Apostolic
times.

As the name was lacking before the fifth century,

one could not expect to find references to "original sin"
in the scripture, but it "was copiously and in a great
variety of terms asserted and explained therein,"2 ?

Clark

cited several additional texts, not cited by Webster, like
Genesis 6 *5• which while not referring directly to Adam's
sin, did "teach and prove the original and universal depra
vation of man's nature from its effects."2®
Probably the most important point that Clark made
dealt with the claim that the doctrine of original sin
made God the author of man's sin.

He defined sin as a pri

vation of moral good, and therefore, had no efficient cause
that one could impute to God,

Man, in the case of sin, was

not a moral agent or efficient cause of sin, but only the
deficient cause.
good.

Man sinned because he failed to perform

Clark's answer was incomplete, but pointed toward

26Ibld., pp. 99-10 0 .

2?Ibld., p. 1 2 5 .

2® Ibld.. p. 7^.
Genesis 615 stated, "And God saw
that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that
every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil
continually."
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the argument that Edwards expressed upon the nature of sin.
But more importantly, Clark uncovered a basic difference
between the Puritan and Arminian view of sin.

To the

former, sin was a lack of good, the Inability to perform
righteous actsj in other words, it was a part of the basic
nature of man.

Arminlans viewed sin from the standpoint

of guilt, and guilt required the performance of unholy acts,
instead of an original corruption or a polluted nature.
The individual's personal activity had to deserve damna
tion.

Therefore, the questions that Webster posed were

not valid in the Puritan sense, and Clark, mistakenly, did
not dismiss them, rather than agreeing that few held such
feelings or that infant damnation belonged to the secret
things of God.
In the pamphlet dispute that followed, one point,
infant damnation, became the major contention between
moderate and liberal Puritans.

Charles Chauncy and Edmund

March .joined Webster in defenses of the Winter's Evening
Conversation, and all three liberal clerics insisted that
Clark had Ignored the major dispute, that Calvinism advo
cated infant damnation.

Chauncy and March ignored the body

of the tract, and directed their writings to the preface.
Edmund March advised the attestors to Clark's defense to
temper his statements.

He asked them why, in Clark's

tract, infants were a special case, that they were not

Ill*
subject to the federal liableness for Adam's sin,

"while

othersj viz.»

all that live to years, etc. remain under

the same?"3°

Chauncy exploited the same inconsistency in

Clark's scheme.

Puritans viewed the whole of Adam's pos

terity as liable to eternal death for Adam's sin, but
Clark's doctrine allowed some of Adam's posterity, namely
infants, exception from damnation.

Chauncy accused Clark

of substituting "the private opinions of such men as Mr.
Locke and Taylor, in the room of universally known tenets
of Calvinism,"31

Clark had made the damnation of infants

a special case, and in that instance agreed with the lib
eral position.

Chauncy assumed that Clark's silence con

noted total agreement with Webster and a significant modi
fication*

"I rather think the better of him for not say

ing, with the Calvinists, that the first sin is so imputed
to them /infants/, as that they are liable to the damna-

^The attestors to Clark's tract were Joseph Sewall,
Thomas Prince, Samuel Phillips, Thomas Foxcroft, and Ebenezer Pemberton.
Ibid., p. ii.
30Edmund March, Fair PlayI
Or a Needful Word to
Temper the Tract Entitled A Summer-Morning Conversation
(Portsmouth* Daniel Fowle, 1758), p. l^f.
31/Charles Chauncy/, The Opinion of One that has
Perused the Summer-Mornlngs Conversation Concerning Ori
ginal Sin by the Rev, Mr. Peter Clark (Boston*
Green and
Russell, 1756)* p. 1^.
Clark, expecting a favorable re
sponse from Charles Chauncy, asked the liberal cleric to
review his work.
The result was this unfavorable letter,
printed anonymously.
H. Sheldon Smith, Changing Concep
tions of Original S i n , p. 47.
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tion of hell."32
In less than a year, the liberal view abandoned
the specific attack begun by John Taylor, and held that
the only point of controversy was the emotional issue of
infant damnation, the point least defensible from either
the scriptures or common sense.

The idea that an all

powerful God would condemn innocent, newborn babes repugned
the Puritan defender and aided the Arminians.

This issue

was only a minor point in the entire concept of original
sin, a point that had little validity for either side when
viewed in the broad perspective.

The condemnation of in

fants was in fact no different than the condemnation of
adults.

If Adam's sin tainted all mankind equally, and the

taint of that sin deserved damnation, then no separate
cases existed for infants and adults.

These liberals backed

Clark into expressing neither a Calvinist nor a liberal
view of original sin, over this one specious question, an
emotion filled one that he wanted to leave moot.
Joseph Bellamy, a disciple of Jonathan Edwards, bet
ter typified the kind of Puritan response these charges re
quired.

Bellamy challenged the validity of Webster's

placing God as the judge higher than God as the sovereign.

32chauncy, The Opinion of One that has Perused, pp.
1 6 -1 7 .
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But how do you prove, that death comes upon
It /the infant7 in this legal manner, from
God as the lawgiver and judge? Who while
acting in that capacity, ever renders to every
one according to their desserts?33
His answer to infant damnation was equally unequivocal; if
one agreed to the imputation of A d a m ’s sin, as under the
federal conception, then God had no choice but to damn .
them.

They were not innocent babes, but shared in Adam's

sin, as all the rest of mankind had.

"God may justly cast

them off forever; in case that sin deserved so great a
punishment, which you grant it d i d . H a d

Clark answered

Webster in this manner, he would have avoided his incon
sistencies, and the nature of the controversy would have
taken a different complexion.

The liberals would have had

to pursue the central issues that separated the moderate
and liberal Puritan thought on this doctrine.

The contro

versy would have retained the framework first established
by John Taylor;

was original sin a fundamental statement

of Puritan orthodoxy, scripturally what proof existed for
original sin, and what punishment did man deserve, if any,
for Adam's sin?

Clark lacked the bluntness of Bellamy,

and had allowed the controversy to become stalled upon a

33Joseph Bellamy, A Letter to the Rev. Author of
the Winter's Evening Conversation (Boston; S. Kneeland,
175&Y, P. 5.
:
“

3^-ibld.. p. 7.

minor point.35
The controversy included another round of pamphlets
by Samuel Webster and Peter Clark.

Together, The Winter's

Evening Conversation. Vindicated and A Defense of the Prin
ciples of the Summer-Mornings Conversation, illustrated the
degradation of the debate.

Clark's apparent surrender over

the point of infant damnation overshadowed the several
good, reasonable arguments that he had Introduced.

Clark

had stated that the futurity of infants belonged to God
alone, but admitted that if God did condemn infants, surely
He would not punish them as severely as those whose actions
deserved damnation.

God exempted them from "the stings and

horrors of a guilty conscience, which arise from reflection
upon men's actual sins."-^

Clark avoided the onus of de

claring that infants deserved damnation, and essentially
gave up this minor point.

Webster turned this acquiescence

into abandonment of the entire doctrine of original sin.
He insisted that there was less controversy between his
position and Clark's than between Clark and the Calvinist,-^

35joseph Bellamy had more importance in this contro
versy than the present discussion indicates.
However, be
yond this letter, his contribution belongs more properly to
Chapter V.
Infra, pp. 152-159.
3^Peter Clark, A Defense of the Principles of the
Summer-Mornings Conversation Concerning Original Sin (Bos
ton i Edes and Gill, 1760), p. 19, and p. 23.
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The more important assertions, clouded by this
false argument, dealt with the necessity of man's sinning
while under a polluted or tainted nature.3®

Webster stated

that natural necessity removed the blame of sin from man,
and placed the blame on the cause of the Imputation.

Clark

countered that the federal relationship did not make sin
ning necessary? God was not actively involved in the impu
tation.

God did not will the fall of Adam, but permitted

the violation of the covenant made between God and Adam,
so that man brought sin into the world through his own free
will.

With the fall, man lost free will and sin completely

and irrevocably tainted his nature.

Therefore, one could

not reasonably charge God as the author of sin, but merely
the permitter of sin.39
Clark, by borrowing heavily from Jonathan Edwards*
treatises on The Freedom of the Will and Original S i n ,
actually countered one of the major claims lodged by the
liberals against the Puritan scheme.

However, in the con

text of this controversy, such insight did not aid the

8
37samuel Webster, The Winter's Evening Conversation,
Vindicated (Bostoni
Edes and Gill, 1759), p. 21.
^Es s e n t i a l l y this is the same doctrine of neces
sity that the Arminians claimed that the sovereignty of God
required.
Man's actions were determined, and therefore,
man lacked responsibility for sin.
Supra. p. 8 8 .
39peter Clark, A Defense of the Principles, p. 104,
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Danvers minister.

The doctrine of original sin was no

longer the concern of the liberal clergy.

The controversy

between Peter Clark and Samuel Webster clouded rather than
clarified the issues between liberal and moderate Puritan
doctrine.

Clark's reluctance to answer the charges of

Webster straight away, led to an avoidance of the major
issues, so that this pamphlet debate was only a sideshow
in the controversy between Puritans and Arminians.

The

disputants did uncover many of the major issues initially,
and Clark's answers definitely demonstrated the trend to
wards a redefined Puritan doctrine, but they failed to
maintain the controversy on
Several authors, in

the level it

began.

defending Puritanism from the

Arminian attack upon original sin, avoided the regretable
twist that Clark’s and Webster's controversy had taken.
Joseph Bellamy was one, but more Important in this dis
cussion were Samuel Niles and Jonathan Edwards.

Both of

these authors Ignored the pamphlet warfare that was taking,
place in.New England and struck at the root of the heresy,
at John Taylor's Scrlpture-Doctrlne of Original Sin itself.
Samuel Niles wrote The True Scrlpture-Doctrlne of Original
Sin, Stated and Defended in

1757, and in

Edwards' The Great Christian Doctrine
fended was published posthumously.

of

the following year,
Original Sin,De

Because these works

avoided the peculiar twist that the other phase of the
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controversy had taken, they dealt more exactly with the
major issues of disharmony between Puritan and Arminian
principles.

Both dismissed infant damnation and agreed

that God had every right to damn infants as He damned adults,
because of pollution from Adam's sin.
In the preface to Original S i n , Jonathan Edwards
stated that he had written his defense prior to knowledge
of Mr. Niles' work, and continued publication even with the
chance of d u p l i c a t i o n . E d w a r d s had not read Niles' de
fense, so that he did not realize that concern over dupli
cation was unwarrented.

There was a great disparity be

tween the answers that Edwards and Niles presented to Tay
lor's tract,

Niles' work was scriptural and scholastic,

and had ignored the changes in eighteenth century eplstemology.

He echoed John Calvin, the Synod of Dort, and St.

Augustine in reaffirming those defenses of origina.1 sin
formulated centuries before.

Niles denied that Taylor had

opened a new argument, but merely restated the false debate
begun by Pelagius in the fifth century.

The difference be

tween Niles' and Edwards' arguments demonstrated the tran-

^®Edwards stated that Niles had confined his answer
to the first two parts of Taylor's Scrlpture-Doctrlne.
while his own was a more general defense of the entire doc
trine.
Both he felt, "may receive light from each other,
and may confirm one another? and so the common design be
better subserved." Edwards, Original S i n , p. 103,
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sition from a more traditional Calvinism to the new rea
sonable Puritanism in the period following the Great Awak
ening.

Both held similar doctrinal views, but the manner

in which they defended these views differed drastically.
Edwards could no longer reassert the fundamentalist ideas
of Calvin, but now had to reinterpret those principles ac
cording to the temper of the Enlightened Age.
The background of the two divines differed as
much as did their treatises on original sin.

Samuel Niles,

born in 1673» was seventy-three at the time he wrote the
True Scripture-Doctrine.

He was the first student to enter

Harvard College from Rhode Islands matriculating at.twentyone , he vastly exceeded the average age of entering firstyear students.

Following graduation in 1699* he spent over

ten years as a missionary in Rhode Island, before he became
minister at the South Parish in Braintree.

Soon after his

ordination on May 23, 1711, the Braintree parishioners felt
Niled' conservativism over the inclusion of singing in the
Sunday services.

Unlike most New England clerics, Niles

feared the inroads of popery by such a practice, and saw
the "hand of the Devil in the new way of singing, as they
call it,"^1

He accepted this innovation only after the de-

-■•Acceptance of Kymnody was widespread in the eigh
teenth century.
Niles, however, retained Calvin's impost
against singing proclaimed during the sixteenth century
Reformation.
Niles' position wa:s generally more stringent
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fection of twenty: members of his congregation to the Church
of England.

During the Great Awakening, his conservativism

reappeared; he was one of the most bitter opponents of
George Whitefield and the "enthusiastic exhorters.

Fol

lowing the revival, his major concern was defending ortho
doxy from the liberal wing of the Puritan Church.

In 1757

he again defended another Reformation principle, and his
conservativism was as apparent in the True Scripture-Doc
trine . as in his refusal to accept hymnody.
John Taylor, in exploding federal or covenant theo
logy* stated that there was a logical inconsistency in the
covenant of works, the covenant of grace, the Mosaic Law,
and the imputation of sin.

The covenant of works, accord

ing to Taylor, made between God and Abraham, governed the
salvation of the Jews until the death of Christ and the
ascendency of the covenant of grace.

The covenant of works

established a legal salvation, God judged man according to
his merits, but this legal salvation preceded the law which
God gave to Moses.

Taylor stated that this contradicted

reason to assume that man was under legal salvation from
Adam to Moses without the law.

He cited Romans 5«13» "For

than that common In New England at that time.
Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 4-, p. 4-88.

^2Ibld.. p.>89.

Shipton,
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until t h e :law sin was in the worldi
puted when there is no law.”^3

but sin is not im

Under the conditions estab

lished by the Old Testament and by Paul, until God gave
man the Mosaic Law there was no imputation of sin.

Thus,

Adam's sin could not be imputed because there was no law
in the world.

To Taylor, this text from Romans specific

ally denied that the doctrine of original sin was a funda
mental religious statement.
Niles' traditional answer to Taylor stated that
Adam was the federal and natural head of mankind, and as
the first man represented all his posterity in the coven
ant with God.

His failure to comply with the provisions

of that covenant resulted in his fall from grace, and the
pollution of all his natural posterity with his sin.

How

ever, Niles stated that God, in His infinite foreknowledge,
knew that Adam would fall from grace, and therefore, en
joined Christ in the covenant of grace prior to the cre
ation of the w o r l d , ^

Since the covenant God made with

man came after the creation of the world, Niles had the
covenant of grace preceding that of works.

This scheme

clearly contradicted reason? if the covenant of works came

^Edwards, Original S in, p. 315.
^ S a m u e l Niles, The True Scripture-Doctrine of Ori
ginal Sin, Stated and Defended (Boston! S. Kneeland, 1757),
pp. 24-25.
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after the covenant of grace, then the former had. no valid
ity, and was a false covenant.

God's predetermination of

Adam's fall from grace removed the first sin from man's
free will, and thus could not he imputed.

Calvinist doc

trine had allowed Adam free will prior to the fall, but
Niles' conclusions contradicted any notions of free will
at all.
Taylor had broached infant damnation in his dis
cussion of man's original nature.

He denied that man was

originally either righteous or corrupt and polluted with
Adam's sin.

Conformity to the law required the action of

a moral agent, and an Infant could not be a moral agentj
an Infant came into the world without any preconceived
notions of good and evil because these were learned con
cepts.

The Calvinist assumption that Adam was perfectly

righteous before the fall, or that his posterity were ori
ginally corrupt because of imputation, contradicted reason.
Man was born without any innate knowledge or ability, and
therefore, was originally neither good or evil.
Niles brushed aside Taylor's reasonable argument,
responding only with biblical proof.

He answered that if

^ T a y l o r indicated here his reliance upon Lockean
epistemology.
Man could not assume an original pollution,
because there was in man no innate determination of good
and evil, because they were learned qualities.
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man were destitute of original righteousness, then man
would have had no right to immediate communion with God.
But God had spoken directly to Adam, demonstrating that in
fact he was originally righteous.

Further, Niles argued

that simple observation of infants' demonstrated the pol
lution of Adam's sin and their lack of virtue.
The absence of this /conformity to the moral
law/ so evidently appearing in all children,
as soon as they are mature enough to be cap
able of religious and virtuous action, demon
strates them to be born, in a state of sin.^7
Niles' conclusions demonstrated a complete lack of under
standing of Lockean epistemology and a reliance upon tra
ditional arguments.

His treatise was of the type which,

Taylor boasted, made his work irrefutable,
Samuel Niles worked himself into a maze of contra
diction within the Calvinist scheme.

One could not refute

Taylor without reinterpreting the foundation of the prin
ciples he defended and rejecting scholastic reasoning.

Man

had new faith in human ability and responsibility, so that
the old arguments no longer were acceptable.

Reason was

the tool that man used to find God in the eighteenth cen
tury, and scripture had to conform to reason., rather than
reason to scripture.

Ibid.. p.

Niles failed to answer Taylor because

63.

^?Ibid., pp. 179-180
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his philosophy and religion were medieval, and the Puritan
order emerging in the 1750's required an enlightened de
fense .
Obviously, Niles had not read nor understood Jona
than Edwards' Freedom of the W i l l , for in that treatise,
Edwards answered many of those problems that lead Niles
into inconsistencies and illogical conclusions,

In the

Great Christian Doctrine of Original Sin, Defended, Edwards
continued the framework established in his first work .
ho

against the Arminian heresy.

He defined original sin,

not merely as Ad a m ’s sin, as Taylor took it to mean, but
as "the innate sinful depravity of the heart” vulgarly
understood to include the imputation of Adam's

sin,

Taylor's concern with original sin was a result of not
understanding imputation of sin, and looking for guilt or
or blame in an act too remote to suppose human activity,
Edwards compared the federal relationship of Adam and his
posterity to the roots and branches of a tree.

If the

^®Many of the arguments presented by John Taylor
parallelled those of Daniel Whitby and Thomas Chubb, so
that many of those conditions Taylor deemed necessary for
human nature, Edwards had already demonstrated to be false
in the Freedom of the Will, Because of the nature of ori
ginal sin, Edwards presented a much more scriptural proof,
and thereby avoided the charge of being too metaphysical.
Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 267,

^Edwards, Original Sin, p. 107.
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roots, the beginnings of the tree, are polluted and rotten,
one could not expect the branches to produce good fruit,
God in the covenant made with Adam ’’looked on his posterity
as being one with him.”5°

Thus, the pollution of man's

soul a t „birth was not frim the imputation of Adam's guilt,
but the imputation of the first sin.

The race of Adam

partook
of the sin of the first apostasy, so as that
this, in reality and propriety, shall become
their sin; by virtue of a real union between
the root and branches of the world of mankind
.,.and therefore the sin of apostasy is not
theirs, merely because God imputes it to them;
but is truly and properly theirs, and on that
ground, God imputes it to them.51
Edwards established the covenant or federal framework on both reasonable and scriptural grounds.

Niles and

Clark had relied heavily upon the proof of the federal
nature of Adam and Christ from Romans 5 * 1 9 . ^

This text

was the major pillar of federal theology, but remained in
adequate in light of human liberty and the rights of man.
Taylor had argued against the covenant theory, because of
the necessity of the pollution of moral agents,

Edwards

stated that Taylor misunderstood imputation and also the

5°Ibid.. p. 3 8 9 .
53-ibia.. pp. 407-408.
5 2 "For as by one man's disobedience many were made
sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righ
teous. "
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nature of the pollution that resulted from Adam's fall.
Taylor had charged that the doctrine of necessity had made
God the author of sin, corrupting man's nature by a divine
declaration.

In Freedom of the W i l l . Edwards had rejected

the charge that sin’s entrance into the world required
God's activity, but only His permission,-^

Taylor had

attacked a rigid determination that Edwards declared did
not exist; man was not bound to sin by a divine decree.
In this treatise on Original S i n , he expanded the nature
of man's pollution.

According to Edwards, God created man

with two sets of principlesi

a natural or carnal set which

made him a part of God's creation, and a spiritual or super
natural set which was decidely superior.5^

When man fell

from grace and communion with God, he lost the spiritual
set of principles and possessed only the carnal or natural
one s. -5-5

This accounted for the corruption of mankind;

without the superior principles to guide him to holy and
virtuous activity, man could not refrain from becoming sin-

-^Supra, pp. 93-9^.
5^Edwards was careful to point out that "natural
and supernatural" did not have the traditional scholastic
connotation.
Natural principles were not those which man
had originally, but only those which man has "only as a man,"
His use of natural and supernatural differentiated between
the carnal and spiritual sets of principles.
Edwards, Ori
ginal S i n , pp. 381-382, and Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p.

281.

^Edwards, Original Sin, p. 382.
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ful.

Further, as mankind multiplied, only these natural

principles passed to A d a m ’s posterity, as one could not
pass on something that he did not possess.
Edwards' explanation avoided the usual difficulties
attendant with covenant or federal theology.

The pollution

imputed to mankind was not guilt for sin, nor an active
exercise by God.

God could not be the author of sin, as

He never implanted any bad principles in man's nature, but
merely withdrew those that were perfect and holy.56. The
separation of natural and supernatural principles explained
man's original righteousness before the fall, and the pol
lution of sin afterwards.

God's sovereignty remained in

tact, and the Arminian charge of His authorship of sin was
demonstrated to be false.

Both Edwards and Clark described

sin as a privation of moral good and built upon God as the
permissive cause and not the effector of sin.
As Taylor had directed two-thirds of his tract to
a scriptural denial of original sin, Edwards top connected
his reasonable argument with the scriptures.

Of the

five biblical citations that Taylor had claimed referred
to Adam's sin, or the consequences of that sin, the most
important was the long passage from Homans. ^

From this,

56lbid.. p. 383.
57"Wherefore, as by one man sin entered into the
world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men,
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Taylor had extracted his scriptural argument against fed
eral theology, the imputation of sin, and described death
merely as physical death and not the wages of sin.

As

Indicated by Niles, Calvinists had difficulty with the
thirteenth verse,

"sin is not imputed when there is no law.”

Thus, according to Taylor, the death that "reigned from
Adam to Moses," was not spiritual death, but only physical
death which carried no blame for sin.

Niles had abrogated

the covenant of works in an attempt to answer Taylor, but
Edwards sought a higher patriarch than Abraham for that
covenant.

Edwards stated that this passage clearly indi

cated Paul's intention of proving that the covenant of

for that all have sinnedi
(For until the law sin was in
the w o rld j but sin is not imputed when there is no law.
Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over
them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's
transgression, who is the figure of him that was to come.
But not as the offence, so also is_ the free gift.
For if
through the offence of
onemany be dead, much more the
grace of God, and the gift by grace, which is by one man,
Jesus Christ,, hath abounded unto many. And not as it was
by one that sinned, so is the gifti
for the judgment was
by one to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offen
ces unto justification.
For if by one man's offence death
reigned by one; must more they which receive abundance of
grace and of the gift of righteousness shall reign in life
by one, Jesus Christ.)Therefore as by the
offence of one
judgment came upon all
men to condemnation; even so by the
righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto
justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience
many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall
many be made righteous.
Moreover the law entered, that the
offence might abound.
But where sin abounded, grace did
much more abound;
That as sin hath reigned unto death, even
so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life
by Jesus Christ our Lord." Romans 5• 12-2-1.
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works predated Abraham.

Man's moral state depended upon

Adam and not upon Abraham, and the law that man violated
and made him a sinner was not the Mosaic Law, but the cov
enant articles between God and Adam,

Paul showed that

"sin, guilt, and desert /sic/ of ruin, became universal in
the world, long before the law given by Moses to the Jewish
nation had any being,"58
Edwards found no obstacle in the thirteenth verse
as had other defenders of the covenant theology and ori/

ginal sin.

He demonstrated that sin belonged to man, not

because Adam's seed was spoiled, but that Adam was the
legal representative of mankind, a highly compatible idea
with the Age of Enlightenment.^

Jonathan Edwards reinter

preted the covenant relationship between Adam and his pos
terity, and opposed any notion of sinning because of a
divine imposition.

The relationship was a natural one,

conforming to a higher law than man's, and entirely reason
able .
Edwards' Original Sin avoided all. of the pitfalls
inherent in Samuel Niles' scholasticism, and demonstrated
that Puritan doctrine, regulated by reason, created a via
ble religion in the eighteenth century.

He retained the

58lbid., p. 3 3 8.
^^Miller, Jonathan Edwards, p. 277.
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Puritan doctrinal positions 6n the sovereignty of God, the
denial of free will, and the pollution of original sin.
His methodology had changed from the first treatise on free
will to the second on original sin, but then so had the
controversy.

The two treatises joined the dominant themes

in Edwards' life.

He emphasized the unity of the scrip

tures and experience in contrasting human depravity with
the divine beauty of God.

He had exploded the belief that

man sinned by necessity and demonstrated that man merely
had a tendency to sin, a tendency which gave as clear an
indication of man's depravity as if he had sinned by nec
essity.

The Arminian notion that man had a basically good

charcater because he sinned less than he performed good
works was as absurd as to declare "the state of. that ship
is good, to cross the Atlantick Ocean in, under a notion
that it will proceed and sail above water more hours than
it will be sinking."^0
Jonathan Edwards died on March 22, 1758, from an
innoculation against smallpox.

He lived long enough to

redefine Puritan principles upon a reasonable basis, but
did not determine the direction in which they would be de
veloped by his principle students, Joseph Bellamy and Samuel
Hopkins.

Edwards had not intended to posit an optimistic

^°Edwards, Original Sin, p. 129.

world view,

Man remained polluted by Adam's sin and sal

vation was "not opened to a general call.

However, Edwards’

view of God had significantly changed traditional Puritan
ism.

God's sovereignty was not diminished, but the rule

of reason tempered the disparity between God the judge and
God the sovereign.

God did not control mankind and the

world by arbitrary judgment or whimsy, but created and
governed by reason.

For the developing optimistic view,

Edwards' greatest advance was to remove man from the nec
essity of sinning.

He had tempered the doctrine of pre

destination, without destroying God's sovereignty or grant
ing man free will,

Jonathan successfully created a world

order, consonant with Puritan principles, that neither
diminished the power of God, nor resulted in the mechanical
sterility of the Deists.

The doctrinal resolutions of

Edwards provided the foundation from which Joseph Bellamy,
and other New Divinity followers of Edwards, would create
optimistic Puritanism.

CHAPTER V
THE WISDOM OF GOD IN THE PERMISSION OP S IN«

JOSEPH

BELLAMY'S OPTIMISTIC INTERPRETATION OF NEW
ENGLAND PURITANISM
With the death of Jonathan Edwards in 1758, the
leadership of the New Divinity School of theology passed
to his close friend and student, Joseph Bellamy.

Their

friendship of mind and spirit began after Bellamy gradu
ated from Yale College, and journeyed to Northampton to
read theology under Edwards in 1736.1

Shortly after his

graduation at sixteen, Bellamy experienced saving conver
sion and dedicated his life to the ministry.

Edwards re-

1Bellamy graduated from Yale College with special
honors in language and literature, and until his conver
sion, did not display any special concern for theology.
Following conversion, he read with the Reverend Mr. Samuel
Hall, pastor at Chesire, Connecticut, before travelling to
Northampton.
Bellamy's stay with Edwards coincided with
Jonathan Edwards' preparation of the Faithful Narrative of
the Surprising Works of G o d , a history of the revival in
Northampton,' 173^-1735.' Bellamy absorbed much of the
spirit of revival from Edwards and that revival.
For more
biographical detail, see Glenn Paul Anderson, "Joseph Bel
lamy (1719-1790)i
The Man and His Work," (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Boston University, 1971), and Tyron Edwards,
"Memoir," The Works of Joseph Bellamy, vol. 1 (Bostoni
The
Doctrinal Tract and Book Society , 1853), and William B.
Sprague, Annals of the American Pulpit, vol. 1 (New Yorki
Arno Press and the New York Times, 1969), PP. ^04-^14.

13^
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mained, until his death, the strongest influence upon
his theological thought.

After reading at Northampton

for about one year, Bellamy was licensed to preach by
the New Haven East Association of Ministers on May 3 1 t
1737.

The following year, in November, he accepted a

temporary call from Bethlem, Connecticut? that call be
came permanent on February 28, 17^0, and ordination fol
lowed that spring.^

Bellamy occupied the pulpit of the

Bethlem Church for the next fifty years.
In the year of his ordination, the revival swept
through the New England village of Bethlem and lasted
until the summer of 17^-1.^

The evangelical fervor, spur

red by the presence of George Whitefield, the Grand Itin
erant, in the Connecticut Valley, overtook the young
preacher.

Bellamy followed Whitefleld's example, and for

nearly two years, stumped Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey.^

Often he would

2

Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 132, and p. 181, and
Edwards., Memoir, p. viii.
3Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 193.
^Itineracy was a new phenomena in New England that .
the revival spawned, and was in turn spurred by it. Before
the Great Awakening, ministers ventured beyond their pul
pit only upon invitation from another congregation. Itin
erant preachers ignored, the contractual relationship be
tween a minister and his congregation, and preached in
fields, in the commons, as well as in churches.
Ibid.,
PP. 329-331.
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preach several times on the same day from different pul
pits.

Bellamy was a powerful preacher— his pulpit style

and ability exceeded that of Jonathan Edwards' and, ac
cording to some contemporaries, surpassed even those of
George Whitefleld's.^
Bellamy and his fellow itinerants, Benjamin Pom
eroy, Eleazar Wheelock, Jonathan Parsons, John Graham,
and Jedidiah Mills, occupied a moderate position in the
revival experience.

They separated themselves from the

enthusiastic lay exhorters, like James Davenport and
Andrew Croswell, who had stimulated the negative reaction
to the revival and to experiential religion.

Bellamy saw

these radical new lights spreading a "fanatical and cen
sorious spirit, which seemed to put in Jeopardy the best
interests of the church,"^

Their evangelizing fostered

pride, ignorance, and spiritual quackery that moved Bel
lamy to end his itineracy.?

In 1?42, he returned to his

flock Bethlem, and initiated a program for preparing
young men for the ministry.

Bellamy led his students

away from the "errors" of enthusiasm, into careful, system
atic theology by reading, conversing, and writing upon the

5lbld., p, 195.
^Bellamy, quoted in Sprague, Annals of American Pul£it, p. 405.
?Edwards, Memoir, p. xl.
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important doctrinal questions.

By this method, he empha

sized experimental and practical religion, and retained
the proper spirit of the Great Awakening.

He probably

directed more student's theological studies than any
other divine in New England at this time, and consequently
exerted his personal influence over the theology of the
succeeding generation.®
Joseph Bellamy, in his writings that followed the
Great Awakening, focused upon the radical new lights, or
"refined Antinomians,"9 that appeared during the revival.
These radicals preached a salvation by faith and depen
dence upon God's grace that Bellamy equated with the Antinomian heresy prevalent in Boston in the l630's.

Like

their predecessors, the "refined Antinomians" held a false
conception of the sacrifice that Jesus had madet

Christ

satisfied the entire obligation of the elect, so that
nothing more was required of them than their assurance of
personal salvation.

Such preaching, he argued, emphasized

a self-righteous grace that endangered true piety and ex
periential religion.

Puritan doctrine denied that man

8Ibld.. p. lvii.
^Bellamy coined the phrase "refined Antinomians" in
his attack upon the "false piety" expressed by Andrew Croswell.
See Bellamy's tract entitled A Blow at the Root of
the Refined Antlnomlanlsm of the Present Age (Boston's sT
Kneeland, 1763).
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could ever hold such assurancej rather man lived in igno
rance of his actual future state.

These new Antinomians

misrepresented the true nature of religion and the gospel
scheme of salvation.
Hence it is on the one hand that Arminian,
Neonomian, and Pelagian errors have taken
their rise and the Antinomian on the other.
Wrong notions of God lie at the bottom; and
then wrong notions of the law; and then
wrong notions of religion in generali and
all originally proceed and grow up out of
the wrong temper of men's minds.
Bellamy did not ignore the threat Latitudinarianism posed
for orthodoxy, but reacted more strongly to the radical
new lights, and the danger they presented to revivalism
and emotional religion.

11

He reflected this concern in

nearly all of the doctrinal and controversial works he
published in the two decades following the Great Awaken
ing.

Fear of this radical threat modified his essentially

Edwardsean Calvinism into a more optimistic theology,
Bellamy was not an original theologian, but pri
marily an interpreter of Edwardsean thought.

He began his

Joseph Bellamy, True Religion Delineated; or Ex
perimental Religion, as Distinguished from Formality on
the one hand, and Enthusiasm on the other, set in a scrip
tural and a Rational light (Bostont S. Kneeland, 1750),
p. 68.
^Bellamy's objections against the new light radi
cals were not unique.
Jonathan Edwards addressed the same
problem in identifying true religion in Religious Affections and True Grace, Distinguished from the Experience
S F ^ v i l s . ------------ --------- -------------------

139
study of theology under Edwards' Influence, and the
master-pupil relationship continued after Edwards' death.
Their correspondence began in January, 17^1» and illus
trated their warm friendship and Bellamy's respect and
reliance upon his former teacher.

They shared ideas,

letters, and books; each sought the other's suggestions
and approval for their major doctrinal works.*2

In 1750,

when Bellamy finished True Religion Delineated, he sent
the manuscript to Edwards for comment.

The latter re

sponded with hearty approval, and wrote a preface declar
ing the importance of this book, as false piety had ob
structed revivals in religion since the Reformation.^
True Religion Delineated, the cornerstone of
Bellamy's interpretation of the new theology, was a gen
eral defense of Puritan covenant theology,

Bellamy asked

rhetorically, what was true religion, and answered that
it was both an understanding and a conformity to the law
and to the g o s p e l . H e

divided the treatise into two

discourses to discuss essentially four issues;

the being

of God, the law of God, the ruin of man, and the salvation

12Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 27^, and Stanley T.
Williams, Six Letters From Jonathan Edwards to Joseph
Bellamy, p. 231.
■^Jonathan

Edwards, "Preface," True Religion Delin

eated , p. ii.
^Bellamy, True Religion Delineated, p. 2.
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of man.1-*

The first discourse demonstrated the reason

ableness of God and God's law, and the second demonstrated
that covenant theology conformed exactly to the gospel
and t o ’reason,

Bellamy intended this treatise to be theo

logically constructive, rather than controversial.1^

He

did, however, challenge Arminian and Antinomian errors in
understanding God's law and their failure to conform to
the gospel,
Bellamy's search of the scriptures uncovered in
Matthew 2 2 i37-39* the only law that God gave to man*
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy
heart, and with all thy soul, and with all
thy mind...and the second is like unto it,
thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.
He stated that Adam's violation of this commandment caused
mankind's fall, and Christ's completion established the
new covenant of grace,

God's law could not have changed

between the fall of mankind and Christ's atonement* the
law was as infinite and unchangeable as God Himself.

To

change the law required a change in the nature of Go d , an
idea that Bellamy held too impossible to suppose,1?
Bellamy deviated slightly from Puritan orthodoxy in his

l^Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 692.
l^Frank Hugh Foster, Genetic History of New England
Theology (New York*
Russell and Russell, 1963)1 p. 108.
1?Bellamy., True Religion Delineated, pp. 63-64.

1^1

interpretation of the being of God.

God was as absolute

and as infinite for Bellamy as for traditional Puritan
ism, but He could neither be arbitrary nor unreasonable.
God's law commanded men to love Him with all their hearts,
souls, and m i nds, but did not demand any absolute stan
dard of conformity for all men.

His law accepted the

natural variance in men's abilities, and therefore, placed
perfect obedience to that law within the abilities of all
men.l®

Bellamy here demonstrated the fundamental shift

from the scholastic view Of man to that held in the eigh
teenth century.

He witnessed the dignity of the individ

ual, with distinct abilities and differences, and adapted
God's law to this conception.
Throughout the treatise, Bellamy referred to God
as the moral governor of the world, rather than God the
sovereign or God the judge.

The term "moral governor"

moderated between these extremes} God determined and con
stituted the law absolutely, because the nature of the
law and the being of God demanded it.

Only an infinite,

all-powerful being could establish an Infinite law beyond
the limitations of the finite creature.

l®"And it is plainly the case, that all mankind,
as to their natural capabilities, are capable of a per
fect conformity to the law, from this, that when sinners
are converted they have no new natural faculties, though
they have a new temper." Ibid.. p. 99.

142
God. knows infinitely the best what to do with
what he has, that there is no motive from with
out to excite him to act, it is infinitely fit
he should be left to himself, to act according
to his own discretion,19
On the other hand, Arminians insisted that God act only
as a judge— to judge individuals according to their merits,
rather than hold their future state dependent upon an ab
solute decree.

Dr. Samuel Johnson referred to God as the

"moral governor" as well, but connoted only God's judge
ship.^®

Jonathan Edwards' sovereignty of God matched

the traditional Calvinist view, and held that God acted
according to his absolute decree.^1

Bellamy's position

stood midway between these two viewsi

God established the

law absolutely, but judged man's performance to the law
according to his individual abilities.
Bellamy reflected the traditional Puritan position
that God acted sovereignly because of His infinite abil
ity and foresight.

Yet, "moral governor" tempered this

traditional view, so that God could not act either arbi
trary or unreasonably; therefore, sin, or the violation
God's infinite law, was an infinite evil and deserved
eternal damnation.

Man sinned by refusing to love God

with all his heart, mind, and soul; this refusal was en-

19Ibld.. p. 37.
2QSupra. p. 35.

2*Supra, pp. 94-95*
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tirely voluntary and did not stem from any polluted nature
or inability of man to conform to the law.22

Damnation,

then, was not an arbitrary punishment, but one levied by
a reasonable God.

God's infinite being required that He

act absolutely, but likewise His infinite reason demanded
that He not contradict reason.
In the second discourse, Bellamy applied the rea
sonableness of God and God's law to those doctrinal ques
tions connected with covenant theology.

He maintained

the federal relationship of Adam and Christ as the physi
cal and spiritual heads of mankind, and consequently the
doctrines of original sin and salvation by faith alone.
However, he did not retain the traditional, Augustinian
imputation of sin, passing from the body of Adam to his
posterity through his polluted seed.

Man, according to

Bellamy, sinned voluntarily, following the free, sponta
neous inclinations of his heart.

Man did derive a pol

luted nature from Adam, mankind's legal representative,
but that legal guilt did not restrict m a n ’s ability to
conform to God's law.
Now it is true, we did not personally rise in
rebellion against God in that first transgres
sion, but he who did do it was our representa
tive.
We are members of the community he acted
for, and God considers us as suchj and there-

22Bellamy, True Religion Delineated, p. 106.
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fore looks upon us as being legally guilty.
Arminians and liberal Puritans denied the federal
nature of Adam as man's representative, because those that
he represented did not determine his selection.

They ar

gued that mankind could not be legally responsible for
the actions of an agent determined by an absolute decree,
without free c h o i c e . B e l l a m y countered this view,
stating that God had as much freedom and right to legally
appoint Adam the physical head of mankind as He did to
appoint Christ, or the second Adam as the spiritual head.
If God could not appoint the first, then, reasonably, He
could not appoint the s e c o n d . A g a i n ,

Bellamy emphasized

both the absolute and reasonable nature of Godj He acted
with divine authority, but His actions conformed to rea
son.

Bellamy argued the necessity of the federal relation

ship, so that Christ completed the same law that Adam had
violated.

Federal theology, then, maintained the cor

rect perspective of the nature of sin, the performance by
Christ, and the promised salvation through grace.

Both

Arminians and Antinomians lost this necessary perspective,

23Ibld.. p. 256.
2^Supra, pp. 89» 93» and p , 101, for Daniel Whitby's
and John Taylor's discussion of the necessity of man's v o 
lition in moral agency.
^Bellamy,

True Religion Delineated, p. 264.
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and therefore, did not understand either the true nature
of God, or of religion.
The first covenant between God and Adam still ex
isted after the fall and needed to be fulfilled.

God's

law was infinite and unchangeable! man's obligation to
love God was the same after Adam's fall, as after Christ's
performance as man's surety,

Bellamy stated that both

Arminians and Antinomians misunderstood the necessity of
God's great sacrifice!

the former saw the abatement of

the law and Christ's satisfaction for their imperfections,
and the latter, Christ's dying for them in particular,
resulting in their absolute election.2^

Neither heret

ical group understood the actual need for Christ's atone
ment.

His performance proved that God's law was justj

His satisfaction of the justice of the law magnified the
evil nature of sin, and made the law honorable.

Christ

did not abate the law, but established it, and disclosed
the means for sinners to turn from sin towards God.2?
In True Religion Delineated, Bellamy was particu
larly concerned over the Antinomian tendencies of the
new light radicals' view of the atonement.
ered God to be a creditor and man a debtor.

26Ibld., pp. 311-312.
2?Ibld., pp. 328-329.

They consid

146
When Christ upon the Cross said, it is fin
ished he then paid the whole debt of the elect,
and saw the book crost /closed/, whereby all
their sins were actually blotted out and for
given. 28
This Antlnomian view was without basis in the gospel, said
Bellamy.

The sacrifice of Christ did not merely open the

salvation to the elect, but opened a wide door for the
exercise and display of divine mercy.
Christ's merit lays the foundation for a gen
eral resurrection, and all that believe and
repent shall be raised up to Glory and compleat blessedness, and all that die in sin
shall be raised up to shame and compleat mis
ery, 30
At this point in the treatise, Bellamy departed signifi
cantly from Edwards and from traditional Puritanism, by
postulating a general call for the redemption of mankind.
Edwards, while not maintaining strictly the Calvinist
doctrine of predestination31, did confine redemption to
God's elect,

Bellamy, in responding to the new light

radicals, stated that the law posited by God and completed
by His son, did not reasonably exclude any man's perfor
mance should he voluntarily choose to follow Christ's ex
ample.

Christ's performance demonstrated the means to

salvation— total commitment of heart, mind and soul to
God— without restriction to any portion of mankind.

28Ibid., p. 336.

29ibld.. p. 344.

3°ibid.. p. 364.

31supra. p . 128,

147
Bellamy's general call placed salvation within the
abilities of all men and advanced the role volition played
in either salvation or damnation.

But his general redemp

tion differed substantially from the universal redemption
demanded by John Beach, Samuel Johnson, and other Arminians.

Bellamy stated that salvation was totally by grace—

Puritan saving grace, not common, universal, or general
grace given to all mankind,32

His salvation scheme still

required election, as man needed the proper temper of mind
(saving grace) to perform the only works required by God's
.lawi

faith in Jesus Christ and love for God above love

for self.
Bellamy's treatise defended traditional Puritan
doctrine, but his demands for the reasonableness of God
and of the gospel tempered the pessimism and restrictlve*ness of man's future state.

God was not an arbitrary or

vengeful tyrant, but the promulgator, through His infinite
wisdom, of the best possible world order.

Bellamy offered

a rather optimistic scheme within the confines of Puritan
doctrine, but he retained one major obstruction to the
encouragement of all m e m

the great punishment mankind

deserved for Adam's original sin.

He had denied the

actual pollution of this sin, but substituted a legal

32supra, pp, 39-40,

1^8
guilt that was no less damning for Adam*s posterity.
Man's tainted nature consisted of a temper or state of
mind that turned man from God toward sin.

Man was not

so much bathed in sin, as he was wont to sin by his own
natural inclinations.33

Preceding from corrupt motives,

man after the fall could not perform holy and righteous
acts.

Bellamy's legal guilt and Puritan actual guilt

had the same effectj without the saving experience of
God's grace, mankind could not complete God's law and
gain salvation,3^
Because of Bellamy's evangelical position, he re
tained the doctrine of original sin.

Genuine repentance

required the sinner's knowledge of the infinite evil that
sin presented to God, and that he justly deserved damna
tion and God's wrath.

Man could not understand the whole

of God's plan or the great sacrifice that Christ had
made unless he opened his heart and mind to the evil of
sin.

The saving experience was not as the Antinomians

claimed, the realization that God had saved them speci
fically, but the understanding of their enormous personal
guilt for their depravity.

The nonrepentant sinner,

when confronted with the reality of his future state,

33Bellamy, True Religion Delineated, p. 152,
3^lbld.. p. 256.

1^9

would curse and blame God wrongly for his condition.
Whereas the truly repentant sinner would humble himself
before God and praise His beauty and purity.35
God had allowed the entrance of sin into the world
for some greater purpose than simply the damnation of
part of mankind., Bellamy expanded upon this theme on
Hay 30, 17531 when he preached The Great Evil of Sin, As
Committed Against G o d , before the Consociation of Litch
field County,

He repeated the hateful nature of sin to

God; sinners broke God's law, but more importantly, they
went against the very nature of God.
All sin is forbidden by His authority; and
therefore every act of sin is considered
as an act of rebellion against the Lord,
,
and sinners have the character of rebels.3°
As in True Religion Delineated, he described sin as a
means to true evangelical repentance.

Sin, the voluntary

action of man against God, was Inimical to Him, yet it
served God's greater purposes and aided in the determin
ation of His elect.

Without sin, man could not clearly

understand the nature and beauty of God and the deprav
ity of man.

Realization of the nature of sin "immediately

affects the heart with sorrow, and humbles and abases the

35ibid.. p. ^5» and passim,
36Joseph Bellamy,
mitted Against God," The
Edwards, editor, v o l . T
and Book Society, 1853),

"The Great Evil of Sin, As Com
Works of Joseph Bellamy, Tyron
{Boston1 The Doctrinal Tract
p. ^-6 9 .
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soul before the

Lord.

"37

Only through sin did

God

reveal

to man any understanding of the divine plan.
In both the sermon and the larger treatise, Bellamy
sidestepped an important issue raised by the liberal Puri
tans.

If God hated sin, because it violated His law,

authority, and government, then why did He not merely
forbid sin?

The liberals posed this query to the ortho

dox position which, like Bellamy's, had not explained the
presence of sin in a world dominated by an all-powerful
God, unless He had willed men to sin.

Bellamy admitted

that God had the authority to forbid sin and thus insure
the salvation of all men, but he stated that the presence
of sin must better serve the divine plan.

He explained

that God's scheme, as revealed in the scriptures, pointed
to "some greater good than human happiness."38

"He judged

it best to permit the Angels to sin and man to fall, and
so let misery enter into His dominion," because the con
sequences of sin contributed to purposes unknowable to
the finite creature.39

Bellamy described only vaguely

how sin benefitted the divine plan, asserting that the
answer was beyond man's understanding.

This response was

37ibid., pp. 463-^64,
38Bellamy, True Religion Delineated, p.

passim.
39ibid. . PP. ^3-^.
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inadequate in an age celebrating human reason, and, in
light of Bellamy's demands that God act reasonably, the
mystery of God's permission of sin seemed incongruous.
Notwithstanding this mystery, Bellamy's True Reli
gion Delineated received wide acceptance throughout the
colonies, in England, and in Scotland,

Jonathan Edwards,

after giving the manuscript his explicit approval, sent
a copy to John Erskine^0 in Scotland, where it was sub
sequently reprinted.

In 1752, Samuel Davies, t h e •new

light leader in Virginia, wrote Bellamy that in his colony
the treatise was widely read and circulated.

William B.

Sprague, writing a century later, wrote:
With the single exception of Edwards' book
on the Beligious Affections, perhaps no book
in the language, on the same general subject,
has been more widely known, or more highly
and generally prized.^1
And in this century, Edwin S. Gaustad, when referring to
its circulation, called it "the Pilgrim's Progress of New
£ip
England." * An important reason for the agreement of

^°John.Erskine (1721-1801), Scottish minister at
Culross and later Edinburgh, was a correspondent of many
of the New Divinity leaders.
Bellamy and Erskine corre
sponded for over thirty-five years, frequently exchanging
books of common interest.
^ Sprague, Annals of the American Pulpit, p. 405.
^2Edwin S. Gaustad, "The Theological Effects of the
Great Awakening," Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
vol. 40 (1953-195*0, P. 697. 1
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these assessments lay In the nature of the treatise.

Like

his teacher's system of theology, Bellamy presented basi
cally a strict Calvinist interpretation.

He had, however,

tempered the absolute determinism of God's sovereignty
and man's redemption, and elevated human dignity in the
gospel scheme.

He described God as the moral governor of

the world and demanded that He act reasonably and argued
that salvation was not restricted, but open to the abil
ities of all men.

He brought an essentially pessimistic

doctrine into line with the eighteenth century.
In 1758, Bellamy defended the role of original sin
in Puritan redemptive scheme, during the controversy be
tween Samuel Webster and Peter Clark that had begun the
previous year.

His reply to Webster asserted God's sov

ereignty and man's legal guilt for Adam’s

s

i

n

.

Realiz

ing that the liberals were, avoiding the major issues of
the controversy, he published Four Sermons on the Wisdom
of God in the Permission of Sin in the same year as his
letter to Webster.

In these sermons, Bellamy explained

more completely why an omnipotent, absolute sovereign,
who hated sin, permitted man to violate His law.

First,

he answered the Arminian claims that the Puritan God
LL
fore-ordained sin
, and second, demonstrated that God's

^ Supra, pp. 115-116,
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permission of sin occasioned the greatest happiness and
virtue in the world.

In this manner, Bellamy converted

one of the most hopeless doctrines in traditional Puri
tanism into one that promised greater felicity for the
whole of mankind, than if God had absolutely forbidden
sin.
In disputing the Arminian claims against the Puri
tanGod, Bellamy

borrowed heavily from Edwards' treatise

bn the Freedom of the Will.

Bellamy, like Edwards, in

sisted that God's permission conformed perfectly to reason,
divine reason that was infinitely superior to human reason.
Man could see the wisdom of God's actions only through
hindsight..

The Bible aptly chronicled the inability of

man to decipher God's plan prior to its completion.
Genesis 50*20, Joseph answered his brothers,
you, ye thought evil against me

1

In

"But as for

but God meant it unto

good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much
people a l i v e . G o d

permitted Joseph's brothers to sell

him into slavery, an act of evil intention, for without
the commission of that sin, Joseph would not have risen
to the governorship of Egypt.

God permitted a sinful act,

^ F oster, Genetic History of New England, p. 19.
^ E d w a r d s used the same biblical passage in Freedom
of the' Will in a similar manner to describe the permission
of sin.
Supra, pp. 93-9^«
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and through that act Increasedi
the belief of the being and perfection of
God and of His government of the world} and
to give him an affecting, ravishing sense of
the holiness, wisdom, goodness, power, and
faithfulness of the God of A b r a h a m . 46
The passage from Genesis demonstrated that the permission
of sin did not lessen the great evil of sin.

The act of

Joseph's brothers was still hateful to God, but worked
greater good than if God had denied its commission.
Because God turned the sin into benefit for mankind, the
executors of sin deserved no less God's complete wrath
and damnation.

Further, human reason could not under

stand the beneficial effects of that permission until
the act was completed; God's ultimate purpose remained
hidden from the finite creature until He chose to reveal
r

it.
In True Religion Delineated, Bellamy stated that
God had some higher objective for the world than human
happiness, and that the permission of sin aided, rather
than hindered the completion of that g o a l . T h e

story

of Joseph in Genesis was only one example of the frustra
tion of human happiness for some higher purpose, not imme-

Joseph Bellamy, Four Sermons on the Wisdom of God
in the Permission of Sin (Bostont S. Kneeland, 1758), pp.
TfW.
^Bellamy, .True Religion Delineated, p. 42.
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diately knowable to man.

The first five books of Moses

demonstrated similar frustrations!

the evil committed

against the Israelites by Pharaoh, the destruction of
Pharaoh's army in the Red Sea, and the hardships of the
forty year trek to Palestine.

In each case mankind could

perceive only misery and not God's higher'intention, be
cause human reasoning was limited to those parts of the
divine plan already revealed.

Thus, man could visualize

the wisdom of the whole of God's plan only through the
nature of those revealed parts.

If they conformed to

reason and demonstrated God's divine wisdom, as in the
examples Bellamy cited, then one could conclude that the
whole must conform in the same manner.^®
God, by allowing sin, clearly displayed His power
and glory before man, and furthered man's knowledge of
the divine system.

Bellamy agreed that God could have

exposed His scheme through revelation, but knowledge ob
tained in that manner would not have had the desired ef
fect,

"Nothing could teach them like experience."^

Sin,

and its corresponding misery, disclosed explicitly the
purity and beauty of God and the baseness of mankind, and
revealed God's right to command and man's obligation to

^Bellamy, The Wisdom of God, p. 106,
^9lbid.. P. 138.
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obey.

As m a n ’s knowledge of God increased, he experi

enced an elevation of humility, holiness, and

happiness.

50

Thus, the experience of sin, while revealing m a n ’s de
pravity and desert of damnation, actually benefitted
mankind and raised the general level of happiness in the
world.

Bellamy acknowledged that to sinful man, the per

mission of sin appeared dark and gloomy rather than
glorious and beautiful.

However, man's view of God was

imperfect, and wicked men viewed only the evil and wick
edness in G o d ’s acts, not their beauty and wisdom.

They

saw only "the wanton destruction of Pharaoh rather than
the greater good in saving Israel and exposing Go d ’s
divine power. "-51

God's elect, on the other hand* gained

a clearer vision of God's perfection through the presence
of sin, than possible in a sinless world.
The apostasy of the angels and man has given
the moral governor of the universe an oppor
tunity to set all his moral perfections in
the clearest and most striking point of light;
and, as it were, to open all His heart to the
view of finite intellegence.52
Bellamy stated that one could best explain the
beneficial effects of God's permission of sin by compar
ing the relative value of good in a world containing sin,
/

5°ibld., p. 153.
^1Ibld., pp. 111-112.
52Ibld.« p. 159.
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and one without sin.

He concluded that the permission

of sin, including the damnation of a portion of mankind,
had two distinct advantages.

First, only through sin,

could man realize the power and the glory of God by
actual experience.

By suffering under God's power and

witnessing His divine justice in the treatment of sin,
man clearly obtained an understanding of God's design
and perfection.

Revelation or logic could not have pro

duced the same results as God's touching man's very
soul.33

The permission of sin, then, was the best pos

sible means for God to uncover or expose His intentions
to the world, and to bring honor and glory to Himself.
Secondly,, the damnation of part of mankind created greater
happiness among those that were saved.

The regenerate,

realizing the great difference between man's moral state
and God's, fell upon their knees and honored God for His
perfections.

Damnation expanded God's glory and concomi

tantly, human happiness and holiness.
Bellamy included a rather specious statistical
argument demonstrating the greater good resulting from
God's permission of sin.

He supposed that if the entrance

of sin damned one-third of mankind, and if by that act
the relative level of holiness and happiness in the two-

53ibid., p. 135» and p. 153.
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thirds saved increased a hundred-fold, and the misery of
the damned decreased by a like amount, then one could
readily visualize the advantage that sin created.

In a

world unstimulated by sin, the relative value of happiness
remained at a constant value of three (one degree of hap
piness per individual), while in a world stimulated by
sin, the value of those saved increased by two hundred,
and the misery of the one-third damned increased by one
hundred, plus the loss of the one degree of happiness
that the damned originally had.

Thus, in this abstraction,

the presence of sin gave mankind a clear ninety-nine de
grees improvement, even though one-third of the world
received damnation.

Stated slightly differently, a world'

containing sin held thirty-three times as much happiness
and holiness than in one not stimulated by s i n . ^
Bellamy overstepped his conclusions with this
quantitative approach,; the figures were arbitrary and he
had attempted to quantify something that he even admitted
was beyond man's complete understanding.

However, such a

demonstration Indicated the faith of the age in mathemat
ical truths.

While the demonstration smacked of counting

angels, it revealed confidence in science and mathematics
to explain those things beyond human experience.

5^ibld. . p. 18^-n.
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Bellamy's purposes, the effort did. demonstrate God's
"proposing the best ends, and choosing the best means
for their accomplishment."^
No distinction was made, in these sermons or
Bellamy's earlier treatise, between man's first sin and
all subsequent sins.

In all cases, sin was voluntary

and resulted from God's permission, or "merely not hinder
ing the activity of sin."-^

Adam's first sin was not pre

determined, any more than later sinful acts, but all
followed the free inclinations of the individual.

Bellamy's

Four Sermons on the Wisdom of God in the Permission of Sin,
complemented his earlier optimistic proposals on man's
salvation.

Bellamy's conclusions conformed to the rea

sonable philosopies of the Enlightenment, and his Wisdom
of God had a distinctly Leibnitzian flavor. ^

God pro

posed the best possible ends for the world, and chose the
best means for their accomplishment.

For Bellamy, the

permission of sin best demonstrated those means, and dis
played God's infinite justice and mercy, and stimulated
honor and worship to Him in the best of all possible man-

55ibid.. p. 1 5 4 .
56Ibid., p. 74.
=>7
-"Foster, Genetic History of New England, p. 120.
Foster believes that Bellamy had read Leibnitz before
1759, although there is no record that he had.
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ners.
Bellamy had departed significantly from his '
teacher in the sermons on the permission of sin.

Edwards

had insisted that G o d ’s last end in the creation of the
world was the glory of God and not the happiness of m a n , ^
Bellamy concluded that these ends were not
mutually exi
elusive, for the glorification of God stimulated human
happiness.

In any case, Bellamy's more optimistic scheme

provoked response from the more traditional Puritan posi
tion.

Samuel Moody published anonymously An Attempt to

Point out the Fatal and Pernicious Consequences of the
Rev. Mr. Joseph Bellamy's Doctrines in 1759.*^

Moody

charged that Bellamy was "being overly curious and posi
tive in doctrines and dispensations obtuse and mysteri
ous."^0

He, like most earlier Puritans, was content to

allow God alone understanding of some parts of His divine
plan.

Moody was more willing to accept Armlnian free will

5 % a r o u t a n i a n , Piety Versus Morallsm, p. 34,
^^Samuel Moody (1726-1795)» the first master of the
Dummer Academy, received his B.A. from Harvard in 1746 and
M.A. three years later.
Moody entered the ministry, but
by 1759, had found that vocation unsuitable.
On February
27, 1763, he became the master of the Dummer "Free Grammar
School." Shipton, Sibley's Harvard Graduates, vol. 12, pp.
48-50.
^°Samuel Moody, An Attempt to Point out the Fatal
and Pernicious Consequences of the Reverend Mr. Joseph .
Bellamy's Doctrines- (Boston, 1759), p. 6 .
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than Bellamy's permission!
I conceive, w i t h safety and c ertainty that
all we can a f f i r m w i t h r e g a r d to sin, is,
that it is in the w o r l d ; — that God is h o l y ; —
hates s i n — cannot be the author of it; and
therefore the creature must.
And is this
not enough?6l
Bellamy's scheme,
to good;

to Moody,

ove r b a l a n c e d sin in r e l a t i o n

one might assume that the earth,

complete wit h

sin,was more h oly and h a p p i e r t h a n h e a v e n w i t h o u t it.
Also,

one could likewise assume,

fro m Bellamy's sermons,

that sinners a d v a n c e d the glory of God and gen e r a l good
in the w o r l d to a gre a t e r degree than did the mos t eminent
saints,

"Is the greater the m o r a l evil, the gre a t e r the

moral good?"^2

Thus Bellamy had placed God in a more u n 

f avorable light, than he h a d Satan,

Moody a r gued that if

God a l l o w e d sin because it advan c e d His glory and u n i v e r 
sal good,

then He mus t n e c e s s a r i l y w i l l and choose sin

to enter into the world.
ov evil,

And, further, Satan,

the auth o r

became the p rimary instrument for a d v a n c i n g God's

honor and p e r f e c t i o n . ^
Moody had m i s r e p r e s e n t e d B ellamy's sermons, had
twist e d B e l l a m y ’s points to serve his own ends,

and had

m i s u n d e r s t o o d the whole argument for permission of sin.

61Ibid.. p. 8n.
63ibid.. pp. 16-17,

62Ibld., p. 18.
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Bellamy had not a r gued that the e a r t h was h o l l e r than
heaven, hut that the presence of sin increased the glory
of God In a m a n n e r not possible w i t h o u t it.

Secondly,

sinners had not a d v anced the glory of G o d , but the s a i n t s ,
in v i e w i n g God's perfection,

praised God and w o r s h i p Him.

The a c t i o n of the saints was occasioned by the presence
of sin.

Further, Moody had m i s u n d e r s t o o d permission,

and

insisted that God's permission r e q u i r e d His activity.
He ar gued that Bellamy's scheme made God the a u t h o r of.
sin, and by a t t e m p t i n g to explain things b e yond human
reason,

blasphemed God.

Better that m a n a c c e p t e d sin as

a result of the free w i l l of man, than to create a n odious
God as Bellamy had d o n e . ^
4
Bellamy a n s w e r e d M o o d y ’s At t e m p t the following
year, c o n c e n t r a t i n g on the nature of God's permission.
Moody had claimed that Bellamy created a false v i e w of the
nature of sini

sin was a benefit and not the great evil

committed against God.
part of God's scheme,

Moody a r g u e d that sin was not a
but only a device of the devil,

Bellamy answered that if God had not perm i t t e d the entrance
of sin into the world,

then the devil caused m a n to sin

over the objections of God.

Moody's reluctance to allow

the p e r m ission of sin di s h o n o r e d God to a g r e a t e r degree

6^Shipton, S1bley*s Harvard Graduates. vol. 12, p.

49.
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than did permission,

Bellamy declared that the question

between them was not who sinned, God or man, but why did
the ’’holy and infinitely wise creator and governor of
the world permit the creature to sin, when he could have
easily .hindered it / ? y 66

j-f one admitted that sin was

in the world, then one must explain its entrance over
the divine will.

Permission was the only reasonable means

that sin could gain entrance,

Bellamy turned to Genesis

50*20, and stated that if God in this one Instance per
mitted sin for wise and holy ends, then "it is at least
possible, that He may have done so in all instances."^?
Bellamy's Four Sermons on the Wisdom of God also
evoked the publication of a tract by Samuel Hopkins, an
other student and associate of Jonathan E d w a r d s . ^8

Hopkins

agreed with Bellamy that the permission of sin was the
occasion of great good.He claimed that every

sin that

had taken place in the world had been overruled by God
in order to answer some

good end.

nature such a thing, as

thatit cannot be improved by in-

66Ibld.. p. 6 8 .

"Sin is not in its own

6?Ibld.. p. 5 1 .

68
°Samuel Hopkins, a major leader in the New Divin
ity School, was at least as important as Bellamy in the
modification of Edwardsean thought. Hopkins has not re
ceived the same attention and detail here as Bellamy, pri
marily because the majority of. Hopkins’ controversial and
doctrinal work lay outside the time period of this inves
tigation.
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finite wisdom to bring about some good."^9

Man could not

just assume that God acted in this manner, but must de
clare that in every instance, He acted precisely in this
manner,

"This is the way Christ bruises the serpent's

head, viz. by bringing good out of evil,"?®
Hopkins' Sin, Through Divine Interposition consis
ted of three sermons.

In the first, he drew from the

background established by Bellamy and Edwardsi

God per

mitted the occurance of sin in the world in order to
create greater good.

Hopkins' emphasis changed slightly

from Bellamy's 5 God was more authoritarian, and actively
drew good out of evil acts.

Bellamy inferred that the

benefit from sin required no active participation by God,
and thus, did not deprive the sinner's freedom and liberty.
Hopkins' God was not as passive and interferred with the
results of sin after its commission.

In the last two

sermons, he tempered the advantage gained from the per
mission of sin.

He warned against encouraging sin for the

^ S a m u e l Hopkins, Sin, Through Divine Interposition,
An Advantage to the Universe, and yet this is no Excuse for
Sin, or Encouragement to it". Illustrated and Proved (Boston; 1758), p. 8 ,
?°This referred to Genesis 3?15.
Man's original
sin, inspired by Satan (the serpent) was turned to good by
God; man fell, but by that fall, opened the way for Christ's
redemption.
Ibid., p. 14,

71Bellamy, Wisdom of God, p. 74.
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greater good, that would follow.

The nature of sin was

exceedingly criminal and dishonorable to God, so that
even though it brought about good ends, the evil of sin
had not diminished.
..Those instances of sin which have been the
occasion of the greatest good, were at the
same time very offensive and provoking to
God, and brought his awful judgment on
those who were guilty of it.73
Hopkins agreed that God's divine plan was optimistic, but
insisted that man did not share in the benefits of God's
optimism.
man.

The greater good reflected to God and not to

Bellamy's interpretation of the divine scheme was

more mechanical and guided by a reasonable God, while
Hopkins' maintained a more traditional conception of God's
sovereignty.
Bellamy re-interpreted Edwardsean thought to pre
serve the balance between religion of the heart, and reli
gion of the mind.

When he left itineracy in 1742, he

perceived the greatest threat to experiential religion
arising from the radical new lights and their "refined
Antinomian" doctrines.

For the next two decades, he con

sistently reacted to that threat.

True Religion Delin

eated . undoubtably the most important of his writings,

72nopkins, Sin Through Divine Interposition, pp.

■30-31.
73ibid., p. 2 6 .
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sought to describe the balance between formalism (Arminianism) and enthusiasm (Antinomianism).

More than any

other new light leader, Bellamy sensed his median posi
tion, and as a result, modified Edwardsean theology into
a more optimistic promise for mankind.
By 1 7 6 0 , Bellamy had limited God*s' sovereignty,
so that He could not act unreasonably, posited a general
call for redemption, placed salvation within the reach
of all men, and described the effects of original sin as
a benefit and means to true piety.

This optimistic

scheme was an outgrowth, and not a rejection of traditional
Puritan principles.

He had maintained the fundamental

doctrines of the Reformation, but had adapted them so that
they were consonant with the dignity of man in this rea
sonable age.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The Great Awakening in New England attempted to
end the depersonalization of religion that had occurred
in the previous half-century»

As a reform movement* the

Awakening sought the piety and spirituality of the Puri
tan founders outside the institutional framework of the
church.

The reform was individual, operating on the

heart of the sinner, revealing his natural depravity, and
turning him toward the beauty and purity of God.

This

renewal, accepted initially as an outpouring of the spirit
of God, received relatively little criticism for nearly
two years, 1739 to 17^1 * before reform conflicted with
the institution of the church over questions of itineracy
and enthusiasm.

Opposing views developed, created schism

within the Puritan Church, and introduced a new phase of
reform, the embodiment of the spirit of renewal into the
doctrine and practice of the church.

In the institutional

phase of reform, three clearly discernible doctrinal
groupings appeared.

The moderate, or centrist position

occupied by Dickinson, Edwards, and Bellamy, endeavored to
167
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preserve both the spirit of the revival and traditional
Puritan doctrine.

They conflicted with both, the liberal

wing of the church and with the radical new lights, in
seeking the tenuous balance between religion of the
heart and religion of the mind.
The motivation of Jonathan Dickinson was precisely
the same as that of Edwards and Bellamy.

All three Puri

tan divines had a deep personal involvement, in the revi
val experience, and felt that their antagonists threat
ened not only that single revival, but the entire Protes
tant Reformation.

Dickinson especially attacked the

Anglican Arminians as apostates to popery.

Their denial

of the sovereignty of God, of the doctrines of justifica
tion by faith alone, and the pollution of original sin,
rejected the essential dogma of the Protestant Reformation,
Dickinson defended these doctrinal positions in the lan
guage of that Reformation, without regard to the differ
ence in epistemology between Arminianism and traditional
Puritanism.

The logical systems were not at stake, but

instead, the very principles of the Reformation.

Further,

Dickinson did not address his arguments to New England
Congregationalists or Presbyterians, but to Anglicans—
Anglicans who admitted their Arminianism.

That he ignored

the reasonableness of their arguments was understandable,
for he felt the unified support of New England Puritanism
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sustaining him.
Between Dickinson's death in 17^7 an d 1Jonathan
Edwards' publication of Freedom of the Will in 175^ and
Original Sin in 31758* one could no longer presume unified
support for traditional Puritan dogma.

Many opposers of

the revival now moved into open heterodoxy, supporting
mild forms of Arminianism, Arianism, or Universalism.
They borrowed from the polemical assertions of the Eng
lish divines, Daniel Whitby and John Taylor, against Cal
vinism, and overbalancing religion of the mind.

The tra

ditional Puritan response to these heresies no longer
sufficed; Lockean reasoning and Newtonian science had
replaced older scholastic conceptions, so that religious
questions, formerly withheld from human understanding,
could not now reasonably remain hidden,

Puritanism after

1750 could not merely re-affirm the five articles of the
Synod of Dort, but had to conform to the mood demanded by
the eighteenth century.
Jonathan Edwards answered these needs of New Eng
land Puritanism,

Sydney E. Ahlstrom called him a "Dortian

philosophe," because he fused the seminal ideas of the En
lightenment with the major principles of the Reformed
Church.1

He defended the sovereignty of God and man's

1Sydney E. Ahlstrom,

"Theology in America 1 A Histor

'
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pollution from original sin and demonstrated that the
Arminian scheme contradicted reasonable Lockean thought.
Edwards did not attempt to posit an optimistic religious
view in these treatises, but to re-establish traditional
Puritan doctrine upon a modern basis.

He directed his

polemical attacks upon those English Arminians who favored
an intellectualized religion, divorced from emotion.
With Edwards, ho contradiction arose between emotional
and reasonable religion, for without touching the heart,
religion lost its essential pietical spirit, and led to
a sterile faith.

Within Edwards' scheme, a unity existed

between Enlightened thought and his redefined Calvinism,'
a unity that strengthened the revival experience.
The New Divinity theologians, especially Joseph
Bellamy, were not able to maintain the balance that
their teacher had established.

Edwards was involved

primarily with the liberal or Arminian attack upon the
centrist position.

Even his treatise on Religious Af

fections resulted from his controversy during the Great
Awakening with Charles Chauncy, the liberal.

Bellamy

in True Religion Delineated, a treatise on the same sub
ject which drew heavily from Edwards' work, reacted more

leal Survey," The Shaping of American Religion, edited by
James Ward Smith and A. Leland Jameson (Princetoni
Prin
ceton University Press, 1961), pp. 2^5-2^6.
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strongly to the danger presented to orthodoxy by the
radical new lights than by the Arminians,
vival experience explained this fear.

His unique re

More than either

Edwards or Dickinson, Bellamy reacted negatively to the
excesses of the revival and left Itineracy because of the
diffusion of false religion.

These radicals overbalanced

religion of the heart; salvation required only that man
knew, from the emotional experience of conversion, that
he was of the elect.

Sanctification played no part in

their "refined Antinomianism."
The impulse causing Bellamy to modify Edwardsean
theology came from this threat that he perceived from
the radical new lights.

In 1750 in True Religion Delin

eated. Bellamy described a general redemption, available
to all men, in order to emphasize the importance of san
ctification in the salvation scheme rather than justifi
cation.

The radicals had argued that Christ's atonement

paid the elect's whole debt for Adam's and man's sins,
and required no further duties.

Bellamy argued that

justification gave man only a new temper, so that he
could turn from sin to God.

Sanctification, the actual

use of that new temper in the process of purification,
was completed only in heaven.

He tempered this call for

a general atonement, stopping short of Arminianism, by
Insisting that the change in man's disposition required
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the particular workings of saving grace, not common or
universal grace.

However, even by qualifying the compass

of Christ's atonement, he offered a significant changei
This affirmation of a general atonement
meant that the elect now were seen as those
who chose God, and not those chosen by God
in the sense that some were to be saved
while others were to be damned.?
In this same treatise, Bellamy stated that God had
some greater purpose in sin, than merely the damnation of
some of mankind.

Eight years later in The Wisdom of God

in the Permission of S i n , he again modified Edwards to
explicate that greater good.

Sin was advantageous for

the whole divine scheme, and benefited man more than if
God had forbidden the entrance of sin into the world.
Sin was the best possible means for demonstrating God's
glory and uncovering His grand design.

Bellamy's mediation

o-f Edwards' Calvinism moved away from those Dortian prin
ciples that Edwards had preserved.

Specifically, he. had

modified man's total depravity and the limited nature of
atonement outlined by the Synod of Dort in 1618.^
Bellamy's optimistic interpretation of man's first

?Anderson, Joseph Bellamy, p. 88 7 .
-^Ahlstrom, Theology in America, p. 2k6.
The five
points included, besides total depravity and limited atone
ment, unconditional election, irresistible grace, and the
perseverance of the saints.
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sin d i f fered substa n t i a l l y fro m that of S a m u e l Hopkins',
espec i a l l y w i t h regard to the sovereignty of God.
Bellamy reacted more

Again,

strongly to the o p p o s i t i o n f r o m the

radical new lights, and softened God's s o v e r e i g n t y in
order to increase man's role in damn a t i o n as he had in
salvation.

He e x p a n d e d J o n a t h a n Edwards'

statements on

God's p e r m ission of sin; man's free acts b rought sin into
the world, u n h i n d e r e d by God's agency.
other hand, was more the

Hopkins,

on the

"consistent Cal v i n i s t , " ^ and

pushed the absolute nature of God almost to the point of
m a k i n g God the. a u t h o r of man's sins.

C o n s e q u e n t l y , Hopkins

did not describe the same benefit of sin to m a n k i n d that
Bellamy did;

God alone b e n e f i t t e d from the presence of

evil in His divine plan.
Bellamy,

in d e f e n d i n g the spirit of revivalism,

observed critics at b o t h extremes of his m o d erate position.
His ends were the same as Edwards' and Dickinson's, but
his r e c o g n i t i o n of the d a n g e r fro m "refined A n t i n o m i a n i s m"
led him to reject m u c h of the negative or pessimistic,
d o g m a w i t h i n the Pu r i t a n creed.

He d i d not confine his

conce r n only to this rad i c a l position.

In the years that

follow e d the p u b l i c a t i o n of The W i s d o m of God

(1760 to

1763), he became involved w i t h Moses Mather, past o r of

^Ibld.. p. 256.

1?^
the church in Middlesex, over the nature of the covenant.
Bellamy, like Edwards, sought to remove those obstructions
to true piety and experimental religion, the Half-Way
Covenant and Stoddardlsm.

Both denigrated the sacraments

of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, by opening their cele
bration to the unconverted.

In this controversy, Bellamy's

opponent was one of the old light opposers to revivalism.
At the same time, he was also engaged in controversy
with Andrew Croswell, a new light radical, over the nature
and glory of Jesus Christ.

Although these controversies

led in different directions, Bellamy's goal was constanti
to defend revivalsism and the true understanding of the
gospel and the promises of God.

Because he was truly in

the middle, his Edwardseanism received greater modifica
tion than that of other New Divinity theologians.
The impact of Bellamy's scheme of theology is more
difficult to assess than to describe.

His system of

training students in theology, and the institution of the
first "Sunday School" at Bethlem, must have given wide
reception to his dogmatic religious views.

He personally

had trained at least sixty ministers, and when Hopkins,
Nathaniel Emmons and Jonathan Edwards, J r . 5 are also con-

^Jonathan Edwards, Jr. was trained by Joseph Bel
lamy at Bethlem, whereas Nathaniel Emmons had not trained
under Edwards or his students; he was nonetheless a thor-

175
sidered, the number of clerics trained by these four New
Divinity leaders exceeded one hundred-fifty,.®

Edmund S,

Morgan stated "the New Divinity had a consistency and
vigor that young intellectuals found challenging," and
as a result by 1792 they had claimed one-half the pulpits
in Connecticut, and an increasing number throughout New
England.?

The expansion of the. New'Divinity in Connect

icut undoubtably reflected the personal influence of.
Joseph Bellamy,

"the Pope of Litchfield County,"®

Although the number of clerics converted by Bellamy
and others was large, Morgan argued that their success was
not matched among the populace at large.

"Their sermons

became complex, abstruse, metaphysical /and7 devoted to
details of theology that the layman found incomprehensi
ble."^

Their theology required a subtle mind and a deep

religious motivation, so that they addressed their "fear-

ough-going Edwardsean.
Hopkins and Bellamy were the more
important New Divinity leaders, immediately after Edwards'
death, but shared that leadership towards the end of the
century.
£
Ahlstrom, T h e o l o g y in A m e r i c a , p. 255.
?Edmund S. Morgan, "The American Revolution Consid
ered as an Intellectual Movement," Paths of American
Thought, edited by A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Morton
White (Bostoni Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), p. 19.

8Ibid.. p. 18.

9Ibld., p. 20.
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less, intransigent, ridiculous brand of Calvinism” to
other bright young clerics, rather than to their congregations.

10

The alienation of the New Divinity minister

from his congregation did not modify his doctrine; he
was unwilling to appease the unconverted, in order to
increase the size of his congregation.11
Morgan declared that this alienation explained the
shift from the dominance of New England society by the
clergy in 17^0, to control by statesmen in 1790.

His

assessment has more validity than that offered by Alan
Heimert, who argued that no such shift occurred.

The

later described an unusual development on the American
Revolutionary mind in the late 1750's, emanating from
Bellamy's sermons on The Wisdom of God in the Permission
of Sin and The Millenium.

Heimert indicated that Bellamy's

call for the enlistment of all men as volunteers in the
church militant against the Antichrist aroused the revolu
tionary fervor of the 1770's.12

10Edmund S. Morgan, The Gentile Puritan, A Life of
Ezra Stiles. 1727-1795 (New Haveni
Yale University Press,
1966), p. 314.
I1Ibid.. p. 31^.
•^Alan Heimert, Religion and the American Mind
(Cambridge j Harvard University Press, 1966).
Heimert dis
cussed the relationship between the church militant and
the revolution, pp. 339-350.
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What had begun was the long process, to be
completed neither in the Revolution nor even
in 1800, of making men's wills the ultimate
guarantor of the collective happiness and
the general weIfare.13
Heimert overplayed the influence of religion on secular
political science.

The Enlightenment, an essentially

secular intellectual movement, did not arise out of a
change in New England theology, but rather stimulated the
religious change that occurred in the 1750's and 1760's,
The Wisdom of God had a more restricted appeal
than True Religion Delineated, as the former was "complex,
abstruse, and metaphysical."

No solid indication exists

that its influence extended beyond the 1760"s and, the
controversy that had stimulated it.

However, that was

not the case with True Religion Delineated.

In that

treatise, Bellamy defended revivalism in extremely simple
terms (merely man's love to God), and in a manner that
was widely read and studied.

Timothy Dwight, the New

Divinity president of Yale College who succeeded Ezra
Stiles in 1795* stated that during the Second Great Awak
ening of 1802, Bellamy's treatise accelerated the spirit
1If.
of revival that swept through Yale.
His most important

13ibid.. p. 350.
l^Tyron Edwards, Memoir of Joseph Bellamy, p. lxi.
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and longest lasting effect was defending revivalism and
mediating Edwardsean theology to conform to the optimis
tic demands of the eighteenth century.
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